The term “double standard” has a negative connotation. We criticize people by saying that they have, or use, a double standard in their dealings with others. What exactly does this mean, and why is it bad?
Justice, as Aristotle observed more than two millennia ago, requires two things: first, that likes be treated alike; and second, that unlikes be treated differently (in proportion to their differences). Not just any similarities or differences matter—only those that are relevant to the treatment in question. For example, unless one of my twins has done something to warrant differential treatment, such as failing to do assigned chores, I should treat them the same. It is not necessarily an injustice to have different bedtimes, chores, or privileges for children of different ages, since their needs, interests, abilities, and actions may differ. Every parent knows this—or very quickly learns it. Sometimes equal consideration requires equal treatment. Sometimes, because of relevant differences between those being treated, it requires differential treatment.
When we say that someone has a double standard, we’re saying that he or she treats people differently even though, or even when, there is no relevant difference between them. If Jones judges blacks by one standard and whites by another, Jones has a racial double standard, for in most contexts (not all!) race is irrelevant. If Smith judges women by one standard and men by another, Smith has a sexual double standard, for in many or most contexts (not all!) sex is irrelevant. The proper response to a charge of having (or using) a double standard is showing that there is, in fact, a relevant difference between the individuals being differently treated. If there is a relevant difference, then it would be wrong not to use a double standard.
Not all differences are relevant, obviously. If I give good grades to students whose names begin with the letter “A,” and poor grades to the rest of the students, I would be hard pressed to justify my differential treatment, since the letter with which one’s name begins is irrelevant to the grade one deserves. The same would be true if I assigned grades on the basis of need, desire, friendliness, or attractiveness. If I give good grades to students who score 90 or higher on the exam, and lesser grades to the rest, I could easily justify my differential treatment, since one’s score on an exam—assuming it’s a fair test of the material—is relevant to the grade one deserves.
The double standard is a kind of injustice. But it’s not the only kind. It’s also unjust to use a single standard for individuals who differ in relevant ways. This is the argument I’ve been making with respect to homosexual “marriage.” Allowing homosexuals to “marry” is unjust, since there are relevant differences between homosexual couples and heterosexual couples. Not everyone thinks of this as an injustice, to be sure, perhaps because nobody appears to be harmed by expanding the definition of “marriage.” But harms don’t have to be obvious to be real. Some harms, such as the harm done by pornography or violent films, are diffuse and subtle. In fact—though I will not argue the point here—many people would be harmed by allowing homosexuals to “marry”; we just don’t see the harms (or, for that matter, the harmed). What we see are the people who benefit from the change. We think that if some people benefit and nobody is harmed, there cannot be injustice. This is blindness. Whether it is willful blindness I leave for you to decide.
Have you heard about Debra LaFave, the teacher who, at the age of 23, had sex with one of her 14-year-old male students? Many people think she got off too easily, and that, had the sexes of the parties been reversed, the punishment would have been more severe. They say that there’s a sexual double standard in the criminal-justice system. It supposedly treats males and females differently even when there is no relevant difference between them. Women get off easily; men are severely punished—for the same act. Many people, such as Bill O’Reilly, think that the punishment should be the same. In other words, there should be a single standard for both sexes.
The problem with this reasoning is that there’s a relevant difference between the cases. That people don’t see the difference astonishes me. The difference is that a 14-year-old girl can be impregnated. A 14-year-old boy cannot. Even if everything else in the cases is held constant, such as (1) the trauma to the victim (I suspect that girls are traumatized much more than boys in such cases) and (2) the motives of the perpetrator, there would be this difference.
Why is that a relevant difference, you ask? Because society has an interest in protecting children. This interest includes ensuring that every child is born to, and raised by, two loving, competent, stable, mature parents. No 14-year-old falls into this category. A child born to a 14-year-old has nothing but trouble ahead of him or her. One way for society to prevent such births is to mete out severe punishment to men who have sex with underage girls. The punishment can be justified not only on retributive grounds, since the amount of harm done differs, but on grounds of deterrence. Greater punishment has a greater deterrent effect. I’m not saying that there should be no punishment for the likes of LaFave. I’m saying that the relevant difference between males and females justifies a difference in punishment.
As I said, this all seems obvious to me, and yet, I have not heard anyone in the popular press note the relevant difference I described. What I have heard are charges of unfairness, injustice, and outrageousness that females such as LaFave are punished less severely than their male cohorts. The failure to see the relevant difference is, I think, the fruit of years of feminist propaganda. Feminists have been saying ad nauseam that there are no differences, other than grossly physiological ones, between men and women. Males and females are said to be psychologically—cognitively, conatively, and affectively—interchangeable. If they differ at all, it is because society has socialized them differently; and surely the law should not enforce, endorse, or legitimize this “unjust” socialization. The constant repetition of the “men and women are the same” meme corrupts our thinking to the point where, unless we make a conscious effort, we can’t see the obvious. In effect, we have been brainwashed.
It might be replied that a person would have to be an idiot not to notice that only females can be impregnated. How can feminists be blamed for idiocy of this sort? But this ignores the intellectual and social climate in which we live. Feminists have succeeded in stifling any discussion of sex differences, even (especially!) on college campuses. Look at what happened to Harvard president Lawrence Summers, who merely entertained the possibility that there are innate sex differences. To say or imply that there are differences between the sexes, much less that the law should incorporate, reflect, or emphasize those differences, is to risk being called sexist (or worse). Many people might reasonably conclude, in the face of such threats, that denying all sex differences, and insisting on a single standard at all times, in and out of the law, is the prudent course. This is not just intellectually dishonest; it is craven.