AnalPhilosopher

My academic department—Philosophy and Humanities—recently added a course to its curriculum: Social and Political Philosophy. Most universities have such a course, but UTA never did (at least since I've been here). I've enjoyed teaching it this fall and look forward to teaching it again in two years. My upper-level rotation consists of Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Law, Social and Political Philosophy, and Seminar in Research Methods and Philosophical Writing. I used to teach Biomedical Ethics on a regular basis, but now it's being taught by Miriam Byrd. My lower-level courses are Logic, which I teach every fall, and Ethics, which I teach every spring. When I realize that I get paid to discuss all of these topics, which I love, I have to pinch myself. What a wonderful life! Here, in case you're wondering what sorts of things we discussed in Social and Political Philosophy, are the study questions for the final examination. There are 21 students enrolled in the course.

Sophie is 13 years old today. We've been together since she was two months old. The main difference between having a child and taking a puppy into one's home is that you don't expect to see your child die. To Sophie, I've barely aged. I was 35 years old when she came to live with me and I'm 48 now. I don't think I look or act any different now than I did 13 years ago. But Sophie has gone through every stage of doghood during our time together. She's been a rambunctious puppy, a vigorous adolescent, a mature dog, and now a slow-moving old girl. She sleeps a lot. She stopped going on walks with Shelbie and me several months ago, probably because it was too painful. But she's still mentally alert; she has a good appetite; and every now and then she and Shelbie play like puppies. Here is Sophie in late August, shortly after I shaved her (click to enlarge):

I cherish every day we have together.

To the Editor:

"Kids Gone Wild" correctly describes a systemic problem in our culture's social and educational fabric. But what is missing from the discussion of why children are ill mannered and have little respect for adult authority is the fact that children spend as much as five hours a day on average watching television.

Both regular shows and advertisements are replete with rude and antisocial children.

One advertisement, portraying a substitute teacher overcome by an out-of-control class, teaches children that being out of control is expected and acceptable.

Seen often enough, these behaviors become natural and appropriate to imitate. If the children are wild now, how will they behave as adults?

We have long been concerned about the effect of television on attitudes toward sex. We should be just as concerned about other pathological content that our children are seeing.

Switching off the TV is too radical for most people. But we should at least ban advertising to children under age 12, as some Scandinavian countries have done. This is a constructive solution that would help ameliorate the problem.

Annamarie Pluhar
Executive Director
The Television Project
Brattleboro, Vt., Nov. 29, 2005

Here.

What would we do without the nutty Left? Life sure would be boring.

Monkey, n. An arboreal animal which makes itself at home in genealogical trees.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Bias is effective only if, and only to the extent that, it is undetected. If you tell me that you're a liberal, for example, or that you oppose the war in Iraq, I will pay close attention to what you say. I won't dismiss it out of hand, but I'll be alert for signs of distortion, falsehood, and exaggeration in your factual claims. One way to hide one's bias is to use loaded terms. Read this news report from today's New York Times. Do you see the expression "extricating American forces [from Iraq]"? How does extrication differ, if at all, from withdrawal or redeployment? To extricate is to "free or disentangle from a constraint or difficulty" (The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide, 1999). To withdraw is to "remove or take away" (ibid.). The meaning differs, doesn't it? Saying that the president plans to extricate troops from Iraq implies that they are stuck there, or that they are having difficulties there. Saying that the president plans to withdraw or redeploy troops has no such implication. "Withdraw" is neutral. "Redeploy" is neutral. "Extricate" is loaded. Which term should appear in a news report? By the way, other people have pointed out that the mainstream media are stuck on Vietnam. The metaphor of a quagmire—with or without the word "quagmire"—is used repeatedly. A quagmire is a kind of difficulty from which one must be extricated. See the connection? The Times is trying to hoodwink its readers into viewing the war in Iraq as a quagmire. It wants its readers to think the war is a failure and to blame the Bush administration for prosecuting it. It's one thing to say such a thing on the editorial page; it's quite another to say or imply such a thing in a news report.

If there was a single, overarching theme to Nisbet's teaching, it was his steadfast evenhandedness and sense of balance: whatever his own views on a subject, all sides or positions were noted, and received fair-minded exposition. For instance, the lectures on Rousseau and Marx, whose political views were plainly anathematic to Nisbet, abounded with examples of their keen insights into society and the human condition generally. The extent to which Nisbet paid everyone his due was truly extraordinary. This intellectual habit flowed naturally from his personal civility.

(Robert G. Perrin, “Robert Alexander Nisbet,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 143 [December 1999]: 695-710, at 708 [italics in original])

How many of you like to travel? How many of those of you who like to travel have the time for it? How many of those of you who like to travel and have the time for it have the money for it?

Travel, as I pointed out in this blog some time back, requires three things: desire, time, and money. The irony of my life is that I’ve always had two of these things but never three. From the time I started working until about ten years ago, I had a desire to travel—to “see the world.” Two places in particular I wanted to visit are Scotland and Australia. The problem is that I lacked either time or money. When I was in college, law school, and graduate school, my work kept me too busy to travel. (Unlike some of my fellow students, I was unwilling to “blow classes off” for something as frivolous as having fun. I turned down many invitations to go to Florida for spring break, for example.) I often had money during the school year, since I lived on student loans, scholarships, awards, gifts, and the income from part-time jobs.

During the summer, between semesters, I still wanted to travel, and I had time in which to do it, but I lacked money. If I worked during the summer, as I often did, I lacked both time and money. I didn’t despair, however, for I knew that one day I would have both time and money. I was right. About seven years ago, I repaid my student loans (it took 10 years) and got out from under my credit-card debt. I now have plenty of money. I also have plenty of time. Every summer, I’m off for 14 or 15 weeks. Every winter, between mid-December and mid-January, I’m off for five weeks. I even have four-day weekends during the fall and spring semesters, since I teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

You guessed it. I no longer desire to travel. I love nothing more than staying home with my girls, reading, writing, running, riding, and tinkering. I haven’t seen my blessed mother—or two of my three brothers—in almost 12 years. The last time I left Texas was in 1997, when I attended a philosophical conference in Berkeley, California. I’m glad I traveled a lot in my youth. I’ve been to most of the states and to two foreign countries: Canada and Mexico. I’ve explored—afoot, by bicycle, by kayak, and by motor vehicle—much of my beloved West. I now travel vicariously, by reading and by talking to those who travel. In that regard, I’m like Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826). Maybe one day I’ll desire to travel (again); but I wouldn’t bet on it, and neither should you.

Rank, n. Relative elevation in the scale of human worth.

He held at court a rank so high
That other noblemen asked why.
"Because," 'twas answered, "others lack
His skill to scratch the royal back."
Aramis Jukes.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

Your "Black Friday" front-page article and photos ("Dawn Rush Hints at Strong Start to Holiday Sales," Nov. 26), like media accounts all over, took the day's events at face value, almost in a celebratory tone: people planning for days and waking up in the dark of night to wait in line in freezing weather, fiercely determined to obtain their prized goods.

And for what? To buy things, to save a few dollars.

Do we wait in the cold and dark for things that truly matter? Do we stand in line to protest the persistence of poverty amid wealth? To demand an end to the millions of deaths each year due to malaria and malnutrition?

I, too, like to save money, but I would suggest that we ought to get our priorities straight and think about what we value in our lives and in this world. And our media ought to report such events with some critical distance.

Alan Krinsky
Pawtucket, R.I., Nov. 26, 2005

The paradox of politics is the reconciliation of liberty and obligation. . . .

(J. D. Mabbott, The State and the Citizen: An Introduction to Political Philosophy, 2d ed. [London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967 (1st ed. 1948)], 14)

Here.

See here for Bill Vallicella's defense of William Bennett. The reason leftists hate Bill Bennett is that he's smarter than they are. They can't refute him, so they smear him.

Obsession, n. 1. The act of obsessing or the state of being obsessed. 2. A persistent idea or thought dominating a person's mind. 3. Treating Brian Leiter the way he treats others. 4. Holding Brian Leiter responsible for his thuggish behavior.

Here.

Someone wrote to me to say that I'm "obsessed" with Brian Leiter. It made me laugh. I'm no more obsessed with him than he is with me. He abused me publicly on his blog. I'm returning the favor. Where's the obsession? Leiter has been abusing people for years, and now he wants to abuse me without paying a price for it. It's time someone gave him his comeuppance. Stay tuned.

You've read all 921 pages of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th edition, and plan to read all 956 pages of the 15th edition.

Roger Pilon argues that Judge Samuel Alito has the (moral) right to remain silent on Roe v. Wade during his confirmation hearings. See here.

Because the true meaning, value, and significance of marriage are fairly easily grasped (even if people sometimes have difficulty living up to its moral demands) where a culture—including, critically, a legal culture—promotes and supports a sound understanding of marriage, both formally and informally, and because ideologies and practices which are hostile to a sound understanding and practice of marriage in a culture tend to undermine the institution of marriage in that culture, thus making it difficult for large numbers of people to grasp the true meaning, value, and significance of marriage, it is extremely important that government eschew attempts to be “neutral” with regard to competing conceptions of marriage and try hard to embody in its law and policy the soundest, most nearly correct conception. Moreover, any effort to achieve neutrality will inevitably prove to be self-defeating. For the law is a teacher. And it will teach either that marriage is a reality that people can choose to participate in, but whose contours people cannot make and remake at will (e.g., a one-flesh communion of persons consummated and actualized by acts which are reproductive in type and perfected, where all goes well, in the generation, education, and nurturing of children in a context—the family—which is uniquely suitable to their well-being), or the law will teach that marriage is a mere convention which is malleable in such a way that individuals, couples, or, indeed, groups, can choose to make it whatever suits their desires, interests, subjective goals, etc. The result, given the biases of human sexual psychology, will be the development of practices and ideologies which truly do tend to undermine the sound understanding and practice of marriage, together with the pathologies that tend to reinforce the very practices and ideologies that cause them.

(Robert P. George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis [Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2001], 86-7 [italics in original])

Here.

Here is a New York Times column about disrespectful, disobedient children. I've certainly noticed a change in the past couple of decades. My brothers and I were taught to be respectful of adults. All adults, even strangers. Kids today (in my experience) make no distinction between adults and other kids. They're disrespectful toward everyone. How did this happen? When and why did parents stop laying down the law to their children, including teaching them manners? Is it Bart Simpson's fault? But parents are supposed to counteract bad cultural influences, not let them go unanswered. Perhaps parents want to be liked rather than respected by their children, so they refuse to discipline them. ("Discipline" means teach; a disciple is a student.) But why all of a sudden do parents want to be liked rather than respected? Are we seeing the upshot of 1960s-era "free love" and "anti-authoritarianism"?

Here is Paul Krugman's* column of this date. Krugman, like liberals generally, is obsessed with security. He can't stand it that things like health care are not guaranteed to every individual, no questions asked. As an economist, Krugman should know that security is costly. I purchased job security (academic tenure) by giving up income. Lots of income, for I could have been practicing law for the past 23 years. If factory workers want job security, they must be willing to pay the cost. There ain't no such thing as a free lunch. Krugman wants to make everyone pay for everyone else's security. Isn't that special? Why not leave it to individuals to strike their own deals? Why do liberals always prefer coercion to liberty? Perhaps we should call them "totalitarians" or "illiberals" rather than liberals.

Addendum: Krugman's column is the 23d Most E-Mailed Article. See here. It's pretty bad when you're behind Frank Rich, who is little more than a comedian.

* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).

Animal Ethics is celebrating its second birthday. See here.

To the Editor:

Re "Bad for the Country," by Paul Krugman (column, Nov. 25):

I'd add that what's bad from General Motors is bad for the country. While Honda and Toyota have developed hybrid technology that is so much in demand that buyers wait months for delivery of new vehicles, G.M. continues to grind out more of the same: monster S.U.V.'s that inhale gas, spew out fumes and clog our highways.

G.M.'s manufacturing practices haven't evolved, only its advertising. Now it's trying to convince us that its S.U.V.'s and trucks conserve gas!

For years G.M. has pushed the macho truck-owner image instead of demonstrating the kind of leadership that General Electric, BP Amoco and, yes, Ford have begun to show by transforming themselves into responsible environmental citizens.

Robert F. Sommer
Overland Park, Kan., Nov. 25, 2005

Affianced, pp. Fitted with an ankle-ring for the ball-and-chain.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Here is Judge Richard Posner's post on avian flu.

Brian Leiter, take note: Academic thugs sometimes lose their jobs. See here.

The following item appeared in the business section of today's Dallas Morning News:

What's a half-million years' worth of work time among friends?

Advertising Age recently crunched some numbers to calculate how much company time American employees spend reading blogs.

It concluded that:

■ 35 million Americans read blogs at work.
■ In 2005, those workers "will waste the equivalent of 551,000 years reading blogs."
■ Reading of nonwork blogs is equal to 2.3 million jobs.
■ Or, put another way, that time is equivalent to "a daily, 40-minute blog break" for every American worker.

That's not a precise figure, of course. Ad Age called its analysis a "best-guess extrapolation," based on blog-related surveys and data.

But the numbers do help gauge an activity that everyone knows is occurring at work, even if the phenomenon hasn't been documented. (Ad Age tried to filter out actual job-related blog reading.)

Blog readers have plenty to choose from. Ad Age cites a blog search engine's estimate that the number of blogs is doubling about every five months. At that rate, it says, there will be one blog for each man, woman and child on Earth—all 6.7 billion of them—by April 2009.

Edward Dufner

Get back to work!

This post by Donald Luskin shows how liberal media bias works—and why The New York Times can't be trusted to deliver facts.

Sylph, n. An immaterial but visible being that inhabited the air when the air was an element and before it was fatally polluted by factory smoke, sewer gas and similar products of civilization. Sylphs were allied to gnomes, nymphs and salamanders, which dwelt, respectively, in earth, water and fire, all now insalubrious. Sylphs, like fowls of the air, were male and female, to no purpose, apparently, for if they had progeny they must have nested in inaccessible places, none of the chicks having ever been seen.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

To the Editor:

The lawsuit brought by Mississippi's attorney general, Jim Hood ("A Policy of Deceit," Op-Ed, Nov. 19), attempts to retroactively rewrite insurance policies to force companies to pay for flood losses that have been expressly excluded from standard insurance policies for decades. If successful, Mr. Hood will not only destroy the viability of the state's insurance market, but he will also undermine the integrity of every legal contract in the nation.

Mr. Hood's lawsuit is about politics, not fairness or justice. Rewriting insurance policies to cover flood losses after the fact is unfair to the companies that did not collect one dollar of premium to cover such claims and to the responsible consumers who paid flood insurance premiums to the National Flood Insurance Program to protect their homes and businesses.

Insurers will take all appropriate steps under the law to defend the sanctity of their contracts. At the same time, we will continue to pay every covered claim as quickly as possible to help hurricane victims get back on their feet after the disaster.

Ernst Csiszar
President and Chief Executive
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Chicago, Nov. 21, 2005

I said I’d come back to Brian Leiter from time to time. Someone needs to expose his intellectual dishonesty and moral thuggishness, although, by now, largely because of the blogosphere, both of these vicious traits of his are well known. Today I’d like to discuss a textbook case of the genetic fallacy that can be found in Leiter’s writings. See here and here. You will note that I made PDF files of both pages, so that Leiter cannot revise or delete them. I intend to use Leiter as an example in the next edition of my logic textbook.

Leiter is upset (or at least puzzled) that not everyone shares his view that “marriage” should be redefined so as to include any two adults, of whatever sex. (It’s not clear whether he thinks limiting marriage to two people is justified, and, if so, why.) The arguments against redefining “marriage” are many and sophisticated, but you wouldn’t know it by reading Leiter’s blog. He says there are only three grounds for opposing homosexual “marriage”—religion, tradition, and definition—and dismisses all of them in three short paragraphs. This alone should alert the reader that something is amiss.

Having “disposed” of the arguments against homosexual “marriage,” Leiter proceeds to speculate—from his armchair—about the motives of those who oppose it. He says that much or all opposition to homosexual rights, and to a right to homosexual “marriage” in particular, is rooted in latent homosexual desire. (Does Leiter think there’s something wrong with homosexual desire? Does he himself have homosexual desire? If not, does he secretly desire to have homosexual desire?) Supposedly, those who think of themselves (and present themselves) as heterosexuals, but who in fact have homosexual desires, lash out at their homosexual “selves” by taking positions that are hostile to homosexuals as such.

This explanation is risible, but let’s keep a straight face (Freudian slip?) and ask what, if anything, follows from it. Does it have any effect on the arguments of those who oppose homosexual “marriage”? The answer is no. Leiter is committing the genetic fallacy, which consists in confusing the context of discovery with the context of justification. Where an idea comes from is a separate question from whether the idea is a good one. As Wesley C. Salmon explains in his logic textbook, the Indian mathematical genius Ramanujan (1887-1920) “claimed that the goddess of Namakkal visited him in his dreams and gave him mathematical formulas.” As soon as Ramanujan awakened, he wrote the formulas down and verified them. How Ramanujan formed his beliefs has nothing to do with whether they were (are) true. Good ideas can have suspicious origins, just as bad ideas (such as egalitarianism) can have reputable origins.

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that everyone who opposes homosexual “marriage” (including some of Leiter’s philosophical colleagues) is a latent homosexual, and that that psychological fact about them causes (and thereby explains) their opposition to homosexual “marriage.” Nothing follows about either the truth of the premises they appeal to in their arguments or the validity of the inferences they draw from those premises. The premises can be true even if belief in them by the arguer was caused by hostility toward homosexuals (or self-loathing, or whatever). If someone were to dismiss the argument on the ground that the person making it came up with it in an odd way, or is badly motivated, or is trying to “punish” homosexuals, he or she would be committing the genetic fallacy. The origin of a thing, as we saw in the case of Ramanujan, is irrelevant to its value, worth, or merit.

Leiter might reply that he’s not dismissing anyone’s argument—and if he’s not dismissing anyone’s argument, then he can’t be committing the genetic fallacy, which consists in dismissing an argument on improper grounds. He might say that he’s trying to explain something, namely, why people argue against homosexual “marriage.” There are two explanations: first, that they believe they have good grounds (even if they don’t) for opposing it; and second, that they’re manifesting latent homosexual desire (or hostility, or self-loathing, or whatever). Leiter is convinced that there are no good grounds for opposing homosexual “marriage,” so he opts for the second explanation.

The problem is that Leiter hasn’t taken seriously the actual arguments made by opponents, much less tried to improve them. As I said, he gives them only perfunctory (indeed, sneering) treatment. He seems so convinced that no rational case can be made against homosexual “marriage” that he seeks a psychological explanation of the pervasiveness of arguments against it. Leiter’s “explanation” therefore wins by default. How convenient! All this shows is a lack of imagination and charity on his part. (This is a common Leiterian technique, by the way. His dogmatism prevents him from taking alternatives to his views seriously; then, in an effort to explain why not everyone shares his views, he imputes bad motives to those who disagree with him. This is not argumentation; it’s thuggery.)

I should point out that it’s not within the province of either law or philosophy (Leiter’s academic fields) to speculate about the psychologies of arguers. Leiter has no psychological credentials and cites only one empirical study to confirm his bizarre theory of latent homosexuality. He mentions Freud, but Freud isn’t taken seriously by social scientists. (If Leiter disagrees with this, he should cite studies—if he can find any—that rigorously test and confirm Freud’s theories. Freudianism is a cult, not a respectable research program.) It’s interesting that Leiter’s idol, Friedrich Nietzsche, also engaged in armchair psychologizing; but at least Nietzsche’s psychologizing concerned peoples and cultures rather than individuals. Leiter’s explanations float free of evidence, argumentation, and reason. If you get the sense while reading Leiter’s blog that he lives in a fantasy world, this is why.

To see the absurdity of Leiter’s method, let’s apply it to some familiar cases. We could dismiss the doctrines of Plato on the ground that he suffered from an unresolved oedipal conflict. We could dismiss Nietzsche’s work on the ground that he was mentally imbalanced. We could dismiss John Rawls’s theory of justice on the ground that his difference principle reflects Rawls’s timidity (risk-aversiveness) and guilt (at having been given so much when others were given so little). We could dismiss Leiter’s and Chomsky’s criticisms of capitalism on the ground that they envy those with wealth and status. We could explain Leiter’s hostility to religion as either a manifestation of latent religiosity (in Freudspeak, a desire for a supernatural father) or rebelliousness against his human father. We could explain Leiter’s obsession with rankings and reputation as a recognition of his own inferiority, or as a manifestation of low self-esteem, perhaps brought on by having been bullied as a child. We could explain Leiter’s abusiveness as a reaction to having been abused as a child. And on and on.

Do you see why philosophers shy away from trying to explain why people hold the views they hold? We’re interested in reasons, not causes. We teach our students to focus on arguments and theories, not persons or motives. Arguments and theories are good or bad independently of who makes them, how they were discovered, or why they’re adduced. Leiter needs to take (or retake) a critical-thinking course.

Here.

As you can see by the odometer in the sidebar, I passed the 400,000-visitor mark today. My readership is gradually increasing, which is gratifying. I've been averaging over 1,000 visitors a day for a couple of weeks. What I pay attention to is the difference between any given month and the same month a year earlier. I started this blog on 5 November 2003, just over two years ago. Starting with November 2004, every month has had significantly more visitors than the same month a year earlier. As long as that continues, I'll be pleased. Thanks for visiting—and thanks to everyone (including Brian Leiter, the academic thug) who has linked to me or added me to a blogroll. As I've said many times, I enjoy writing in this blog every day. It is my generic literary outlet. I hope you find some of what I write educational or entertaining. If you came here looking for depictions, descriptions, or accounts of anal sex, get lost. This site has nothing to do with sex, much less with anal sex.

Public intellectuals are read for information but also for entertainment—educated people enjoy reading the writings of lively minds on current affairs even if they realize that the writers are opinionated, incompletely informed, and basically unreliable—and for buttressing the reader’s predispositions, that is, for solidarity, for what in the last chapter I called “rallying.” As Charles Sanders Peirce pointed out long ago, people are uncomfortable being in a state of doubt and therefore dislike having their beliefs challenged. Unless compelled by the norms of their calling (the norms of scientific inquiry, for example) to submit their views to challenge, people will seek confirmation and support, including solidarity with like-minded thinkers. Two psychological tendencies related to Peirce’s point are confirmation bias and herd instinct, the latter meaning that most people want to feel themselves part of a community of like-minded thinkers because it gives them greater confidence that they are right or at least are not likely to be thought daft for holding the beliefs they do. Dislike of dubiety (Peirce’s point) and herd instinct drive people to seek evidence that will confirm rather than disconfirm their priors (confirmation bias), even though searching for disconfirming evidence would be the epistemically more robust procedure, as Mill and later philosophers of science stressed; Mill especially emphasized the danger that conformism poses to intellectual progress. Notwithstanding Mill, nothing is more reassuring, so far as the felt soundness of one’s beliefs is concerned, than to find an intelligent, articulate person who shares them and is able to make arguments and marshal evidence for them better than you yourself could do and thus arm you to defend them better if challenged, as well as to still your own doubts.

(Richard A. Posner, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2001], 147-8 [footnotes omitted])

Predilection, n. The preparatory stage of disillusion.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I was born in April 1957, so I was too young to watch the original airing of The Twilight Zone. The series ran for five seasons: from 1959 to 1963 (inclusive). But I remember watching it on a weekly basis, so it must have been in the form of reruns. All told, there were 156 episodes: 36 the first season, 29 the second, 37 the third, 18 the fourth, and 36 the fifth. I believe the episodes in the fourth season were 60 minutes long instead of the usual 30, which explains why there were only half as many.

I vividly remember some of the episodes. My favorite has always been “The 7th Is Made up of Phantoms,” which is about modern-day soldiers in tanks being shot at by Indian arrows while conducting training exercises in the American West. I remember bits and pieces of other episodes. Some of the episodes scared me, which I now find humorous. It makes sense, though. The series was meant for adults, not children. Many of the episodes had philosophical themes. They were designed to promote reflection on various aspects of the human condition. (Hmm. I foresee a course entitled “The Philosophy of The Twilight Zone” in my future. If I can teach a course on the virtues and vices of Lewis and Clark, I can teach a course on the philosophical implications of The Twilight Zone. Denny?)

A few months ago, I realized that I can purchase DVDs of The Twilight Zone. I did some research on Amazon.com and talked to people like Ray Patnaude of Tech Central Station and my friend Joe Culotta. Apparently, there are different DVD releases. The one I like best is called “The Definitive Edition,” for it contains the episodes in their original order. So far, I’ve purchased Seasons 1, 2, and 3. I believe Season 4 is about to be released. My favorite episode (about the soldiers) is in Season 5 (episode 130), so I’ll have to wait a while for it. But it would be a long time before I watched it anyway, since I’m watching the episodes in the original order and am taking my time with it. Last night, for example, I watched the fifth episode, “Walking Distance.” It was fabulous! The acting by Gig Young and the others (including the ubiquitous Ron Howard) was superb; the cinematography was excellent; and the plot was simply magical. Stop reading if you don’t want me to spoil the plot.

Gig Young plays 36-year-old Martin Sloan, who is a harried business executive. He decides to go to his hometown (Homewood) for a few days to clear his head. Near the outskirts of town, he stops for gasoline and ends up getting an oil change. While the oil is being changed, he decides to walk the mile and a half into town. At first, he doesn’t notice anything unusual; but gradually it dawns on him that he has gone back in time. He finds his childhood home and meets his parents. Then, shockingly, he meets himself. Needless to say, his parents are skeptical of his claim to be their son, but when his father examines the man’s wallet, he realizes that the man is telling the truth. Their conversation is touching. At the end of it, the father insists that the son leave—so that the “real” son can have the summer to himself.

I omitted a lot of detail, but you get the idea. I loved the scenes from this episode, for they reminded me of my own childhood in rural Michigan. I had a wonderful childhood. My parents gave me just the right amount of structure and freedom; I had many loving relatives; I got to spend summers on farms with my cousins; and I had three brothers with whom to compete, cooperate, and share experiences. According to the booklet that came with Season 1, Rod Serling came up with the plot for this episode during a visit to his hometown in upstate New York. I suppose everyone who had a pleasant childhood has wanted to go back to it from time to time. I certainly have. This is not necessarily a sign that one is unhappy as an adult. It can signify nothing more than a desire to be young and innocent again, or to be among family and friends, or to experience certain feelings again.

I’d be interested in hearing from people who saw the original Twilight Zone in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Please use the comment function so that others can read what you write. How unusual was the series? I get the feeling from reading the booklet that it was confusing—even unsettling—to many people. Science fiction had never been presented on television. Even the executives who gave Serling authority to produce the series were perplexed. When “Walking Distance” was described to network executive William Dozier, he exclaimed, “Bullshit! This doesn’t work. Who the fuck’s going to believe this, Rod?” Earlier, when Serling described an episode in which a man falls in love with a mechanical woman, Dozier snorted, “Oh shit, you’re kidding. Is this what this is all going to be about?” Had Serling not been famous, The Twilight Zone would never have gotten off the ground.

Here.

To the Editor:

As Frank Rich ("One War Lost, Another to Go," column, Nov. 20) correctly asserts, there are no good ways to undo the damage done in Iraq and refocus our resources on the real terrorist threats to America.

Similarly, it serves little purpose to lament the lack of a few more votes for Vice President Al Gore in 2000 or Senator John Kerry in 2004, or how those few more votes would have made the world a different place. We are where we are: We have President George W. Bush!

We can, however, pledge, from this day forward, to choose only leaders who are competent, experienced and battle tested.

We best honor the fallen by keeping such a pledge; we best prevent the reoccurrence of disasters like Iraq by keeping such a pledge.

Voters must accept responsibility and change course: Mr. Bush is only being Mr. Bush, the same Mr. Bush on display in 2000 and 2004 to all who paid attention.

John E. Colbert
Chicago, Nov. 20, 2005

Billingsgate, n. The invective of an opponent.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Paul Krugman's* columns are available online. Here is today's column. Krugman wants a national entitlement to health care. Translation: He wants to transfer wealth from the healthy to the sick, from the responsible to the nonresponsible (or irresponsible), and from the productive to the unproductive (or lazy). Notice that he doesn't mention the massive federal bureaucracy that such an entitlement would create—or, just as importantly, the power its bureaucrats would wield. The following claim jumped out at me: "[M]ost Americans believe that their fellow citizens are entitled to health care." No evidence is given in support of this claim. It strikes me as obviously false. Suppose for the sake of argument that it's true. What follows? Surely Krugman doesn't think that from the mere fact that most Americans want something, they're entitled to get it! Most Americans want to retain the traditional definition of "marriage." Does Krugman believe that that ends the debate? Krugman is all in favor of creating new rights, but what about the rights of individuals to retain their wealth? He says nothing—nothing—about desert or responsibility, about whether those who receive free health care deserve it or whether they're responsible for their own bad health. Instead of putting his economic expertise to use by analyzing the costs and benefits of various health-care policies (including leaving health care to the private sector), Krugman plays the advocate. The problem is, he has no evaluative expertise. That he values this or that means nothing to me. I have different values. What he has to do to persuade me to support national health insurance is show that my values commit me to it, not that his values commit him to it.

Addendum: Bush-hatin' Paul's column is the 15th Most E-Mailed Article. See here. Could it be that people are tiring of his manipulative, hateful rhetoric?

* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).

To the Editor:

As an author, I certainly want my copyrights honored. Yet I hope Google finds some way to proceed with and even add to its Book Search program, and work out its differences with the world of hard-copy print media ("Googling Literature: The Debate Goes Public," Arts pages, Nov. 18).

I think it's to everyone's advantage for copyrighted literature, too, to be available on the Internet. A book could be downloaded, for example, for a small fee, once the search engine has pointed to that work as a research tool.

I love libraries, but if the hard or paperback book as we know it is destined to disappear or become a collector's item because a simpler method of information storage and retrieval has evolved, there are really no losers except our hidebound old habits.

And I can think of winners: for example, the earth's forests.

Max Reif
Walnut Creek, Calif., Nov. 19, 2005

I've been watching the college football game between Nebraska and Colorado (in Boulder) on my Dell 42-inch high-definition plasma television. Nebraska is far ahead, which means that, if Iowa State wins tomorrow, Colorado will not win the Big 12 North Division title and will not play in the conference championship game (against Texas). Officials had to stop the game and clear an entire section of the stadium after fans threw objects onto the field. Think about this for a moment. These students are among the most highly educated in the country. Many of them are children of privilege. Many of them will be leaders of government, law, education, medicine, science, technology, and commerce. Whence the thuggishness? Then again, look at Brian Leiter's blog. He has three college degrees, but he's been acting like a thug for years. His university not only doesn't punish him for it; it rewards him.

Here is a column about Hillary Clinton's position on the war in Iraq. I think she'd make a good commander in chief.

Lewis and Clark reached the Pacific Ocean several days ago. The party was pinned against the north side of the Columbia River by high winds and torrential rains, which prevented it from moving. When the weather cleared, the party moved to a safe location to explore the coastline and mark their names on trees. Having accomplished this, it was time to decide what to do. One option was to go upriver and form a winter encampment. Another was to build a fort on the south side of the Columbia—provided there was enough game in the area to sustain the party for several months. Although it was a military expedition, Lewis and Clark solicited the opinions of the party, including Sacagawea and York. (York was Clark's slave.) Clark duly recorded the "votes." He wrote that "Janey" (Sacagawea) was in favor of any place that had "potas," which I assume means potatoes. Here are the journal entries for this date. It's not known whether Lewis solicited the opinion of his dog, Seaman. I like to think that he did and that Seaman replied with an enthusiastic wag of the tail, which, in dogspeak, means, "I'll do whatever you do, Big Ape."

Innate, adj. Natural, inherent—as innate ideas, that is to say, ideas that we are born with, having had them previously imparted to us. The doctrine of innate ideas is one of the most admirable faiths of philosophy, being itself an innate idea and therefore inaccessible to disproof, though Locke foolishly supposed himself to have given it "a black eye." Among innate ideas may be mentioned the belief in one's ability to conduct a newspaper, in the greatness of one's country, in the superiority of one's civilization, in the importance of one's personal affairs and in the interesting nature of one's diseases.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I'd like to wish my American readers a happy Thanksgiving. I hope you're enjoying your Tofurky. Me? I had homemade pizza with fake pepperoni and fake mozzarella cheese. It was delicious.

Here.

To the Editor:

Thomas L. Friedman ("George Bush's Third Term," column, Nov. 23) writes that President Bush "still has time to be a bridge to the future," adding:

"If he doesn't, the resources he will have squandered and the size of the problems he will have ignored will put him in the running for one of our worst presidents ever."

The catastrophic developments that Mr. Friedman identifies as having taken place under President Bush—a stupefying national debt, an insane war of choice against the wrong enemy, preposterous tax cuts for the rich paid for by the suffering of the needy—have already proved him to be the worst president in our nation's history.

William D. Wolff
Los Angeles, Nov. 23, 2005

To the Editor:

We now have 50 million people in Iraq and Afghanistan with a chance for freedom; democracy inching forward in the Middle East; hope in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; 5 percent unemployment; a 3.8 percent rise in the gross domestic product; several million jobs created; minority achievement gap narrowing; two Supreme Court justices and counting. A great president!

Florence Schmieg
Wilmington, Del., Nov. 23, 2005

Somebody explain the point of this editorial opinion. I can't discern it.

The fair and balanced observer will hear in the hysterical complaint and angry foot-stamping of FOX's liberal critics baffled frustration over the loss of the liberal monoculture, which, I've argued here, long protected the Left from debate—and further, from the realization that its unexamined ideas are sadly threadbare. What the illiberal liberals really object to is any conservative presence, however fair-minded, in public debate.

(Brian C. Anderson, South Park Conservatives: The Revolt Against Liberal Media Bias [Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2005], 67 [italics in original])

My beloved Ginger died five years ago today at the age of seven years, 10 months. Here she is in May 1998, shortly after receiving her semiannual shave (click to enlarge):

I think about Ginger every day. Sophie and I miss her very much.

Ronald Bailey interviews Peter Singer here.

Retribution, n. A rain of fire-and-brimstone that falls alike upon the just and such of the unjust as have not procured shelter by evicting them.

In the lines following, addressed to an Emperor in exile by Father Gassalasca Jape, the reverend poet appears to hint his sense of the imprudence of turning about to face Retribution when it is taking exercise:

What, what! Dom Pedro, you desire to go
Back to Brazil to end your days in quiet?
Why, what assurance have you 'twould be so?
'Tis not so long since you were in a riot,
And your dear subjects showed a will to fly at
Your throat and shake you like a rat. You know
That empires are ungrateful; are you certain
Republics are less handy to get hurt in?

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

To the Editor:

Re "Cheney Sees 'Shameless' Revisionism on War" (front page, Nov. 22):

Is it not the vice president himself, and the president and other administration figures, who have shamelessly revised this country's justification for going to war in Iraq?

The first rationale was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. When they could not be found, the second rationale was to link Saddam Hussein to Al Qaeda.

When that rationale proved elusive, a third rationale was formulated: to bring democracy to the region. This goal is now in jeopardy, due in large measure to a lack of planning to ensure security and a blossoming terrorist movement.

Vice President Dick Cheney would do well to turn his attention to the larger issue of resolving the mess he has helped create, rather than practicing active amnesia.

Thomas V. Czarnowski
New York, Nov. 22, 2005

Note from AnalPhilosopher: Czarnowski is an idiot. There can be more than one rationale for a given action, such as a war. There were, in fact, many rationales for the war in Iraq, as the administration has acknowledged repeatedly. That the administration chose to assert or emphasize one rationale at the outset of the war, and others later, doesn't mean that the others were inoperative or nonexistent. Suppose I believe (as I do) that it's wrong to kill and eat animals. I will make it my goal to persuade people, rationally, to abstain from meat. Since different people have different values, I will have to make multiple arguments, one from utilitarianism (for the utilitarians in my audience), one from Christianity (for the Christians in my audience), one from environmentalism (for the environmentalists in my audience), one from Kantianism (for the Kantians in my audience), one from feminism (for the feminists in my audience), one from egoism (for the egoists in my audience), and so forth. Is there something wrong with this? Only if there's something wrong with rational argumentation!

Here.

I just received my bimonthly long-distance telephone bill from Working Assets, the slogans of which are "Making Your Voice Heard" and "Making It Easy to Make a Difference." Here is one of the "Citizen Actions" being recommended:

Confirming the Worst: Fight Alito Nomination

President Bush has nominated Judge Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. If confirmed, Alito, who has ruled that women should get permission from their husbands for an abortion, would replace the moderate swing vote Sandra Day O'Connor. Unfortunately, Judge Alito's 15-year record of written opinions demonstrates extreme hostility to civil rights, environmental protection and reproductive rights. The religious right is ecstatic—Pat Robertson called the pick a "home run"—but the rest of us should demand that the Senate defend our hard-earned rights.

Urge Sen. John Cornyn at 202/224-2934 to oppose the nomination of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court. Or check the box below to send a CitizenLetter.

There is so much dishonesty in this blurb that I don't know where to begin. Let me focus on the ruling about abortion. It's made to seem as though Judge Alito imposed his personal values in this ruling. What he did, of course, is compare a state statute with the United States Constitution (as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court) and decide that they're not incompatible. In other words, he thought the state was constitutionally entitled to legislate as it did. Note that he could have come to this conclusion even if he, personally, would not have voted for the legislation. The author of the Working Assets blurb isn't interested in (1) being fair to Judge Alito, (2) educating his or her readers about the law, or (3) being honest. The goal is to prevent Judge Alito from being confirmed. The end justifies the means.

Are we on the road to serfdom? Ed Feser thinks so (see here), and I'm inclined to agree. But we're not doomed to go down this road. We can reverse, or at least stall, the leftist machine that's carrying us.

Lie, n. 1. An intentionally false statement. 2. A statement with which liberals disagree.

Here is Richard Cohen's column entitled "Did Bush Lie?" You would think that Cohen would discuss the concept of a lie somewhere in his column, but he doesn't. His column reads like a Bush-hating rant. I have never—to this day—seen a convincing case that President Bush lied about anything, including the war in Iraq. If you believe President Bush lied and hope to persuade others (rationally) to believe the same thing, you must provide evidence that:

1. President Bush uttered a declarative sentence at a particular time; and
2. At the time he uttered the sentence, President Bush believed it to be false; and
3. President Bush uttered the sentence with the intention to deceive.

If you can't do this, stop saying he lied.

Addendum: Cohen concludes his column by suggesting that President Bush was "repeating the lies of others." Strictly speaking, one cannot repeat a lie, for lying requires a particular (complex) mental state. The most one can do is repeat a falsehood. But unless the person who repeats the falsehood both believes it to be false and utters it with the intention to deceive, he or she isn't lying. Cohen wants his readers to think that repeating a lie is lying. It's not. In fact, it's an incoherent concept.

Addendum 2: I've been reading Cohen's columns for many years, and I've never been impressed by his intelligence. Some of his columns appear to be written by a retard. It's ironic, therefore, that Cohen thinks President Bush is a dunce.

Mouse, n. An animal which strews its path with fainting women. As in Rome Christians were thrown to the lions, so centuries earlier in Otumwee, the most ancient and famous city of the world, female heretics were thrown to the mice. Jakak-Zotp, the historian, the only Otumwump whose writings have descended to us, says that these martyrs met their death with little dignity and much exertion. He even attempts to exculpate the mice (such is the malice of bigotry) by declaring that the unfortunate women perished, some from exhaustion, some of broken necks from falling over their own feet, and some from lack of restoratives. The mice, he avers, enjoyed the pleasures of the chase with composure. But if "Roman history is nine-tenths lying," we can hardly expect a smaller proportion of that rhetorical figure in the annals of a people capable of so incredible cruelty to lovely woman; for a hard heart has a false tongue.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Here is Brendan Miniter's column on the squabble set off by Pennsylvania Representative John Murtha.

Here.

To the Editor:

Re "Computing the Cost of 'Acting White,'" by John Tierney (column, Nov. 19):

An important aspect of the difficulties for those who try to achieve beyond the accepted group stereotypic norm is coping with the envy of the group.

As we know from psychoanalytic theory, envy is a painful emotion that arouses destructive impulses, causing one to wish to get rid of the object of envy, to avoid painful feelings. This is a simplified version of a difficult phenomenon when it takes hold in a large group.

An individual willing to break out of accepted group roles must be quite brave, ambitious and willing to feel alone. This is not true for most people, who value membership in their group.

Until we can find a way to give those who feel left out more hope to improve their own lot, and to change the goals of the peer group, we will not truly tackle this problem.

Deena Harris, M.D.
New York, Nov. 19, 2005
The writer is a psychoanalyst.

I saw an interesting sign in Arlington, Texas, this afternoon as I drove to Whole Foods Market to buy a Tofurky:

It wasn't a church. It was an advertising agency.

Is there a better album than Led Zeppelin's Physical Graffiti (1975), or a better song than "Ten Years Gone"? How could 30 years have passed so quickly? I'll always be 18, whatever the calendar says.

Addendum: In case you're wondering, yes, I saw Led Zeppelin in concert. It was in the Pontiac (Michigan) Silverdome in 1976. I won a ticket in a radio-station contest and rode down on a bus with other winners. The band members looked like ants from our seats, but the sound was good. There was no warm-up band. Led Zeppelin played for about three hours. At one point during the concert, the music stopped and the stage lights went out. I thought it was an intermission. All of a sudden, a spotlight came on. There on the stage was Jimmy Page (see here as well), wearing his electric guitar and holding a violin bow in the air. He proceeded to play his electric guitar like a violin. It was unbelievable, one of the highlights of my life.

Paul Krugman's* column of this date ranks 17th in the list of Most E-Mailed Articles. See here. I can't believe he's pleased with the new arrangement whereby people have to pay to read his columns; but maybe he's money hungry and doesn't mind. Maybe he'd rather be rich than read. Speaking of which, I wonder how much Krugman donates to charity. He wants to take money from the wealthy and give it to the poor. If wealthy liberals such as Krugman put their money where their mouths are, there would be no need to coerce anyone, which makes you wonder whether they're motivated by concern for the poor or envy and hatred of the rich. Can you say "hypocrisy"?

* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).

Here.

The duty of public civility goes with the idea that the political discussion of constitutional essentials should aim at free agreement reached on the basis of shared political values, and that the same holds for other questions bordering on those essentials, especially when they become divisive. In the way that a just war aims at a just peace, and thus restricts the use of those means of warfare that make achieving a just peace more difficult, so, when we aim for free agreement in political discussion, we are to use arguments and appeal to reasons that others are able to accept. But much political debate betrays the marks of warfare. It consists in rallying the troops and intimidating the other side, which must now increase its efforts or back down. In all this one may find the thought that to have character is to have firm convictions and be ready to proclaim them defiantly to others. To be is to confront.

(John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, ed. Erin Kelly [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2001], 117-8)

The 2005 bicycling season has drawn to a close. This past Saturday, in Denton, Texas, I did my 27th bike rally of the year and 371st overall. That makes 2005 my second-best year in terms of number of rallies completed. Here’s a summary:

1989 = 06 (006)
1990 = 31 (037)
1991 = 27 (064)
1992 = 25 (089)
1993 = 22 (111)
1994 = 21 (132)
1995 = 22 (154)
1996 = 22 (176)
1997 = 22 (198)
1998 = 21 (219)
1999 = 22 (241)
2000 = 16 (257)
2001 = 23 (280)
2002 = 22 (302)
2003 = 22 (324)
2004 = 20 (344)
2005 = 27 (371)

The average distance of this year’s 27 rallies was 62.8 miles—just over 100 kilometers. As hard as it may be to believe, I had no accidents and no flat tires. Twice, however, I had a flat tire when I got home. I must have punctured as I was rolling to my car at the finish. How’s that for good luck?

The weather at this time of year is iffy, to say the least. The brochure for this rally—called the Turkey Roll—says it’s for “tuff turkeys only.” I’ve done the Turkey Roll 13 times in the past 17 years. (Twice I did a 30K footrace instead; the other two times I wimped out.) I’ve ridden in cold, wet weather and in warm, sunny weather. I’ve ridden in howling winds and in calm air. Half the fun is not knowing what you’ll get. Saturday’s weather, I’m happy to report, was near-perfect. The temperature was in the low fifties at the start and increased gradually as we pedaled. The sky was initially overcast, but the clouds blew off, leaving a glorious sun overhead. By the time we finished, it had clouded up again. I enjoyed the sun while it was out. The wind, however, was stiff all morning. Here is a map of the course (click to enlarge):

I love traditions, and this rally is traditional. I almost always see my friends Joe Culotta, Mike Sweeney, and Julius Bejsovec there. It has less of a race atmosphere than other rallies, so nobody feels pressure to hammer. We rode side by side for much of the way, talking, laughing, and commiserating. Julius’s stepson (to be) Scott recently took up bicycling. I was surprised by how well he rode. I hope to see him at the rallies next year. For some reason, I felt good Saturday. I hurt my back on 10 October while doing a long (13.2-mile) training run for the White Rock Marathon. The pain has been quite bad for the past couple of weeks. I have to walk bent over and haven’t been able to do any running. But bicycling doesn’t bother me. It was great to get some aerobic exercise after 13 days of inactivity (other than walking). I felt like a dog that had been caged. My average speed for the 58.70 miles was 17.16 miles per hour. That makes it my 10th-fastest rally of the year.

The highlight of the Turkey Roll is the rest stop about 40 miles in. It’s a motor home belonging to Terrill King and his wife. They park their motor home alongside the road, in the middle of nowhere, and set up tables and chairs for the bicyclists. The tables are covered with food (including beef brisket) and drink. Bicyclists go into the motor home to use the toilet. The Kings are enthusiastic Aggies. I always tell them that I taught for a year at Texas A&M before coming to UTA, and before I leave, I express hope that the Aggies beat the hated Texas Longhorns in their game the day after Thanksgiving. It would be a special victory this year, for it would knock the Longhorns out of the national title game. All in all, my friends and I had a great time in the beautiful Denton countryside. I can’t think of a better ending to another year of bicycling.

Addendum: Somebody has posted images of the rally. See here. I’m visible in image 030. I’m the rider in red on the far right, talking to my friends as we await the start.

To the Editor:

Dan Savage's argument for a constitutional amendment is premised on the false assumption, shared by the right, that there is no constitutional right to privacy. Our Constitution establishes a government with limited powers and is predicated on a conception of natural (pre-political) rights.

The Ninth Amendment says, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."

So if there is no explicit power to violate privacy given to the government, which there isn't, then we retain our natural right to privacy.

Aeon James Skoble
Bridgewater, Mass., Nov. 16, 2005
The writer is an associate professor of philosophy at Bridgewater State College.

Note from AnalPhilosopher: The natural right to privacy doesn't include a right to murder people in my house.

Existence, n.

A transient, horrible fantastic dream,
Wherein is nothing yet all do seem:
From which we're wakened by a friendly nudge
Of our bedfellow Death, and cry: "O fudge!"

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

You know you're anal retentive.

Here.

Here is Judge Richard A. Posner's post about orphan drugs.

Here is an interview with French "philosopher" Jean Baudrillard, whose book America has a neat cover. (Then again, you can't judge a book by its cover.)

Incredibly, we have still not had a national discussion of the morality of the war in Iraq. The discussion has focused, and continues to focus, on what President Bush believed, intended, expected, and sought. These issues are tangential. The war can be right even if President Bush's beliefs were false, his intentions bad, his expectations groundless, and his motives impure.

Zanzibari, n. An inhabitant of the Sultanate of Zanzibar, off the eastern coast of Africa. The Zanzibaris, a warlike people, are best known in this country through a threatening diplomatic incident that occurred a few years ago. The American consul at the capital occupied a dwelling that faced the sea, with a sandy beach between. Greatly to the scandal of this official's family, and against repeated remonstrances of the official himself, the people of the city persisted in using the beach for bathing. One day a woman came down to the edge of the water and was stooping to remove her attire (a pair of sandals) when the consul, incensed beyond restraint, fired a charge of bird-shot into the most conspicuous part of her person. Unfortunately for the existing entente cordiale between two great nations, she was the Sultana.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

We are hearing many calls for a quick exit from Iraq, most recently from Representative John P. Murtha. This pessimism is unwarranted, for the insurgents are losing big.

They have shifted their main strategy from guerrilla warfare against America and its allies, and now target Iraqi civilians in the Shiite communities. In two elections, millions voted, defying terrorist threats. These millions clearly defined the insurgents as terrorists and totalitarians (who seek a return to Saddam Hussein's police state) and not as gallant defenders of the Arab homeland. Bombing civilians reflects weakness, and is a losing strategy.

It would be disastrous to hand a major victory to terrorists who have been unable to terrify the Iraqi people, although they do seem to have frightened many American politicians. Fortunately, the Bush administration is not easily terrified.

Herbert S. Caron
Cleveland, Nov. 18, 2005

Here.

Here.

To the Editor:

Re "Yale Law Frets Over Court Choices It Knows Best" (front page, Nov. 13):

After being quoted in your article, I want to offer a clarification and an apology.

You say: "Students these days make jokes at Justice Thomas's expense, said Stephen Townley, a third-year student. 'It's a question about intellectual rigor.'"

I was wondering whether Yale would have embraced Judge Robert H. Bork (had he been confirmed) more warmly than it has embraced Justice Clarence Thomas. After positing that it would have, I wondered why. I did not personally question the "intellectual rigor" of Justice Thomas, nor did I mean to suggest that students frequently make jokes at his expense.

While Yale students sometimes repeat popular saws about Justice Thomas, our attention ought to be focused on his now-considerable body of work. In any event, I owe the judiciary respect, and I should have taken greater care to ensure that I did not propagate rumors that might lower a member of that body in the estimation of your readers.

Stephen Townley
New Haven, Nov. 15, 2005

Here is an op-ed column about the Lewis and Clark expedition.

Manna, n. A food miraculously given to the Israelites in the wilderness. When it was no longer supplied to them they settled down and tilled the soil, fertilizing it, as a rule, with the bodies of the original occupants.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Here is the website of the Texas Farm Bureau.

Read this. Near the end, the reporter (it's a news story, not an analysis or opinion piece) uses the expression "a group called the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth." Next time you see a story on People for the American Way, check to see whether it's referred to as "a group called People for the American Way." Next time you see a story on NOW, check to see whether it's referred to as "a group called National Organization for Women." Maybe we should start referring to The Times as "a newspaper called The New York Times." Or better yet, "a 'newspaper' called The New York Times."

This is funny.

This can never be posted too often.

Here is Ronald Dworkin's essay on Judge (now Chief Justice) John Roberts.

Hades, n. The lower world; the residence of departed spirits; the place where the dead live.

Among the ancients the idea of Hades was not synonymous with our Hell, many of the most respectable men of antiquity residing there in a very comfortable kind of way. Indeed, the Elysian Fields themselves were a part of Hades, though they have since been removed to Paris. When the Jacobean version of the New Testament was in process of evolution the pious and learned men engaged in the work insisted by a majority vote on translating the Greek word Αιδης as "Hell"; but a conscientious minority member secretly possessed himself of the record and struck out the objectionable word wherever he could find it. At the next meeting, the Bishop of Salisbury, looking over the work, suddenly sprang to his feet and said with considerable excitement: "Gentlemen, somebody has been razing 'Hell' here!" Years afterward the good prelate's death was made sweet by the reflection that he had been the means (under Providence) of making an important, serviceable and immortal addition to the phraseology of the English tongue.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

I have a mansion forget the price
Ain't never been there they tell me it's nice
I live in hotels tear out the walls
I have accountants pay for it all

They say I'm crazy but I have a good time
I'm just lookin' for clues at the scene of the crime
Life's been good to me so far

My Maserati does 185
I lost my license now I don't drive
I have a limo ride in the back
I lock the doors in case I'm attacked

I'm making records my fans they can't wait
They write me letters tell me I'm great
So I got me an office gold records on the wall
Just leave a message maybe I'll call

Lucky I'm sane after all I've been through
Everybody says I'm cool (He's cool)
I can't complain but sometimes I still do
Life's been good to me so far

I go to parties sometimes until four
It's hard to leave when you can't find the door
It's tough to handle this fortune and fame
Everybody's so different I haven't changed

They say I'm lazy but it takes all my time
Everybody says Oh yeah (Oh yeah)
I keep on goin' guess I'll never know why
Life's been good to me so far

To the Editor:

Regurgitating the notion of "dancing Iraqis throwing flowers before American tanks" has no merit when the brutal enemy to be defeated assumes with good reason that it is bound to win. All it has to do is to wait us out.

It is convinced that in the long run we will buckle. It knows us better than we think.

The rhetoric of aspersions cast on our leaders for having deliberately misled us; the repeated dangling of terrible mistakes; and the rumblings about the impatience of the American people not only give the terrorists hope but also convince them that what is in their minds a weak and contemptible society of "infidels" lacks the fortitude to see its mission completed.

And therein lies the greatest danger to a free people.

Thomas Edelman
Santa Monica, Calif., Nov. 17, 2005

Here.

One of my early essays has been reprinted in a book series on rights. See here. (Click "Hardback Book" to see a list of the book's essays.) Now if I could only afford to buy it!

Check out these letters to The New York Times.

Nectar, n. A drink served at banquets of the Olympian deities. The secret of its preparation is lost, but the modern Kentuckians believe that they come pretty near to a knowledge of its chief ingredient.

Juno drank a cup of nectar,
But the draught did not affect her.
Juno drank a cup of rye—
Then she bade herself good-bye.
J.G.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Dr John J. Ray has a new blog. See here.

Here.

To the Editor:

You insist that the Constitution protects abortion rights and that anyone who disagrees is "far outside the legal mainstream."

Even at Harvard Law School, that great bastion of liberalism that I now call my home, it is not terribly uncommon to hear supporters of abortion as a policy right criticize the Supreme Court's sloppy jurisprudence in the area.

Roe v. Wade, like all decided Supreme Court cases, has precedential value. But it is certainly not unreasonable—and surely not outside the legal mainstream—to question its underlying logic.

Elliott Marc Davis
Cambridge, Mass., Nov. 16, 2005

Here.

Here is Judge Richard Posner's analysis of the French riots.

Ally Eskin's blog has a new look. Check it out. The blog address has changed as well, so please update your blogroll.

Donna has been visiting my blog, so I thought I'd draw some attention to hers.

Here.

Here is the text of the speech made today by Vice President Cheney. Democrats are digging their own graves by challenging the legitimacy of the war in Iraq. Bush-haters and America-haters won't be influenced by their perfidy, for they are beyond reason, but moderate Americans will be put off by the blatant hypocrisy and lack of patriotism being displayed by the likes of Harry Reid, John Kerry, and Jay Rockefeller.

It’s awfully early to be talking about the 2008 presidential campaign, especially since much can happen in the next two years to push certain candidates into or out of the limelight. Then again, it’s never too early to talk politics. Does anyone sense that John Kerry is gearing up for another campaign? It’s no disgrace to lose a presidential election. Nor is it a political death sentence. Richard Nixon lost the 1960 election before winning in 1968 and 1972. Several men who went on to become president lost primary battles before eventually succeeding. Among them are Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. There is precedent for a Kerry victory in 2008.

His problem will be Hillary Clinton. I believe she has been waiting patiently for 2008. If both Kerry and Clinton run for the Democrat nomination, it will be nasty. Both have vaulting ambition. Both have name recognition. Both will have huge war chests. The one who emerges from the primary process will be a formidable candidate—unless, of course, he or she has been irreparably damaged by the other’s attacks. It’ll be interesting to see which constituents go for which candidate. Will MoveOn.org support Kerry on anti-war grounds? Will feminists support Clinton because she’s a woman? Where will George Soros put his money? How many people will support Clinton on the ground that Kerry has had his chance? And what if Howard Dean runs again? He’s still immensely popular among grass-roots Democrats for his anti-war stance. I predict that the Internet will be more important than ever in 2008, both in terms of raising money and in terms of getting the candidates’ messages out and responding to attacks. That will help Dean if he runs, because he seems to understand this new medium better than others.

Suppose Clinton wins the nomination. She could choose Kerry as her running mate. Would he accept such an offer? He might. He seems unhappy and unfulfilled as a senator, where he is but one of 100 people. Ordinarily, the vice presidency is a steppingstone to the presidency, but unless Clinton chose not to run in 2012, Kerry would be 73 years old by the time he assumed office in January 2017. That’s too old. Ronald Reagan was viewed by many as too old at 69, when he took office. Would Clinton accept a position as Kerry’s running mate, should Kerry win the nomination? I can’t believe she would, for reasons of personality. Nor would it be a steppingstone to the presidency for her, for she’ll be 69 years old in January 2017. If Kerry and Clinton go head to head in 2008, it’s unlikely that they’ll form the Democrat ticket that year. Given their ages, the loser’s presidential ambitions will be destroyed. That in itself will make the primary campaign hard fought.

Here.

Babe or Baby, n. A misshapen creature of no particular age, sex, or condition, chiefly remarkable for the violence of the sympathies and antipathies it excites in others, itself without sentiment or emotion. There have been famous babes; for example, little Moses, from whose adventure in the bulrushes the Egyptian hierophants of seven centuries before doubtless derived their idle tale of the child Osiris being preserved on a floating lotus leaf.

Ere babes were invented
The girls were contented.
Now man is tormented
Until to buy babes he has squandered
His money. And so I have pondered
This thing, and thought may be
'T were better that Baby
The First had been eagled or condored.
Ro Amil.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

See here for federal appellate judge Richard A. Posner's explication and defense of judicial modesty.

We're at war. It's a war we must win. But Democrats are playing politics with it. They'll be punished for their treasonous behavior at the polls. Count on it.

Here.

To the Editor:

While you are "decoding Mr. Bush's denials," please try decoding the Democrats' duplicitous accusations as well.

First, they demonize President Bush for "not connecting the dots" in the months preceding Al Qaeda's 9/11 atrocities. "What did he know, and when did he know it?" was their mantra at the time.

Next, they demonize the president for, indeed, "connecting the dots" before the March 2003 liberation of Iraq. And what were these not-to-be-connected "dots"? A uniformity of American, British, French, Italian, German, Spanish, Israeli and other intelligence sources—plus Saddam Hussein's own actions implying W.M.D. ownership and hiding.

Imagine what the Democrats would be saying today if President Bush had not connected the Iraqi "dots" and if a still-in-power Saddam Hussein were now playing host (with or without W.M.D.) to a variety of terrorists—as, indeed, some of his Sunni Arab "remnants" are currently doing.

Jim Guirard
Alexandria, Va., Nov. 15, 2005

France is dying, and it has nobody to blame but itself. See here.

Here is Nobel Prize-winning physicist Steven Weinberg: "[S]cientists and philosophers have been trying to define science, mostly unsuccessfully, for centuries." Is science limited to naturalistic explanations of phenomena? That's the issue. Some scientists and philosophers say yes; some say no. Why should the state of Kansas be precluded from saying no?

Myriad, n. 1. An indefinitely great number. 2. The number of Democrats lying about their involvement in the war in Iraq. 3. The number of Democrats thrown out of office in 2006 for misrepresenting their records.

Alvin Plantinga is 73 years old today. I linked to one of his essays the other day. Plantinga gives the lie to the idea, beloved of leftists and other scamps, that religiosity and intelligence are incompatible. He is one of the best philosophers of the past half century, by any reasonable standard. I have learned much from him, as would anyone who took the time to read his books and essays. See here for his essay "Advice to Christian Philosophers." See here for his critique of a review in The New York Review of Books.

Occasional, adj. Afflicting us with greater or less frequency. That, however, is not the sense in which the word is used in the phrase "occasional verses," which are verses written for an "occasion," such as an anniversary, a celebration or other event. True, they afflict us a little worse than other sorts of verse, but their name has no reference to irregular recurrence.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Moore maintains that an act can be judged right or wrong without any reference to motives or intentions. But, besides passing judgment on the act as right or wrong, one can reach quite a different judgment on the agent as morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. To this second judgment motives and intentions are relevant. Moore is right in drawing attention to this dual nature of moral judgment, a duality frequently emphasised [sic] but also frequently overlooked. ‘The surgeon did the wrong thing but you couldn’t blame him as he couldn’t have known the patient had this allergy.’ For confusions one need only look at judgments on great political decisions such as the Munich Agreement. It is clearly possible to hold that it was right to make the agreement, because if we had fought in 1938 we should have fought without the Commonwealth, and without the Hurricanes and Spitfires which won the ‘Battle of Britain’; but that Chamberlain deserves no praise for it, because these were not his intentions and motives. Or, vice versa, it may be said that it was the wrong decision because if we had fought in 1938 we should have had Russia and a strong Czech army and frontier to help us, but that Chamberlain was to be praised for the decision because his motive was an overwhelming desire for peace.

(J. D. Mabbott, An Introduction to Ethics [Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969], 23-4 [first published in 1966] [italics in original])

Here.

One of my readers, John Hadley, brought this book to my attention. I don't own it and haven't read it, but I will.

To the Editor:

As a parent of a severely colicky baby, I found very little that was of help. I finally discovered a large dose of chocolate or, in an extreme case, Scotch did the trick. What to give the baby, however, remains a mystery to me.

Peter Ryan
Vancouver, British Columbia, Nov. 11, 2005

You rotate your silverware.

During this year's National League Championship Series, Dallas Morning News sportswriter Evan Grant kept a thing called "Manager Meter," which "rates the performances of the Astros' Phil Garner and the Cardinals' Tony La Russa." Here's what he wrote one day:

Garner placed higher value on extra offense by putting Chris Burke in center for only his second career start and by playing Mike Lamb at first base. The move was made in second-guess heaven. But you can only second-guess it if it doesn't work out. Lamb had two hits, including a homer and Burke had no problems in center.

"You can only second-guess it if it doesn't work out"? That's odd, because whether it works out is beyond the manager's control. You make a decision based on the probabilities; you hope it works out. Isn't it the decision itself, in its context, that should be evaluated? Can't a manager be blamed even if the decision works out for the best, because it was not likely to? And can't a manager be praised even if the decision doesn't work out for the best, because it was likely to? I don't get it. Grant appears to be evaluating decisions on the basis of how they work out, with no attention paid to their antecedent likelihoods of working out. That is objective (as opposed to subjective) consequentialism. Hard doctrine, no? If we were to apply this doctrine to the war in Iraq, we wouldn't know whether the war was the right thing to do until all of its consequences are known, which could take a very long time. I'm not saying the doctrine is absurd or incoherent; I'm saying that its implications are painful to accept. Objective consequentialists are bullet-biters.

You have to hand it to the Left. It has repeated "Bush lied" and "Bush misled the nation into war" so many times, in so many contexts, with such vociferousness, that people have come to believe it. See here. Leftists are winning the propaganda war. Whether it translates into electoral success in 2008 remains to be seen.

Here.

The following sentence appeared in a New York Times story about leftist opposition to Judge Alito: "The Alliance for Justice poll showed that a majority of Americans would oppose Judge Alito if they thought he would vote to overturn the landmark abortion rights case Roe v. Wade." Suppose it's true that a majority of Americans favor abortion rights. What is the Left afraid of? If Roe v. Wade is overruled, the issue of abortion will be returned to the states, where the majority will have its way. Perhaps some states, such as Texas, will prohibit abortion, but many will not. There is no constitutional warrant for prohibiting states from doing as they please on this issue, as even liberal legal scholars will tell you. Roe v. Wade was a terrible constitutional mistake. It remains a blight on American jurisprudence. The sooner it is overruled, the better.

Twenty years ago, Judge Samuel Alito wrote the following: "I believe very strongly in limited government, federalism, free enterprise, the supremacy of the elected branches of government, the need for a strong defense and effective law enforcement, and the legitimacy of a government role in protecting traditional values." See here. One can only hope that he hasn't changed his mind on any of this.

This just in. Liberals have discovered that there are other issues besides abortion.

Nominee, n. A modest gentleman shrinking from the distinction of private life and diligently seeking the honorable obscurity of public office.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Ronald Dworkin appears to share my view that there is a strong correlation between doing good philosophy of law and being trained in (or having been a practitioner of) law. In his lengthy review of Jules Coleman’s book The Practice of Principle: In Defence of a Pragmatist Approach to Legal Theory (2001) in the Harvard Law Review, Dworkin claims to be puzzled by the persistence of legal positivism as a theory of law. Part of the explanation for its persistence, he says, is the view, held by many positivists, “of legal philosophy as an independent, self-contained subject and profession” (page 1679). Here is Dworkin:

On their [the legal positivists’] understanding, legal philosophy is distinct not only from the actual practice of law, but also from the academic study of substantive and procedural fields of law because both practice and academic study are about the laws of some particular jurisdiction, whereas legal philosophy is about law in general. . . . It is, in short, a discipline that can be pursued on its own with neither background experience nor training in or even familiarity with any literature or research beyond its own narrow world and few disciples. The analogy to scholastic theology is, once again, tempting. (page 1679)

Three things. First, Dworkin’s focus in this review is legal positivism, but the insularity and detachment he criticizes apply to philosophers of law who subscribe to other theories of law (such as natural law). Second, some of the positivists Dworkin criticizes, such as Joseph Raz, are trained in law, so Dworkin is not saying (nor have I ever said) that training in law is a sufficient condition for, or even conduces to, good philosophy of law. What I take Dworkin to be criticizing is not the detachment of legal positivists in particular but the detachment of philosophers of law in general. Philosophers of law who lack credentials in law tend to produce flawed, superficial, and misleading theories of law. To really understand law, and thereby contribute to a philosophical understanding of it, one must immerse oneself in it, be trained in it, and earn credentials in it. There is no guarantee that those who have these credentials will do high-quality philosophical work, obviously, but there is a good chance that those without credentials will do shabby work. Dworkin doesn’t say it (perhaps out of kindness, although he’s not known for being kind), but he appears to believe that Coleman’s flawed theory of law derives from Coleman’s lack of training in law. Third, what Dworkin says about philosophy of law applies, mutatis mutandis, to philosophy of science. Philosophers of science who lack scientific credentials live in an insular world in which they talk to themselves, but produce nothing of value to scientists.

To the Editor:

The other evening, while doing research for a brief, I encountered the exasperatingly brilliant mind of Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr. I uncovered a case that was elegantly written, well reasoned and directly on point.

It is a tribute to the man that even when I disagree with the bottom line, I can still admire his magisterial grasp of the law and his analytical brilliance. These are the things that count when assessing the qualifications of a Supreme Court nominee, and they are much more reliable indicators of excellence than sex, race, religion or political affiliation.

Christine M. Flowers
Philadelphia, Nov. 7, 2005

Here.

Here is an interesting new site. I will add it to the blogroll both here and at The Conservative Philosopher.

I maintain (see here) that having legal credentials has a significant bearing on (i.e., is strongly correlated with) how good a philosopher of law one is. Let's put the thesis to an empirical test. I have a book entitled The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, edited by Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (2002). I assume Brian Leiter considers this a high-quality work, since he is one of the contributors and since he thinks highly of Jules Coleman (as I do). The editors say the following in the preface:

All in all, . . . the project has emerged substantially as we imagined it: a collection of original essays on the major topics in the philosophy of law written by many of the most interesting and thoughtful researchers working today. (page v)

The book comprises 24 essays, two of which are coauthored, for a total of 26 authors. I have just done an Internet search of each author to examine his or her credentials. Of the 26 authors, 19 have law degrees (either LL.B. or J.D.). (Contrary to what Brian Leiter said, John Gardner has a law degree.) I was unable to locate a site for Timothy Macklem, who is described as "Lecturer in Law at King's College London." If Macklem has a law degree, and he probably does, then 20 of the 26 authors, or 76.9%, have legal credentials. That sounds like a strong correlation to me. I'm still waiting to hear what Leiter's view is. Does he believe that there is no correlation between having legal credentials and being a good philosopher of law? Does he believe that there is only a weak correlation? I wonder whether the 20 lawyer/philosophers think their philosophical work on law would be as good as it is had they not studied law.

Addendum: Just to remind you of what I said earlier, the four best philosophers of law of the second half of the 20th century—H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and John Finnis—were (are) trained attorneys. I wonder whether Leiter agrees with me that these are the four best philosophers of law. If so, does he think they would have been just as good without their legal training?

"His M.O., which is by now widely known, is to stifle his critics by threatening them with humiliation before their peers."

You're not the only one who has noticed that. See this.

11-13-85 There was a humorous exchange in [Introduction to Logic] class this morning between David Josephs and me. I was discussing two different senses of the word “or” (inclusive and exclusive) when David raised his hand and said “I always use the word ‘or’ in the exclusive sense.” “Really?” I asked, determined to make him see the error of his ways. “Haven’t you ever said, for example, ‘Mom, get me a G.I. Joe or a Monopoly game for my birthday,’ intending to leave it open that she will buy both[?]”? David shot back with “No; I use the word ‘and’ in that kind of case.” At that, the entire class burst out laughing. “It must be nice,” I chimed in, joining the laughter. I get a kick out of David. He’s one of my brightest students, and he’s not afraid to speak his mind. Today, in addition, I learned that he’s got a good sense of humor.

At least in the law realm, and among students, Leiter is seen primarily as a joke.

Go here, this is the law section of xoxohth.com, which is the preeminent law school forum on the web. I think it has the most posts of any site, and there are a number of federal clerks, a Rhodes, and vault 10 attorneys who post regularly. Enter "leiter" in the search field and see what comes up.

Maybe 5% of potential consumers of one of his products (law teaching) take him seriously.

Enjoy.

13 November 2005, 8:14 P.M. Mom: On 13 November 1985—20 years ago today—I recorded my resting heart rate for the first time. It was 64. I didn't record it again until 19 May 1986, more than six months later. But then I began recording it regularly. For many years now, I have recorded it every other Wednesday. I always do it the same way. I sit at my desk reading the newspaper, only minutes after rising, and always before I sip any coffee. I put my digital watch on the desk in front of me and put my left thumb on my right wrist. As soon as my heart rate synchronizes with a second on my watch, I remember the digit and close my eyes. I count until I reach the same digit, making sure not to count the same digit twice. In other words, I'm very careful and consistent in taking my heart rate. Along the way, I decided to keep an average of my heart rates. Every 10 recordings, I do a new calculation and write it in the margin of the paper. As of today, I have recorded my heart rate 504 times. The average is 51.91. Apparently, the average adult's resting heart rate is 72. That shows you the kind of cardiopulmonary shape I'm in. Since late April of this year, my resting heart rate has been below 50 every time. In late July and August, during the height of the bicycling season, it was 44, 43, 44, and 43 on consecutive readings. This past Wednesday, even though I've had to cut back on running because of my sore back, it was 45. This is no guarantee that I'll live for a long time. I could have a heart attack tomorrow. But if I do, it will be in spite of my years of exercising, not because of it. kbj P.S.: The lowest heart rate I've ever recorded is 42, on 9 August 2000. Lance Armstrong's resting heart rate was 32 during the 2002 Tour de France, according to OLN. In my opinion, he is the best athlete in the world.

Trial, n. A formal inquiry designed to prove and put upon record the blameless characters of judges, advocates and jurors. In order to effect this purpose it is necessary to supply a contrast in the person of one who is called the defendant, the prisoner, or the accused. If the contrast is made sufficiently clear this person is made to undergo such an affliction as will give the virtuous gentlemen a comfortable sense of their immunity, added to that of their worth. In our day the accused is usually a human being, or a socialist, but in mediæval times, animals, fishes, reptiles and insects were brought to trial. A beast that had taken human life, or practiced sorcery, was duly arrested, tried and, if condemned, put to death by the public executioner. Insects ravaging grain fields, orchards or vineyards were cited to appeal [sic; "appear"?] by counsel before a civil tribunal, and after testimony, argument and condemnation, if they continued in contumaciam the matter was taken to a high ecclesiastical court, where they were solemnly excommunicated and anathematized. In a street of Toledo, some pigs that had wickedly run between the viceroy's legs, upsetting him, were arrested on a warrant, tried and punished. In Naples an ass was condemned to be burned at the stake, but the sentence appears not to have been executed. D'Addosio relates from the court records many trials of pigs, bulls, horses, cocks, dogs, goats, etc., greatly, it is believed, to the betterment of their conduct and morals. In 1451 a suit was brought against the leeches infesting some ponds about Berne, and the Bishop of Lausanne, instructed by the faculty of Heidelberg University, directed that some of "the aquatic worms" be brought before the local magistracy. This was done and the leeches, both present and absent, were ordered to leave the places that they had infested within three days on pain of incurring "the malediction of God." In the voluminous records of this cause celebre nothing is found to show whether the offenders braved the punishment, or departed forthwith out of that inhospitable jurisdiction.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

This is funny. The author says that, whereas the Democrat Party used to be fragmented, now it is integrated, or at least not fragmented. Here are some of the Democrat constituencies:

blacks
feminists (including abortionists)
retirees
environmentalists
trial lawyers
academics
homosexuals
labor unions
teachers (and public employees generally)
pacifists

I can't discern the thread that ties them together. Can you? Wait! Maybe it's a commitment to big, intrusive, coercive government, and maybe that explains why Democrats have won only five of the past 14 presidential elections. Americans don't want a nanny state. Republicans will come together when they need to.

To the Editor:

Re "Is There a Doctrine in the House?," by Richard N. Haass (Op-Ed, Nov. 8):

Mr. Haass expresses the views of the old foreign policy establishment by arguing for "integration" as a guiding principle in foreign policy.

President Bush, by contrast, has made the use of American power for the advancement of freedom the guiding principle of his foreign policy. As he has stated, that policy reflects American values and serves American interests.

Rather than pursue integration for its own sake, America should continue to strive for the transformation of oppressive regimes.

Frank Lechner
Atlanta, Nov. 8, 2005

Note from AnalPhilosopher: George W. Bush is president of the United States of America. As such, he is obligated to do what is best for this country, not for other countries or for the world generally. If that means forming alliances with other countries, so be it. If that means not forming alliances, so be it. Working together with other countries has no intrinsic value; it is valuable only extrinsically, i.e., as a means to the end of promoting the interests of the United States. Thank goodness we have a president who understands his role.

See here.

Here.

Here.

The thuggery continues. I didn't want to break it to Leiter, for I know he respects and admires Jules Coleman, but the person who told me a while back that he (Leiter) is "complicated" (in reply to my query whether Leiter is "nuts") is Jules. Sorry, Brian! Had you not dragged Jules into this, I would not have had to quote him to defend myself. Note that Leiter didn't respond to my query (I think it's a legitimate one, don't you?) about how he views the relation between having legal credentials and being a good philosopher of law. He fastens on the term "fraud" to evade the issue. (Leiter always evades substantive issues, preferring the thuggish mode of discourse to the rational.) Am I to assume from his silence (evasiveness) that he holds view 1, i.e., that he thinks having legal credentials has no bearing on how good a philosopher of law one is? Maybe he does; he certainly holds many other perverse views. And let's not forget that Leiter thinks his being a philosopher makes him competent to declaim on every subject, indeed to be the arbiter of all that is good, true, just, and beautiful. I will continue to publicize Leiter's lunatic ravings on this blog. Thanks for visiting. I hope you return on a regular basis to observe Leiter's slow, agonizing, but ever so amusing descent into dementia. By the way, Nietzsche, whom Leiter idolizes and emulates, went insane at 44; Leiter, 42, is almost there. Leiter's blog posts, like Nietzsche's late correspondence, are becoming increasingly delusional, paranoid, and vicious. He is, quite literally, losing his mind.

Addendum: Here are some topics I plan to address in days and weeks to come: (1) Leiter's racket (i.e., how he parlayed his philosophical and legal rankings into a propaganda tool); (2) Leiter's sycophants (of whom, sadly, there are many); (3) Leiter's unseemly bragging (see his university website), and what that reveals about his personality, sense of self, and character; (4) the inferior quality of Leiter's scholarly work; (5) Leiter's belittling of undergraduate teaching (and, by implication, undergraduates); (6) Leiter's systematic evasion of substantive argument (and what this shows about his critical, analytical, and argumentative skills); and (7) Leiter's one-dimensionality (philosophically speaking, he's a one-trick pony). I will also post letters from people (including Leiter's current and former students) on all of these topics and more, so please feel free to contribute (anonymity assured). Finally, I am collecting links to sites that show Leiter's thuggishness. The idea is to create a permanent Internet record of his moral and intellectual character, one that will make his children and grandchildren proud. As this set of links grows (for Leiter's thuggishness is ongoing), it may become necessary to start a new blog. Stay tuned.

Addendum 2: I can't resist a comment on Leiter's pathetic strategy. His M.O., which is by now widely known, is to stifle his critics by threatening them with humiliation before their peers. Look what he did to Ed Feser, for example. That wasn't about Feser; it was about anyone, Feser included, who had the audacity to do or say anything of which Leiter disapproved. Leiter is telling everyone, including vulnerable graduate students and untenured professors, that if they cross him in any way, they will be humiliated publicly on his blog, which has a wide readership among law professors and philosophers. This is why I call Leiter an academic thug. He isn't interested in truth or fairness, and he doesn't have a civil bone in his body; he's interested in policing law and philosophy. He would make a good Nazi. Part of what infuriates Leiter about me is that he can't find a way to hurt me. He knows that I'm tenured and have no plans to move to another university (I'm delighted with my position at UTA). He knows, through experience, that I don't care what others think of me. (Leiter, the master of projection, here projects his obsession with reputation onto me.) His last resort, all else failing, is to make it seem as though two of my teachers, Joel Feinberg and Jules Coleman, think (or in the case of Joel, thought) poorly of me. Unlike Leiter, I don't care what Jules thinks of me. I do know (and now you do as well) what Jules thinks of Leiter. As for Joel, he's dead and gone, unfortunately, so he can't comment. I do know that Joel and I carried on a correspondence for many years; that he sat on all my committees, supervised my dissertation, and wrote letters of recommendation for me; that he asked me to teach his courses for him when he couldn't be there; that he invited me into his house and treated me like a member of his family; and that he discussed my scholarly work in one of his books and made glowing remarks (in private) about my publications. I also know—and here, having known Joel personally, I have an advantage over Leiter—that he would be very much displeased with, indeed revolted by, the way Leiter conducts himself. Joel was a gentleman. Leiter is a thug.

Addendum 3: Leiter mocks me for thinking that Jules Coleman would be a better philosopher of law if he had formal legal training. Here is Richard Posner:

Some philosophers have had additional training, experience, or knowledge that enabled them to engage constructively with specific issues of public policy. . . . Ronald Dworkin is at once a distinguished philosopher and an influential commentator on legal questions, but he was trained as a lawyer.* Mill was an economist as well as a philosopher, Bentham a lawyer and an economist, and both predate the modern compartmentalization of knowledge. I shall note later the striking dearth of nonlawyer philosophers in the ranks of scholarly writers on law.

* The pitfalls in analyzing law with only a philosopher's understanding of it are described in George P. Fletcher, "Corrective Justice for Moderns," 106 Harvard Law Review 1658, 1661-66 (1993), reviewing Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs (1992).

(Richard A. Posner, "What Are Philosophers Good For?" chap. 22 in his Overcoming Law [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1995], 444-67, at 447 [footnote 7 replaced by an asterisk]) Note to Leiter: You may commence mocking Judge Posner and Professor Fletcher.

Addendum 4: Leiter mentioned Michael S. Moore and Frederick Schauer. Both have law degrees, so neither of them is a counterexample to anything I have said. (Not that there could be a counterexample to the kind of claim I made.) My view, to repeat, is that having legal credentials has a significant bearing on (i.e., is strongly correlated with) how good a philosopher of law one is. Does Leiter even think before he writes? I'm convinced that he doesn't. As for Gerald Postema, John Gardner, and Leslie Green, I'm sure they appreciate Leiter's telling the whole world that they lack legal credentials. With friends like Leiter, who needs enemies?

I needed a good laugh before turning off the computer for the day, and sure enough I got it. See here. The editors of The New York Times write:

Democrats should put a heavy burden on Judge Alito to show that he would not do damage to the Constitution. . . .

Here's what they mean:

Democrats should put a heavy burden on Judge Alito to show that he would not undo damage to the Constitution.

Undo it, Justice Alito. Undo it.

The overwhelming majority of professors and students at Yale Law School oppose the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the United States Supreme Court. See here. That tells you everything you need to know about Yale Law School.

Brigham Young University physicist Steven E. Jones believes that the World Trade Center buildings were blown up from the inside shortly after they were struck by airplanes on 11 September 2001. See here. It won't be long before Bush-hating loons like Brian Leiter (1) endorse this theory and (2) accuse President Bush of blowing up the buildings to justify going to war in Iraq. Remember: Everything bad that happens is President Bush's fault. He is the evil genius. (Thanks to Michelle Malkin for the link.)

Is anyone besides me pleased to see President Bush engage his critics? Why did it take so long? He abandoned the field to nuts like Ted Kennedy, Harry Reid, Paul Krugman, Joe Wilson, and Cindy Sheehan for months on end, letting their rantings dominate the headlines. Is it any wonder his approval ratings have fallen? If people hear, over and over again, "Bush lied," they start to believe it. The Left has made a conscious effort to repeat this lie ad nauseam, hoping it would stick. It stuck. In general, President Bush has been a failure as a communicator. He has a bully pulpit. He should have made the case in highly publicized prime-time speeches (not Saturday-morning radio addresses, for God's sake) for every one of his initiatives. Bill Clinton could talk, but he had bad values and poor character. George W. Bush has good values and good character, but can't talk. See here for William Kristol's essay about President Bush's new offensive. (William Kristol is Irving Kristol's son.)

People who major in philosophy in college, or who get advanced degrees in philosophy, do not acquire from their studies the tools required for the analysis of social and policy issues. They do not learn law or medicine, psychology or economics, business or public policy, statistics, biology, political science, sociology, anthropology, social work, or history.* Yet right away they find themselves back in school, using their academic training to teach and write.

* This is not true of all philosophers. Some acquire an impressive competence in a second field, such as political science, literary criticism, cognitive psychology, mathematics, history of science, classics, evolutionary biology—even law. As yet, however, these interdisciplinarians have had little success in bringing philosophical insights to bear on social, political, and economic controversies.

(Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory [Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 1999], 47 [footnote 71 replaced by an asterisk])

Irving Kristol has been called the "godfather" of neoconservatism. Here is his retrospective essay on the topic from two years ago. Note that, according to Kristol, Franklin Delano Roosevelt is one of neoconservatism's "heroes." That alone takes me out of the neoconservative camp, for Roosevelt was a constitutional disaster. Catharine MacKinnon calls her version of feminism "feminism unmodified," as opposed to, say, radical feminism. I call my version of conservatism "conservatism unmodified."

Addendum: Here is another (longer) essay by Kristol.

Prison, n. A place of punishments and rewards. The poet assures us that—

"Stone walls do not a prison make,"

but a combination of the stone wall, the political parasite and the moral instructor is no garden of sweets.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

To the Editor:

Terrorists have now attacked the moderate Arab nation of Jordan, causing many to speculate that President Bush faces further condemnation in the polls of public opinion for his failure in the war on terror.

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now operate with impunity around the world, spreading death and destruction where and when they choose. Osama bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are both still at large.

America has lost its moral high ground in the world by refusing to refrain from the torture of prisoners. Untold numbers of innocent Iraqi citizens have perished under United States control.

Radicalism in Iran has now reared its ugly head again and threatens Israel. Syria once again appears intent on destabilizing Lebanon.

All this upheaval can be attributed to the president who took his eye off the ball by putting the war on terror on the back burner while launching his war in Iraq. Now we lack the resources to help those in need at home and abroad, and we are hopelessly engaged in a war in Iraq with no end in sight.

Michael Boyajian
Fishkill, N.Y., Nov. 10, 2005

Note from AnalPhilosopher: Everything bad that happens in the world is President Bush's fault. Notice that the mass murderers are not even mentioned, much less held responsible for their actions.

Here is the Dalai Lama's New York Times op-ed column on faith and science.

Brian Leiter can't stand it that someone is standing up to him. For years, he has counted on everyone being intimidated by him. His M.O., as I've pointed out before, is to threaten—and thereby stifle—those who disagree with him. See here and here. That is why I call him an academic thug. It fits. Leiter may not realize this, but Joel Feinberg, my beloved teacher, made many mistakes in his work on philosophy of law. Just ask Jules Coleman, who, like me, studied under Joel. Jules told me a few months ago that the book he took over, Philosophy of Law, was filled with mistakes and confusions. I agreed. Some of them were embarrassing. This is not to criticize Joel, who was a fabulous philosopher. It is to observe that his lack of legal training hurt his philosophical work on law. (It did not affect his work in moral or social philosophy.) Jules Coleman is a good philosopher of law in spite of his lack of legal training. He would be better—I think he'll admit it—if he had earned a law degree, and better yet if he had practiced. My point is simple (but obviously out of Leiter's intellectual reach): To be a good (or excellent) philosopher of X, one must have expertise in X, either through formal training in a discipline or, in the case of a profession such as law, through having been a practitioner. Does Leiter think that H. L. A. Hart would have been as good a philosopher of law had he not been a barrister for many years? The four best legal philosophers of the past half-century—H. L. A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and John Finnis—had formal legal training and practiced law. What does that tell you? Leiter needs to think before he writes. He continues to make an ass of himself in public.

Addendum: I'm not saying that formal training in law is sufficient for being a good philosopher of law. Leiter himself disproves that proposition.

Addendum 2: Every time Leiter attacks me, which he has been doing repeatedly, I reply (often in kind, just to show him how it feels to be abused). The links he provides to my blog bring his readers here, where they can see, by reading my posts and examining my links, what a thug he is. Either he's not very smart or he's a glutton for punishment (or both).

Addendum 3: I'm curious about Leiter's view of the relation between (1) being a good philosopher of law and (2) having legal credentials. Here are some possible views:

1. Having legal credentials has no bearing on (i.e., is irrelevant to) how good a philosopher of law one is.

2. Having legal credentials has some bearing on (i.e., is weakly correlated with) how good a philosopher of law one is.

3. Having legal credentials has a significant bearing on (i.e., is strongly correlated with) how good a philosopher of law one is.

4. Having legal credentials is essential to (i.e., is a necessary condition for) being a good philosopher of law.

My view is 3. Note that it allows for exceptions. Perhaps some of those Leiter named are exceptions, although I would not put Leslie Green in that category. I hope Leiter doesn't hold view 1! But maybe he does. He's well known for having nutty views.

Addendum 4: If you came here from Brian Leiter's blog, see here.

Roberta Millstein took time out of her busy schedule to comment on one of my blog posts. See here. I have a question for you, Roberta (assuming you come back). You call yourself a philosopher of science and a philosopher of biology, and yet, according to your curriculum vitae, you have no scientific credentials. You don't have so much as a bachelor's degree in (natural) science, much less a master's or a doctoral degree. How can you be a philosopher of X without having expertise in X, and how can you have expertise in X without having the credentials of those who practice X? I'm a lawyer, for example. I've been trained to think like a lawyer. I've practiced law. I know law from the inside. That, plus my philosophical training, is what qualifies me to be a philosopher of law. If I had no formal legal training, I would be a fraud if I called myself a philosopher of law.

Addendum: If you've come here from Brian Leiter's blog, see here.

Addendum 2: Someone wrote to say that I'm committing the ad hominem abusive fallacy. That's preposterous. A fallacy is a characteristic error in reasoning. The ad hominem abusive fallacy is committed when (and only when), instead of addressing Y's argument, X abuses Y and concludes that Y's argument is defective. I haven't done that. What argument has Millstein made that I dismissed on the ground that she lacks scientific credentials? And why is it abusive to ask for someone's credentials? Do you care whether your doctor has credentials? If so, why? What do those credentials signify?

Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I did commit the ad hominem abusive fallacy. I asked an important question in my post, did I not? Let me put it explicitly, in case it wasn't clear: Why should any scientist or layperson care (put any trust in, give any credence to, take seriously) what Millstein says about science, since she has no scientific credentials? Other philosophers might care what she says, especially since they, too, may lack scientific credentials. (Those who lack credentials have a vested interest in downplaying the importance of credentials.)

This brings me to another letter I received. The author, who wrote under a pseudonym (how brave), pointed out that Millstein has published in philosophical periodicals. Indeed she has. Philosophers of X can talk to each other, and often do talk to each other, even when none of them has credentials in X. But practitioners of and experts in X (as well as laypeople) have no reason to pay attention to what's being said by these uncredentialed philosophers. See here. I get the sense from some of the letters I've received that credentials count for nothing, mean nothing, and have nothing to do with one's credibility. (Note the common root of "credentials" and "credibility.") But if that's the case, why have advanced degrees? Why care one whit whether someone has a Ph.D. degree, for example, or a law degree, or a medical degree? (Try getting a tenure-track position in any academic discipline without credentials!)

Brian Leiter and other America-haters ought to read this speech. Here's what's ironic: Leiter idolizes Noam Chomsky, but even Chomsky believes, and has said publicly, that the United States is "the best country in the world." Will Leiter say it? Don't hold your breath. Chomsky is a patriot. Leiter is a punk.

Addendum: This is what passes for journalism at The New York Times. The reporter's tone is sneering and dismissive. Instead of reporting what President Bush said and either confirming or disconfirming factual assertions (for example, that more than 100 Democrats voted to authorize military force in Iraq), he speculates about the president's motives. "The White House is trying to do this. President Bush is trying to do that." How the hell does the reporter know what the strategy is, if any? The underlying theme of the "report" is that there's a difference between what the president says and what he means, or between what he pretends to be doing and what he's really doing. This is journalism? It's cynicism. Journalists should be skeptical. They have no business being cynical.

Mayonnaise, n. One of the sauces which serve the French in place of a state religion.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

This is too funny. Instead of engaging the arguments against homosexual "marriage," as one might expect a philosopher to do, Brian Leiter tries to explain opposition to it. (There again you have his obsession with motives—causes—rather than reasons.) Worse, his explanation (is Leiter a social scientist?) is laughable! He says those who oppose homosexual "marriage" are latent homosexuals. But if that's the case, then those who support homosexual "marriage," such as Leiter himself, must be latent homophobes. I hope you're reading this moron every day. He is hilarious! I read his blog (including the bad poetry) solely for the entertainment value.

I'd like to express my gratitude to all those who fought—and are fighting—for this country, its people, its way of life, and its ideals. Wouldn't it be nice to hear Brian Leiter express a similar sentiment, for surely he realizes, if he's half as intelligent as he thinks he is, that he is deeply indebted to many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines (not to mention their families) for the comfortable, secure, affluent life he enjoys? You won't hear it, of course. He acts as though he's entitled to the wonderful life he has, and seems oblivious to, even scornful of, the sacrifices that made it possible. Like many leftist critics of this great country, he's an ingrate.

Here is Karl Rove's speech to The Federalist Society. Wouldn't it be nice to see Brian Leiter engage Rove's arguments for a restrained judiciary? He won't, of course, because he has long since renounced rational discourse. For him, everything is personal. Rove is evil. Rove is stupid. Rove can't be taken seriously. Blah, blah, blah.

Here.

Wouldn't it be nice to see Brian Leiter, Michael Sprague, or any of the other philosophers at the Philosophy of Biology blog engage this essay (here is the second part) by Alvin Plantinga? You won't, of course. They want people to believe that there is only one conception of science, that it is neutral as between theism and atheism, and that only an idiot or a religious fanatic could think otherwise. Alvin Plantinga is no idiot, and he's certainly no religious fanatic (though he is a devout Christian). He's much more intelligent than Leiter, Sprague, et al., and he applies that intelligence by arguing for his views. When is the last time you saw Brian Leiter argue for anything? His modus operandi, by his own admission, is ranting. Read Plantinga's essay and see for yourself what his arguments are—and whether they're cogent. What we have in the debate over Design Theory, sadly, is hostility to religion. Nothing more, nothing less.

To the Editor:

Paul Krugman tells us that America's health care system "spends more, for worse results, than that of any other advanced country."

Wonder where rich Canadians go when they are sick? They cross the border to America for health care.

What American, if he were really, really sick, would voluntarily go to Canada, Germany, France or Sweden? Keep health care in America private.

Swing Meyer
Columbia, S.C.
Nov. 8, 2005

Here.

Michael Sprague replies to one of my posts here. I'm delighted to see a semi-literate and semi-civil discussion of the issues. (Sprague couldn't resist taking some cheap shots.) You'll never get anything like that on Brian Leiter's blog. The closest Leiter comes to rational engagement is linking to someone and exclaiming, "Read what this idiot wrote!" That's not argumentation; it's pandering to the prejudices of his readers. We need a name for this fallacy: How about Argumentum ad Leiterem?

Addendum: Sprague conveniently ignored the main point of my post, which is that the nature of science is contested. (Put differently, there are alternative conceptions of science.) He needs to show that limiting science to naturalistic explanations is not arbitrary, as Richard Swinburne thinks it is. If science is not limited to naturalistic explanations, then Design Theory, which explains natural phenomena in supernatural terms, should be taught in science courses, not relegated to a philosophy-of-science course. As I wrote the other day, the question is not whether science counts, but what counts as science.

Addendum 2: Sprague thinks I'm inconsistent in both (1) asking him and his fellow bloggers to engage the issues raised by Design Theory and (2) criticizing the Philosophy of Biology blog for making public-policy judgments. There's no inconsistency. There are three types of question (or claim): factual (what is the case), evaluative (what ought to be the case), and conceptual (what is included in or excluded by a given concept). Philosophers, as such, have neither factual nor evaluative expertise (where did we get it?), so anything they say on such matters has no more weight than if it were said by a layperson. Philosophers, as such, are expert only on conceptual matters, and often they disagree about such matters. The relevant concept to be analyzed by the philosophers at the Philosophy of Biology blog is science. That's what I want them to discuss! I want them to stay within the confines of their training! See here for my discussion of the standard argument against the teaching of Design Theory in public-school science courses.

Once again, it's a pleasure to be called "strange" and "uneducable" by the morally retarded Brian Leiter. I still haven't seen any engagement, by him, with the conceptual or normative issues raised by Design Theory. Isn't it odd that someone trained in analysis, criticism, and argumentation, and who fancies himself a public intellectual, has so little to say about such things? All he does is call people names, question people's intelligence, impugn people's motives, and hurl insults. What a waste of talent! As for my being "sliced and diced" by the members of the Philosophy of Biology blog (can't Leiter come up with another expression?), please read their posts and mine and make up your own mind. You can't trust Leiter to get things right, much less to be fair. His intellectual dishonesty and vindictiveness are well known throughout academia and throughout cyberspace. Just type his name into Google and see what's being said about him by his fellow philosophers and law professors.

Addendum: I see that Leiter has made further scurrilous remarks about me as an addendum to one of his posts. Leiter says I should focus on my career and stop ranting and raving about him. How thoughtful of him to be concerned about my career! My career is going quite well, thank you. Perhaps if Leiter spent more time on scholarship and less on thuggery, his own mediocre career would be more advanced. All I'm doing is standing up to him. If Leiter can't take it, he shouldn't dish it out. Many of the people Leiter abuses on his blog are afraid to stand up to him for fear of jeopardizing their careers. Just look at how Leiter operates. He knows that many philosophers and law professors, including some prominent ones, read his blog, and that anyone who crosses him in any way will be abused publicly. I get e-mail regularly from professors and students (including his own students) who thank me for standing up to him. They say they can't speak out for fear of being harmed (or humiliated) by Leiter. I'm not afraid of the creep. I honestly enjoy his venomous writings. They betray a warped mind and a vicious character. I'll leave it to you which of us is doing the projecting.

Addendum 2: If you want to read my earlier posts about Leiter, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and, especially, here.

Here is a newspaper report of a debate between Roger Scruton and Peter Singer on the moral status of nonhuman animals.

Ruin, v. To destroy. Specifically, to destroy a maid's belief in the virtue of maids.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here is Judith Miller's farewell letter to readers of The New York Times. It's nice to see her come clean about her lawlessness. She admits that there is no federal law that allowed her to refuse to testify before the grand jury. But if she broke the law, why did she think she could or should avoid punishment? As I've said in this blog many times, you can't have it both ways. You can't both break the law and protest that you're being punished. If your aim in breaking the law is to draw attention to what you believe is its injustice, in the hope of changing it, you should willingly and happily accept punishment. This is the lesson taught by Martin Luther King Jr, who was a great man. Miller obviously thinks she has a moral right to break the law. That's fine. She's entitled to work to change the law to bring it into accordance with her moral values. That's how democracy works. But having a moral right is not the same as having a legal right. She had no legal right to refuse to testify. Journalists are not above the law. She was rightly punished for her lawlessness. Whether anything comes of her civil disobedience remains to be seen.

To the Editor:

Re "At Center of a Clash, Rowdy Children in Coffee Shops" (news article, Nov. 9):

It is unfortunate that the issue of rowdy children in public places like cafes and restaurants is seen as a dispute between parents and non-parents.

It is more of a dispute between childlike parents and grown-up parents.

As the parents of a 5-year-old, my wife and I have taken our daughter out of a restaurant or even off a bus when she was being too loud and disturbing other people.

Some children may be too young to understand consideration for others, but their parents do not have that excuse.

Hooray for indoor voices!

David Hershey-Webb
New York
Nov. 9, 2005

To the Editor:

In your article, a mother, Laura Brauer, says:

"Kids scream and there is nothing you can do about it. What are we supposed to do, not enjoy ourselves at a cafe?"

What you are supposed to do, Ms. Brauer, is what my mother did: teach your child to behave in public or get a babysitter.

Kate Powers
New York
Nov. 9, 2005

Isn't it precious to see the editors of The New York Times lecturing Kansans on how to educate their children? See here. To me, the main issue in this case is the nature of science. (Nobody disputes that science counts. The dispute is about what counts as science.) One view is that science should limit itself to naturalistic explanations of phenomena. Another is that there should be no such limitation—that science should accommodate (i.e., be receptive to) supernaturalistic explanations. Richard Swinburne, a professor of philosophy at Oxford University who has written extensively on philosophy of science, has argued that the scientific method, properly understood and applied, supports theism. Read that again. He's not saying that science is compatible with theism. That's obviously true. He's saying that science supports theism. The God hypothesis (theism) explains everything naturalism explains and more, and does so in a simpler way. There are two ways to avoid Swinburne's conclusion. The first is to engage him on the merits—by showing that the scientific method does not, in fact, support theism. You never hear anyone make this case. The second is to stipulate that science is limited to naturalistic explanations. The question is whether this stipulation is arbitrary. Swinburne thinks it is. If a prominent philosopher such as Swinburne thinks it is (and he's not alone), aren't students in Kansas and other states entitled to have the case presented to them so that they can make an informed choice? What are scientists and philosophers of science afraid of? Why are they so dogmatic and defensive? See here for a just-published essay on the subject by philosopher John Silber.

Addendum: You will have noticed in reading this post that I linked to a post on the Philosophy of Biology blog. This is how the Internet works. People link to each other. The other day, I linked to a post on that blog. It showed up as a trackback on the blog—for a day or so. Then, inexplicably, it disappeared. Someone at the blog (probably Michael Sprague, who's mad at me for disclosing that he has no philosophical credentials) removed it. I suspect that the trackback that now appears on that blog will disappear as well. This shows that the members of the blog don't want discussion of the issues. I welcome engagement, as they should. If the trackback disappears, you will know that they aren't interested in rational discourse. This is another example of scientism, which is a kind of dogmatism. Let's also keep track of how I'm treated on that blog. The last time I linked to one of its posts, I was abused. I predict that I will be abused again. We philosophers teach our students that this is a fallacy (the attack on the person). Let's see whether the people at the Philosophy of Biology blog believe what they teach their students.

Brian Leiter calls those who voted for Texas Proposition 2 “mindless bigots.” Proposition 2, which amends the Texas Constitution to define “marriage” as the union of one man and one woman, was endorsed by more than 75% of voters. Admittedly, not every Texan voted, but there is no reason to believe that those who voted were unrepresentative. Is Leiter saying that 75% of Texans are mindless? And what does that mean? Ignorant, in the sense of not knowing something? But what don’t they know? What piece of information are they lacking? Leiter doesn’t tell us. Does it mean stupid, as in unintelligent? But what is Leiter’s evidence for such a sweeping judgment? Is Leiter implying that there is only one intelligent position on the matter? Surely that, and not wanting to retain the traditional understanding of marriage, is what’s mindless. The word for those who believe that certain matters are closed to inquiry or debate is “dogmatists.”

By calling supporters of Proposition 2 “bigots,” Leiter implies that they had no good reason for their votes—that they were motivated solely by animus toward homosexuals. But many of us believe that there are good articulable reasons to retain the traditional understanding of marriage, just as there are good articulable reasons to exclude dogs from voting. (I use this example because I love dogs. My belief that they should not be allowed to vote is not rooted in animus toward them. It is rooted in justice.) Leiter makes a common leftist mistake: He dismisses arguments on the basis of the motives—in this case the suspected motives!—of those who make them. Philosophers teach their students to evaluate arguments on their merits, not on the basis of the personal characteristics (including motives) of those who make them. Leiter acts as though he missed this course. It’s called Critical Thinking.

At least two of Leiter’s University of Texas colleagues, Rob Koons and Daniel Bonevac, almost certainly voted for Proposition 2 (as I did). Does he think they are mindless bigots? Would he call them mindless bigots to their faces? Maybe not. Maybe he would say that they, being highly educated and intelligent, have reasons for their views and were not motivated by animus. But why, then, does he assume that the thousands of other Texans who voted for Proposition 2 lacked such reasons? It’s all very puzzling. Don’t turn to Leiter’s blog for any kind of substantive discussion of the issue, for there isn’t any. What you get is assertion. Lots of assertion, with no supporting argumentation. And name-calling. Lots of mean-spirited, pointless, childish name-calling. Won’t Leiter’s children be proud of him when they reach adolescence and read what he has written (and see how he has treated people)? They will realize that their father is a thug.

Addendum: I have an explanation for why Leiter and other leftists dismiss arguments on the basis of the motives of those who make them. They think that good motives justify actions and social policies (such as progressive taxation and affirmative action). The end—that for the sake of which the action is performed, and which supplies the motive for the action—justifies the means. But if good motives make actions and social policies right, then, by parity of reasoning, bad motives make actions and social policies wrong. Everything comes down to motivation. It’s not what you do; it’s why you do it.

Here.

If you cherish Western civilization, as I do, you will enjoy this blog. Please note that while Western civilization is Christian, you don't have to be Christian, or even religious, to participate in it, value it, or be willing to defend it.

Addendum: While examining my posts of a year ago today, I found this.

Here.

Is it wrong of me to delight in France's destruction? Any idiot could have seen that allowing Muslims to immigrate would destroy French culture. France is a Christian country, with Christian traditions, Christian values, and Christian culture. Christians and Muslims will never live together peacefully. Their worldviews are too divergent. See here, here, and here.

Addendum: If you've come here from Brian Leiter's blog, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

Addendum 2: See here.

See here for Ruben Navarrette's column.

Maybe I'm dense, but I don't understand the point of presidential approval ratings. President Bush will never run for office again. Why should he care whether people "approve" of his job performance? He's doing his job the best he can. He's pursuing the agenda he set forth during the latest campaign. It's not as though, if enough people disapprove, he gets thrown out of office.

I just discovered this excellent blog while visiting Michelle Malkin's site. Did you know that the voters of San Francisco banned handguns? Come April, it'll be open season on law-abiding citizens. Thank goodness I'll never be there.

Pantaloons, n. A nether habiliment of the adult civilized male. The garment is tubular and unprovided with hinges at the points of flexion. Supposed to have been invented by a humorist. Called "trousers" by the enlightened and "pants" by the unworthy.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

To the Editor:

Bob Herbert writes that the public hasn't "taken the reality of this war seriously enough to do something about it" ("And the War Goes On," column, Nov. 7).

But the question is what can we do that will make a difference?

I agree with Mr. Herbert wholeheartedly about the ineptitude of the administration's misguided venture in Iraq. So what can I—one person—do?

I voted against George W. Bush; I disparage the war in conversations with anyone willing to bring up the subject. I've signed petitions and participated in public demonstrations against the war.

What else can I do? This is not an idle question.

Patricia Skalka
Chicago
Nov. 8, 2005

Brian Leiter is an intellectual, but he never gives reasons for his views. He's trained in the arts of persuasion, but he never tries to persuade. Instead, he calls people names. See here for his latest batch of invective.

Here.

Bike rallies and footraces attract photographers, who take pictures of the participants and then offer the pictures for sale. I bought a few pictures years ago, when I was new to bike rallies, but since then I've passed them by. The other day, during the McKinney rally, I was climbing a hill into a headwind when I noticed a photographer to my right. I thought it would make a good picture, so I broke down and purchased an 8x10 print. The photographer, Manny Ortiz of Celebrated Images, graciously sent me two JPEGs of the image, one large and one small. Here it is (click to enlarge):

Note the 99-cent cotton gloves, which kept my hands warm. I predict that by next year, professional cyclists will be wearing such gloves, once they see how cool I look in them.

Great news for Kansas schoolchildren. The state board of education has voted to require that they be exposed to the same debate that is taking place among philosophers and scientists. See here. This fight is not about imposing religion on schoolchildren. It is about keeping scientists from imposing their secularism on schoolchildren.

Addendum: If you've come here from Brian Leiter's blog, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

Election, n. 1. The process of electing or being elected, esp. of members of a political body. 2. Ejection. 3. Dejection.

Camel, n. A quadruped (the Splaypes humpidorsus) of great value to the show business. There are two kinds of camels—the camel proper and the camel improper. It is the latter that is always exhibited.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Texas Proposition 2, which defines "marriage" as the union of one man and one woman, is passing by a 3-to-1 ratio, according to the online edition of The Dallas Morning News. Attorney Hillel Levin wrote the other day that constitutional amendments are countermajoritarian. Of course they are. That's the point. Texans don't want to be fighting about the definition of "marriage" for the next 50 or more years. If the Texas Constitution weren't amended, someone would introduce a bill every session of the Texas legislature conferring "marriage" rights on homosexuals. Texans don't want that. They have every right to bury the issue—and keep activist judges from imposing their will on the people—by exercising their amendment rights. Why have an amendment process if it's not to be used? Levin also wrote that while Texans have the right to amend their constitution to prohibit homosexual "marriage," they shouldn't. That's disingenuous. How many times have you heard a liberal say that, while women have a legal right to abort, they shouldn't abort? I have never heard a liberal say this. To have a right is to have an option. Today, Texans are opting for the traditional understanding of "marriage."

Addendum: Henceforth, no Texas judge can rule that homosexuals may "marry" in this state. The Texas Constitution explicitly prohibits it. But the United States Supreme Court might one day rule that the United States Constitution forbids the limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples. That would nullify all state statutes and constitutional provisions to the contrary. If that ever happens, rest assured that there will be an amendment to the United States Constitution similar to that just adopted by Texans. It will be ratified in record time. My advice to homosexuals is this: Be content with whatever legal rights you have. If you push too hard, you may end up worse off.

Addendum 2: What we're seeing in the case of Proposition 2 is federalism in action. States should be allowed to define "marriage" as they please. This is not a federal matter. If you live in Texas and want to marry someone of the same sex, you're out of luck. Move to Massachusetts, which allows it.

Addendum 3: Let me get this straight. Those of us who believe that marriage is inherently heterosexual (because linked to childrearing), and that it should not be tinkered with for the sake of making people feel better about themselves and their relationships, are "fanatics." See here. This shows how utterly arrogant and obnoxious the homosexual-rights movement has gotten. What we're seeing around the country is a well-deserved backlash.

To the Editor:

Re "Bits, Bytes and Blisters: Tracking Runners From Start to Finish" (The Marathon, special section, Nov. 7):

If the computer technology used to keep track of more than 36,000 New York City Marathon runners—start times, finish times plus 6 to 12 intermediate times—can be done with a "success rate of 99.9 percent," there must surely be a way to tally election results with equal accuracy.

Shirrell Buhler
Hopewell, N.J., Nov. 7, 2005

Read this, then this. Funny, eh?

* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).

Here.

This is hilarious. The New York Times says it's "unnerving" that President Bush has three more years in office. What's unnerving is that the Times will be around for more than three years. Then again, it's losing readers, so we'll have to see.

Here.

You calculate, by hand, the mean, median, mode, and midrange of each exam you give.

I'm not making this up. Here is the second paragraph of a four-paragraph letter to the editor that appeared in yesterday's Dallas Morning News (boldface added):

Religious right-wingers who were up in arms over Ms. Miers are purring now. Obviously, Judge Alito is just what the doctor ordered. America keeps getting sucker-punched by Mr. Bush.

Metaphors are canned thoughts. This man needs some fresh vegetables.

Here.

No, I'm not talking about the football team, which I despise. I'm talking about the 1972 movie starring John Wayne. I happened upon it last night while surfing channels on my Dell 42-inch plasma high-definition television. (Read it and weep.) I think I saw all or part of this movie many years ago, but if so, I had forgotten it. In some ways, the movie was silly, but some of the scenes were powerful, and the violence was frightfully real. It was a cross between Oklahoma (the musical) and Unforgiven. If you haven't seen it, check it out.

11-7-85 There isn’t much that a defense attorney can do in a DUI case, at least in Arizona. There’s no requirement of a particular mental state such as intention or knowledge, for example, and many of the traditional criminal defenses, such as mistake and entrapment, just don’t apply in DUI cases. So we’re at wit’s end in most cases to keep our clients from being convicted. Either we argue that the intoxilyzer machine is unreliable or [we argue] that our client’s field-sobriety tests and physical symptoms have other explanations besides intoxication. Other than that, there isn’t much to do; that’s why, on pretrial statements, I list only “failure of proof” under “defenses.” My usual line of argument at trial is that the prosecutor has failed to establish one or more elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, I try to raise reasonable doubts in the minds of the jurors.

Today, however, I was able to do more than that. One of my clients, a middle-aged Hispanic man, is charged with DUI, but I noticed when I opened his file in court this afternoon that the case was old; the arrest occurred in 1983. I mentioned this fact to the judge (Ann Bowen) during the pretrial conference and was surprised to hear her dismiss the charges on speedy-trial grounds. Technically, she did it on her own motion [sua sponte], although I’m the one who raised the issue. Afterward, I tried to explain what had happened to my client, but he didn’t understand English very well [nor I Spanish]. So I finally got through to him by motioning with my hands that the charges had “gone away” and that he was a “free man.” He seemed to understand. For once, I have made a difference in someone’s life. I still haven’t won a DUI trial, but at least I got DUI charges dismissed. My client must be wondering how I did it.

Here is an essay by the authors of Freakonomics, which is ranked seventh in sales by Amazon.com. You may also find this interesting.

The bicycling season is winding down and the running season picking up. Yesterday I drove 64 miles to McKinney, a city north of Dallas, to do the Rolling Hills Fall Bike Rally. Most rallies are on Saturday. This one was on Sunday. It doesn’t matter to me, since I stay home on Mondays. (I teach on Tuesday and Thursday mornings.) The rally was my 26th of the year and 370th overall. Although I go to almost every rally, I recognized only one person—a man named Don—among the several hundred who showed up. I don’t know why the turnout was so small. The weather was gorgeous. There was a chill in the air at the eight o’clock start, but most people wore only their usual apparel: a jersey and spandex shorts. I wore a long-sleeved shirt under my jersey. Since I don’t wear bicycling gloves, I slipped on a pair of white cotton gloves to ward off the chill. I planned to remove them when it warmed up, although I never did.

The long course was advertised as 65 miles. I did it two or three times in the early 2000s, so I knew the terrain. There would be rolling hills (hence the name) much of the way. The usual wind direction at this time of year is northwesterly, but yesterday we had an east-northeasterly wind. This made for slow riding on the long west-to-east stretch. But I was in no hurry. My goal, since I hadn’t been on the bike in three weeks, was to maintain a steady fat-burning pace for about four hours. I stopped several times to chat with rest-stop volunteers; I listened to music on my Rio Karma; I enjoyed the scenery (Texas’s fall colors are on display); and, to take my mind off the drudgery of pedaling, I thought about philosophy and other subjects. I love the mental aspect of bicycling almost as much as the physical. Unlike running, which is stressful to the point of distressing, it’s conducive to reflection. Get out and ride sometime; you’ll see what I mean.

For three hours, I waited for the turn to the south that would take me back to the start. I knew I would have a tailwind at that point. Unfortunately, the road surface changed to chip seal when I turned. That means tar covered with pebbles. It’s so rough that the bike shakes. There’s so much rolling resistance that you can’t get any speed. So I slogged my way back, thinking about the bean burritos I would buy at Taco Bell on the way home and planning the rest of my day. All told, I rode 66 miles. My average speed of 15.16 miles per hour is one of my lowest, but, as I say, speed wasn’t my goal. I had fun and stayed safe. I have at least one more bike rally this year, after which I’ll focus on running until late March or early April. I ran 4.3 miles Friday and 3.1 Saturday. Today I’m resting, grading Logic exams, and preparing for tomorrow’s lectures. The topic in Logic is natural deduction. The topic in Social and Political Philosophy is desert.

Addendum: The best song of the day—there were many good ones, including Pink Floyd’s “Sheep”—was Traffic’s “The Low Spark of High-Heeled Boys.” Anybody remember it? The ending is incredible. They don’t make songs like that anymore.

Monday, n. In Christian countries, the day after the baseball game.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

It's a glorious day for the Lewis and Clark expedition. The Corps of Discovery has reached the Pacific Ocean. Sort of. Modern editors say that the Corps is seeing the Columbia River estuary rather than the ocean proper. It will be a few days before the ocean comes into view. See here for the journal entries of this date (in 1805). William Clark rarely expresses emotion in his journal, but today his joy is palpable. Imagine: The Corps left the vicinity of St Louis—the limit of civilization—on 14 May 1804, nearly a year and a half ago. It has paddled, towed, and poled the length of the Missouri River, crossed the Bitterroot Mountains, and descended the waters of the Columbia to the sea. The hope is to find a ship at the mouth of the river. Stay tuned.

To the Editor:

Re "An Organic Drift" (editorial, Nov. 4):

You write that "last week, an amendment was slipped into the agricultural spending bill without meaningful debate in a closed-door Republican meeting" that would overturn a court decision that prohibits synthetic substances in organic foods.

You add, "It would allow the agriculture secretary to approve synthetic substances if no organic substitute was commercially available."

Instead of trying to drag organic standards of purity down to its polluted level, industrial agribusiness would be better served by producing truly organic foods on organic farms, recycling farm wastes, eschewing toxic chemicals and genetically modified crops, and creating a sustainable agriculture.

If these rules become law, the Department of Agriculture's organic seal will simply become a marketing tool for chemical agriculture.

It would be interesting to know which legislators "slipped" the amendment into the spending bill and which lobbyists they dine with.

Jeff Cox
Kenwood, Calif., Nov. 4, 2005
The writer, a former managing editor of Organic Gardening magazine, is the host of "Your Organic Garden" on PBS.

Here.

To the Editor:

Does Brent Staples's blurring of the difference between blacks and whites suggest that affirmative action programs be abandoned?

Should we not treat and judge people as individuals and not as members of a race, religion, ethnic group or gender?

Howard H. Kendler
Santa Barbara, Calif., Oct. 31, 2005

Here.

Pyrrhonism, n. An ancient philosophy, named for its inventor. It consisted of an absolute disbelief in everything but Pyrrhonism. Its modern professors have added that.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here.

Whoever invented the leaf blower should be shot. See here. These contraptions are noisy, dirty, and environmentally destructive. First, they throw dust, dirt, and organic matter into the air, making it difficult for people (especially those with respiratory problems) to breathe. Second, they use gasoline, which pollutes the air. Third, they're infernally noisy. Whatever happened to sweeping or raking? Brooms and rakes are quiet; they don't throw dust into the air; and they don't destroy the ozone layer. They're also less dangerous. Would you want to walk around wearing a container of gasoline on your back? What moron would do such a thing? Nothing symbolizes our wasteful, arrogant, obese age more than the leaf blower. The sooner it is outlawed, the better.

I started this blog two years ago today. Here is the first post. Here is my first-anniversary post. I'm pretty sure I haven't missed a day of blogging—which shows how much of a homebody I am. I'm still surprised from time to time when someone (usually a philosopher) criticizes the blog for being insufficiently philosophical. First, it was never meant to be exclusively, or even primarily, philosophical. Anyone who can read can see this by looking to the left, in the sidebar. It is and has been a literary outlet—a public space in which I express (some of) my thoughts and feelings. Yes, some of the posts are philosophical in nature. That's to be expected, given that I'm a philosopher. But many are not. Second, even the nonphilosophical posts often have a philosophical dimension. If I clarify something in a post about baseball, for example, I'm doing philosophy. To me, philosophy is conceptual analysis. It is the process of clarifying ideas, arguments, and methods. When I express a value in this blog, I am not doing so in my capacity as a philosopher, for, in my view, philosophers, as such, have no evaluative expertise. Nor do we philosophers have factual expertise. (Where did we get it?) If I get the facts right about something, it's because I did my homework, not because I drew upon my philosophical training.

I've enjoyed the past two years. I hope you enjoy reading what I write, either because you learn from it or because you're entertained by it, or both. As of this moment, 377,736 people have visited AnalPhilosopher. Many people have visited many times, no doubt, but that just means they like what they find here and come back for more. Long live the blogosphere!

In case you haven't been to my Animal Ethics blog recently (or at all), here is the latest post.

Nihilist, n. A Russian who denies the existence of anything but Tolstoi. The leader of the school is Tolstoi.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

By establishing an ideological litmus test, Senate Democrats are once again playing out their role as a gravedigger of democracy.

To be sure, both parties have played politics with Supreme Court nominees, but when a principled conservative is prevented from serving on the court, democracy is the loser.

Democrats will rue the day when principled liberals are similarly turned down by Republicans with their own litmus tests. Where will the future Ginsburgs, Breyers, Rehnquists and, for that matter, O'Connors come from?

David Shulman
Berkeley Heights, N.J., Nov. 4, 2005

Here is the final paragraph of an editorial opinion in today's New York Times:

One of the most common, and depressing, recent phenomena on state ballots is the presence of initiatives aimed at curbing the rights of homosexuals. In Maine, where the State Legislature recently expanded discrimination laws to include protections for homosexuals in housing, education and other areas, voters are being asked to exercise a so-called people's veto to reverse that law. In Texas, meanwhile, voters are being asked to approve an amendment cementing the current law against same-sex marriage into the State Constitution. We hope the good citizens of both states resist.

Notice the manipulative rhetoric: "curbing the rights of homosexuals." What rights? Texas has never allowed homosexuals to marry, and, in all likelihood, never will. If you don't like it, move to Massachusetts. That's how federalism works. But even if there were a legal right to marry, what's wrong with rescinding it? Is a right, once implemented, permanent? What if the Texas legislature, in a fit of collective insanity, conferred a right to vote on dogs? Would we be stuck with it forever? Obviously not. If the Times thinks there is a moral right of homosexuals to "marry," as opposed to a legal right, it must argue for it. This editorial opinion makes no such argument. It is a bald expression of leftist dogma.

Here.

Here is the Wikipedia entry on Travis County District Attorney Ronnie Earle, who is prosecuting Tom DeLay. Remember: An indictment is an accusation, nothing more and nothing less. Let's let the process run its course.

Here is a New York Times story about the teaching of "Intelligent Design" (I now put quotation marks around this term, since it is redundant). Those who oppose the teaching of Design Theory (my term) argue as follows:

1. Only science may be taught in public-school science courses.

2. Design Theory is not science.

Therefore,

3. Design Theory may not be taught in public-school science courses.

The claim is that the following three propositions are logically inconsistent:

A. Only science may be taught in public-school science courses.

B. Design Theory is not science.

C. Design Theory may be taught in public-school science courses.

The propositions are indeed logically inconsistent—unless, of course, the word "science" is being used in different senses in A and B. I will assume for the sake of analysis that this is not the case. Any two of the propositions entail the falsity of the third. (Take a moment to confirm this.) Two of the propositions—A and C—are evaluative in nature. The second—B—is conceptual in nature. Since philosophers have conceptual but not evaluative expertise, their opinions about A and C have no more weight than those of any randomly selected person, including you. (The same is true of scientists.) As for B, there is dispute among philosophers (and scientists) about the nature of science and about whether Design Theory is science, so looking to philosophers (or scientists) for guidance on this matter is fruitless.

Since the three propositions are logically inconsistent, no rational person can accept all of them. Every rational person, therefore, must reject at least one of them. The proponents of the argument reject C, but there is no reason why everyone must reject C. Someone might reject A. John Rawls described a method known as "reflective equilibrium," which involves finding a balance between principles and judgments. Sometimes principles should be modified to accommodate judgments. Sometimes judgments should give way to principles. There are three equilibria to be struck here, not just one.

Here.

Mark Spahn pointed out to me that what used to be called "inconsistency" is now, all too often, called "hypocrisy." Hypocrisy is a kind of inconsistency—between one's words and one's deeds—but not all inconsistency is hypocrisy. If I believe both p and not-p, I have inconsistent beliefs, but I'm not on that account a hypocrite. Another example of the coarsening of political discourse is the conflation of lying and misrepresenting. All lies are misrepresentations, but not all misrepresentations are lies. A lie is a misrepresentation (or at least a believed falsehood) uttered with intent to deceive. Those who believe that President Bush lied about the war in Iraq should be specific. What exactly did he say? What is the evidence that he believed it to be false at the time he uttered it? What is the evidence that he uttered it with intent to deceive? Calling someone a liar (or a hypocrite) is a serious charge. It should be done only if one has ample evidence to back it up.

Addendum: Here is an example of what I'm talking about. As I've said before, Brian Leiter is a sloppy thinker, a reckless writer, and a bad person. He contributes nothing to serious political discourse. Why, then, do I visit his blog? To watch him make an ass of himself.

Urbanity, n. The kind of civility that urban observers ascribe to dwellers in all cities but New York. Its commonest expression is heard in the words, "I beg your pardon," and it is not inconsistent with disregard of the rights of others.

The owner of a powder mill
Was musing on a distant hill—
Something his mind foreboded—
When from the cloudless sky there fell
A deviled human kidney! Well,
The man's mill had exploded.
His hat he lifted from his head;
"I beg your pardon, sir," he said;
"I didn't know 'twas loaded."
Swatkin.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here and here.

I just discovered a wonderful thing. Go here. Type in a name (e.g., "Burgess-Jackson") and you will get a list of books that contain that name. I had to create an account to be able to do this, but it's free and simple.

To the Editor:

I am grateful to David Brooks for reminding Senator Harry Reid and the New York Times letter writers who waste no opportunity to call the president a liar that President Bill Clinton and his team believed that Saddam Hussein's rule was a threat to United States national security. The Bush administration concurred.

It is not possible for President Bush to have "misled" the American people about the rationale for the war in Iraq when he believed that what he was telling us was true. End of conspiracy.

The president acted to protect the country. I believe this without benefit of zapped fillings. It is the plain truth.

Margaret McGirr
Greenwich, Conn.
Nov. 3, 2005

Here is a site devoted to milblogs. Let me take this opportunity to thank those who are serving in the armed forces. I appreciate your sacrifices and your efforts. You make me proud to be an American.

Conservatism is a disposition or temperament. It involves moving slowing where change is concerned, being respectful of precedent and tradition, and not arrogating to oneself the power to make decisions for others, especially when those others have an epistemic advantage. Conservatives believe that decisions should be left to those most affected by them. Judge Samuel Alito is a conservative in this sense. See here. It's unfortunate that the term "conservative" has come to represent a set of positions on issues. Unlike liberals, who have distinctive substantive commitments, conservatives are concerned with the pace and source of change. As I've said many times, conservatives are not opposed to change per se; they are opposed to abrupt change (especially that which is irreversible) and to exogenous change. It's as unfair to say that conservatives oppose change as it is to say that liberals support change. Everything depends on the nature of the change, the pace of the change, and the source of the change. Judging is inherently conservative, for it requires that decisions be fitted to those already made. Judges do not write on a blank slate. The assumption is that rules and institutions that have stood the test of time embody reason. We can think of this as the inherent or immanent rationality of the law. It's no accident that political conservatives are drawn to the common law, which is judge-made, while liberals are drawn to statutory law. Liberals want to engineer society. Legislation is an effective means to this end, since it is not beholden to precedent or tradition. Conservatives want to conserve what has served us well. Liberals believe that their use of reason is superior to that which is embodied in precedent and tradition. Conservatives view this as a hubristic and dangerous attitude.

Executive, n. An officer of the Government, whose duty it is to enforce the wishes of the legislative power until such time as the judicial department shall be pleased to pronounce them invalid and of no effect. Following is an extract from an old book entitled, The Lunarian Astonished—Pfeiffer & Co., Boston, 1803:

LUNARIAN: Then when your Congress has passed a law it goes directly to the Supreme Court in order that it may at once be known whether it is constitutional?

TERRESTRIAN: O no; it does not require the approval of the Supreme Court until having perhaps been enforced for many years somebody objects to its operation against himself—I mean his client. The President, if he approves it, begins to execute it at once.

LUNARIAN: Ah, the executive power is a part of the legislative. Do your policemen also have to approve the local ordinances that they enforce?

TERRESTRIAN: Not yet—at least not in their character of constables. Generally speaking, though, all laws require the approval of those whom they are intended to restrain.

LUNARIAN: I see. The death warrant is not valid until signed by the murderer.

TERRESTRIAN: My friend, you put it too strongly; we are not so consistent.

LUNARIAN: But this system of maintaining an expensive judicial machinery to pass upon the validity of laws only after they have long been executed, and then only when brought before the court by some private person—does it not cause great confusion?

TERRESTRIAN: It does.

LUNARIAN: Why then should not your laws, previously to being executed, be validated, not by the signature of your President, but by that of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court?

TERRESTRIAN: There is no precedent for any such course.

LUNARIAN: Precedent. What is that?

TERRESTRIAN: It has been defined by five hundred lawyers in three volumes each. So how can anyone know?

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

KBJ:

Perhaps it is age. Or the depression of earlier nightfall and the approach of winter (a serious matter in Wisconsin). But allow me to thumbnail my current state of mind?

This country is split in two—not unlike the North and South. There seems to be an absolute divide that shows no sign of relenting. With it comes (in my opinion) a real chance of bloodshed: another civil war. Both sides are so polarized each sees the other as demons bent on destroying the country, if not life as we know it. Let me suggest the following with the proviso that senility sneaks up on those of us 60 and older. In the end, some marriages are not meant to BE!

Let us split the country. Call it mutually agreeable "secession." (No fault divorce?) All land west of the Mississippi will be governed by the Constitution. No "living, breathing" document here. Perhaps call it "Scalia Land?" Originalists. East of the Mississippi will be governed by a constitution that is living and breathing. Modern. Open to current day interpretation. OK, liberal and conservative sectors with "moderates" choosing whichever is more to their liking. . . .

This transition would take 10-20 years to allow a comfortable transition. Folks could plan well ahead to move into the half that suits them. But the clear understanding would be each half has its own Constitution and Supreme Court as liberals and conservatives envision it today.

Personally, I'd add an amendment to West America's Constitution: all levels of government, taken together, cannot (by statute) take more than 25% from its citizens. This includes ALL taxes and levies and fees: government's TOTAL TAKE. In other words, get at the ESSENTIAL differences between liberals and conservatives and give both sides THEIR country. It is this or civil war, beginning with domestic terrorism.

Lincoln had the choice: a bloodletting or a split. Many believe a split was workable IN that slavery would have died a natural death soon enough. No matter. Our great divide will not be settled. Give both sides what they want with a workable transition. But SOMETHING must be put on the table to stymie the visceral hatreds that seem to be festering.

Or is it just me? And winter?

Will

Hillel Levin argues against Texas Proposition 2 here. Levin thinks the issue of homosexual "marriage" should be resolved by the legislature. (Many people, and he may be one of them, think it should be resolved by the courts.) The point of the proposed amendment is to take the issue out of the legislative arena—and Texans have every right to do so. Texans don't want to be fighting about this issue every legislative session for the next 50 years. We have other and more important business to attend to. If and when views change, the Texas Constitution can be amended again to return the issue to the legislature (or the courts). Let's see how the vote goes. I predict a two-to-one ratio in favor of the amendment. I wouldn't be surprised if it were four to one. (By the way, the Texas Constitution is not—and has never been—limited to procedural matters. Levin should read it some time.)

As for Levin's claim that Proposition 2 "wrongly discriminates," he must think that with respect to marriage, heterosexuals and homosexuals are similarly situated, for only if they are similarly situated would it be wrong (unjust) to treat them differently. If they are not similarly situated, then justice requires that they be treated differently (in proportion to their differences). Allowing homosexuals to "marry" is like allowing dogs to "vote." Denying dogs the right to vote is not unjust. Allowing dogs to vote would be unjust. Nor need such a denial be rooted in prejudice or animosity. It is rooted in justice. It is an acknowledgment of the fact that dogs lack the capacity to participate in the institution.

To the Editor:

Paul Krugman (column, Oct. 31) writes: "It's hard to get leading figures to admit that they were misled into supporting the Iraq war. Kudos to John Kerry for finally saying just that last week."

I say shame on John Kerry for waiting. What does he know now that he didn't know in August 2004, before the presidential election?

If Senator Kerry had mustered the backbone to admit that he was misled then, he would have very likely won the election, and the "political nightmare" that Mr. Krugman so aptly describes might now be just a bad memory.

Beverly Marcus
Seattle
Nov. 1, 2005

Here is Peggy Noonan's latest column.

Here.

Here.

Things aren't going so well in Paul Krugman's* socialist, multiculturalist paradise. See here and here. I'd rather be dead than live in France. Wouldn't it be fitting if Bush-hatin' Paul were forced to live there?

* "Op-Ed columnist Paul Krugman has the disturbing habit of shaping, slicing and selectively citing numbers in a fashion that pleases his acolytes but leaves him open to substantive assaults" (Daniel Okrent, "13 Things I Meant to Write About but Never Did," The New York Times, 22 May 2005).

It's pretty bad when one of the contributors to a blog entitled "Philosophy of Biology" complains that it's light on philosophy of biology. See here. There's a lot of discussion of public policy, though. If only philosophers had expertise on such matters!

What assumptions are being made here, by these left-wing jerks?

See here. It took me about two columns to realize, several years ago, that Maureen Dowd (1) has nothing to say to me and (2) contributes nothing to rational public discourse. She is a waste of space, both physically and journalistically.

I grew up eating grilled cheese sandwiches. When I was 15, I learned that I was allergic to dairy products, so out went grilled cheese sandwiches. A few years ago, I realized that I could go back to eating them if I used fake cheese, of which there were, by then, many delicious varieties. It was like reconnecting with a friend. But somehow I forgot about them until, the other day, my mother mentioned them. Have you ever accidentally eliminated something from your diet? My refrigerator is now stocked with many varieties of soy-based cheese. I eat grilled cheese sandwiches about twice a week. They're great with tomato soup on a cool fall day. Needless to say, I use high-quality breads such as German Pumpernickel, Whole Grain Nut, and Jewish Rye. (I had to put something between the German bread and the Jewish bread.) See here.

Here is an excerpt from Judge Samuel Alito's comments at the White House this past Monday:

I owe a great deal to many people who have taught me over the years about the law and about judging, to judges before whom I have appeared, and to colleagues who have shown me with their examples what it means to be a fair and conscientious and temperate judge.

I also owe a great deal, of course, to the members of my family. I wish that my father had lived to see this day. He was an extraordinary man who came to the United States as a young child, and overcame many difficulties and made many sacrifices so that my sister and I would have opportunities that he did not enjoy.

As the President mentioned, my mother will be celebrating her 91st birthday next month. She was a pioneering and very dedicated public school teacher who inspired my sister and me with a love of learning. My wife, Martha, has been a constant source of love and support for the past 20 years. My children, Philip and Laura, are the pride of my life and they have made sure that being a judge has never gone to my head—they do that very well on a, pretty much, daily basis. And my sister, Rosemary, has always been a great friend and an inspiration as a great lawyer, and as a strong and independent person.

Notice the correct use of "my sister and I" and "my sister and me." I love this man.

Bill Vallicella has just put up a post over at The Conservative Philosopher about the liability of gun manufacturers. See here. By the way, Bill has an excellent solo blog, Maverick Philosopher. You could do much worse than to visit it every day.

Addendum: Bill and I are happy customers of PowerBlogs. If you're thinking of starting a blog (or moving an existing blog), please give some consideration to PowerBlogs. Tell them AnalPhilosopher sent you.

Miscreant, n. A person of the highest degree of unworth. Etymologically, the word means unbeliever, and its present signification may be regarded as theology's noblest contribution to the development of our language.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Jimmy Carter was thrown out on his ear after four years as president. See here. Wouldn't a normal person conclude from such a humiliating defeat that Americans don't want to hear from him—that we don't care what he thinks and have nothing to learn from him? See here for a review of Carter's new book.

Here.

See here for the surprising answer. (Thanks to Bob Hessen for the link.)

Nobody supposes that all white people think alike. Some whites are anarchists. Some are libertarians. Some are conservatives. Some are utilitarians. Some are proponents of a comprehensive welfare state. Some are Rawlsians. Some are socialists. Shouldn’t we expect the same diversity among black people? Wouldn’t it be racist to assume that all, or even most, black people think alike? And yet, that’s precisely what many liberals do. Powerful black conservatives such as Condoleezza Rice, Clarence Thomas, and Janice Rogers Brown are viewed as Uncle Toms, Oreos, or Stepin Fetchits because they dare to think for themselves. How does this differ from any other black stereotype? Why is it not seen as racism? Have liberals persuaded themselves that only conservatives are racist? But why would that be, unless liberals think that conservatives are more susceptible to character defects? (Racism—making assumptions about people on the basis of their race—is a character defect.)

In my experience, racism is as prevalent among liberals as it is among conservatives. Sometimes I think it’s more prevalent among liberals, even those who are highly educated and even those who pretend to be refined, sensitive, and open-minded. Remember: I was a liberal for many years. I know how they think, what they value, and why they behave the way they do. I’ve been a party to liberal jokes. I’ve heard what they say about conservatives. I’ve seen how they operate when it comes to distributing benefits and burdens. How many liberals have been conservatives? How many liberals have a sympathetic understanding of conservatism? How many liberals take conservatism seriously enough to engage it, rationally? Not many, I suggest; and that may be why liberals are prone to mischaracterize conservative thought and sentiment. They are ignorant.

To the Editor:

In your critique of Judge Samuel A. Alito Jr.'s conservative credentials (editorial, Nov. 1), you cite his ruling that a husband must be notified before a woman can obtain an abortion, calling it "outrageous," as evidence of his extreme conservative philosophy.

I respectfully submit that informing a husband before his wife terminates his child's life is far from extreme and is a difficult matter that requires thoughtful debate. Is it really so extreme to afford the husband at least an opportunity to persuade his wife to proceed with the pregnancy? It's his child, too.

Your characterization of this ruling as extreme serves only to expose your own extreme bias.

Ari Weitzner
New York
Nov. 1, 2005

Here.

Dragoon, n. A soldier who combines dash and steadiness in so equal measure that he makes his advances on foot and his retreats on horseback.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Did you know that both black and white cab passengers discriminate against black cab drivers? See here.

Law, n. 1. Politics. 2. Economics. 3. Morality. 4. Religion. 5. Literature. 6. Violence. 7. Science. 8. Logic.

Here is a new blog that may be of interest. Unlike some bloggers, I am more than happy to help smaller bloggers get started.

Here.

Here is a balanced, thoughtful essay about Judge Alito by law professor Jonathan Adler. Compare it to this scurrilous blog post by Brian Leiter, who calls himself a law professor but who appears not to believe in the rule of law. Leiter quotes Judge Richard Posner with approval to the effect that "ideology affects decisions." What is supposed to follow from that factual claim? Certainly not that judges may, should, or must allow ideology to affect their decisions! That something is the case doesn't mean that it ought to be the case. People murder. They shouldn't. People steal. They shouldn't. People cheat. They shouldn't. Some judges (the lawless ones) allow their personal values (their "ideology") to affect, or even to dictate, their decisions. They shouldn't. It's interesting that Leiter quotes Judge Posner with approval, since the learned judge (whom I respect and admire, but with whom I disagree about many things) is notorious for thinking that judges should make policy and not merely enforce constitutional and legislative values. See here. The Supreme Court, contrary to Leiter, is not a "super legislature." Only someone who does not believe in the rule of law, or who does not understand our political system, or who is intent on deceiving his readers, could say such a silly and childish thing.

Here.

Every day, without fail, I read all the letters to the editor of The New York Times, online. I select one letter for publication in this blog. What amazes me about the letters is their dogmatic content and tone. Nine of ten are critical of the Bush administration. That's fine. But many of them reveal that the writer is captive to leftist myths. For example, on the Valerie Plame affair, all anyone knows at this point is that one man (Lewis Libby) has been indicted. He has not been indicted for violating the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which prohibits the "outing" of covert agents. And yet, many letter writers (see here) say or imply that the entire Bush administration is corrupt, deceitful, and vindictive. This is dogmatism. A dogmatist has a closed system of beliefs. Nothing is allowed to count against any of the beliefs. In fact, what would ordinarily count as evidence against the beliefs is taken as confirmation of the beliefs. That only one person, so far, has been indicted merely shows how devious the other members of the administration (including President Bush and Karl Rove) are. My general reaction, upon reading the letters, is disbelief—first, that intelligent people have such shoddy standards of evidence; and second, that people allow their beliefs to be dictated by their feelings, such as hatred. But what should I expect, when readers of the Times are exposed every day to the vile screeds of Paul Krugman, Bob Herbert, Maureen Dowd, and Frank Rich? These columnists set the tone. Their readers mimic them.

To the Editor:

Paul Krugman ("Ending the Fraudulence," column, Oct. 31) explodes the myth of "leadership" in regard to the Bush administration's long litany of "Midases in reverse." I would add to his accounting the myth of this president being a "compassionate conservative."

President Bush is the master architect (or pawnbroker) of policies that are neither compassionate nor conservative. There is nothing fiscally conservative about squandering a federal surplus by cutting taxes for the wealthy, thereby bestowing a huge federal debt on our children and grandchildren, while at the same time fighting a misbegotten war.

And compassion is missing when the social safety net is made more threadbare by wanton disregard for the plight of the poor and most needy.

How interesting that this president's right-wing base of evangelical Christians, who fervently extol "intelligent design," would countenance policies that are Darwinian in their "survival of the fittest" outcomes.

Barbara Allen Kenney
Atlanta, Oct. 31, 2005

The editorial page of The New York Times is, in the words of my teacher Alvin Goldman, a reliable anti-authority. Today, the Times expresses opposition to Supreme Court nominee Samuel Alito. See here. Thank goodness. Had the Times expressed anything besides opposition, I would have been concerned.