AnalPhilosopher

How is the animal-rights movement doing? Is it making progress? See here for one man's take.

Dear Keith,

In your post of 3/31/04 1:22:05 PM, you classify chess as an intellectual contest rather than as a sport, which is a physical contest. You seem to be saying that chess (and checkers) are intellectual contests with no physical, hence no sport, dimension. If this is what you are saying, then I disagree.

Tournament chess, which, like all serious chess, is played with clocks, is extremely demanding physically as well as mentally. Suppose the primary time control is 40 moves in 2 hours, the secondary control is 20 moves in 1 hour, and the tertiary control is 1 hour sudden death. Such a contest could last 8 hours with no adjournment! But even if a game lasts 3-4 hours, the physical demands become considerable. To play well, one must be physically fit and keep oneself supplied with nutrients during the game. Physical training is an essential part of the training regimen for the top players.

So I would say that chess counts as a sport. The Dutch employ the term, Denksport. Besides the sport aspect, it is easily arguable that chess has aspects of an art and a science.

There can be no doubt about it: Chess is the game of kings, and the king of games!

Regards,
Bill Vallicella

I received the following message from a reader:

Enjoyed your article on Tech Central Station re: traditional values and conservatism [see here]. It prompted the following blog entry:

A rare insight by way of a blog by Paul, a 'right-of-center, gun-owning, gay Texan', here quoting Keith Burgess-Jackson (BJ), who calls himself AnalPhilosopher: 'Conservatism is committed to a presumption in favor of tradition. Presumptions by their nature are rebuttable. Law is filled with presumptions. There is a legal presumption that people accused of crimes are innocent. To a conservative, traditions are innocent until proved guilty.'

This idea ties in nicely with a US government funded study of the psychology of conservatism, published last year by some of Stanford, California, and Maryland Universities' finest minds. Amongst other things, they discovered rightwing thinkers to be rather dogmatic and averse to ambiguity. So BJ calls on us to follow tradition dogmatically, without proving its value first and he talks of black and white concepts like innocence and guilt.

Yet BJ talks in the abstract, neither defining his traditions nor the crimes of which they're accused. And he talks as if a tradition accused is on a par with a person accused of crime, which is just silly. Of course, leftwing thinkers—and US liberals—do care less for tradition. They tend to concern themselves with issues like prejudice, poverty, and inequality; aberrations they regard as criminal. And all too often they find dogmatic, traditional values—a woman's place in the home, say—at the root of these crimes.

Here is my reply:

31 March 2004, 3:55 P.M. Stephen: Thanks for writing. With all due respect, your letter expresses the liberal bigotry I discussed (and condemned) in my column. You think you're open-minded and I'm a bigot. That's a distortion of the situation. (At a minimum, it's a contentious description.) Our values differ. You accord a presumption to individual liberty (or equality). We conservatives accord a presumption to tradition. We can call each other bigots if we like, but what's the point? Why not just acknowledge that our values differ, and that this leads us to create (and act upon) various presumptions? Each of us is trying to gain power through the political process so as to implement, solidify, and protect our values. kbj

As you were. Time to play softball with the geezers.

Pedestrian, n. The variable (and audible) part of the roadway for an automobile.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Keith,

I wanted to personally inform you about the death of my father, Joel Feinberg, on Monday around 8:30 AM. He died peacefully after sleeping for about 6 days. There will be a memorial this Saturday at Academy Village, 13701 Old Spanish Trail, at 2 PM.

Sincerely,
Ben Feinberg

Do you remember Bart Giamatti? He's the classicist who presided over Yale University and served a stint as commissioner of Major League Baseball. He's the commissioner who kicked Pete Rose out of baseball and then, as punishment for this historic misdeed, died of a heart attack. Giamatti wasn't a philosopher, but to his credit he thought like one. One of the things philosophers do is impose order on (or discern order in) chaos. They classify. They organize. They array. They construct classification schemes, models, taxonomies, flowcharts, and typologies. They sort things out. The rest of us, philosopher and nonphilosopher alike, are the better for it. We grasp relationships that might otherwise have escaped our attention and understanding. Philosophers—the analytic ones, at any rate—help us make sense of the world.

One concept that fascinated Giamatti, as it should fascinate all of us (we are, after all, homo ludens), is play. What is it, and how does it differ from other things to which it's related and with which it might be confused? What do all cases of play have in common that leads us to classify them as cases of play? Perhaps there is no single feature that all cases have in common. Perhaps there is only a cluster of playmaking characteristics (playmakers?) such that possession of some significant subset of them makes a thing a case of play. In other words, perhaps play is a family-resemblance concept.

Here, for your contemplation, consternation, and edification, is Giamatti's taxonomy of play. (If I could insert one of my famous charts in this blog, I would; but I can't, so I won't. Feel free to draw your own chart.) First, Giamatti distinguished between spontaneous and organized forms of play. He called the latter "game." A game, by definition, is organized play. Within the class of games, Giamatti made another distinction: between those games that are competitive (which he called "contests") and those that are noncompetitive. All contests are games, but not all games are contests. Finally, within the class of contests, Giamatti distinguished between those that are intellectual in nature and those that are physical in nature. He called the latter "sport." A sport, by definition, is a physical contest.

Obviously, these last two categories are not mutually exclusive (even if they are jointly exhaustive). Baseball, for example, is both intellectual and physical. I doubt that any physical contest is devoid of intellectual content (with the possible exception of soccer), but some intellectual contests lack a physical dimension. So let's restate the distinction as follows: Contests are either purely intellectual or a mix of intellectual and physical. That makes the categories both mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

Giamatti's three distinctions create four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive categories of play. The first is spontaneous play. This is exemplified by children playing with trucks in the sand. The second is intellectual contest. This is exemplified by chess and checkers. The third is sport. This is exemplified by the sport of the gods, baseball, and by its siblings, bicycle racing and footracing. The fourth is noncompetitive games. This is exemplified by solitaire.

What do you think? I, for one, find Giamatti's taxonomy illuminating. By the way, I was kidding about soccer. I personally get nothing out of it (except unremitting boredom), but I know lots of people do, and I can't afford to be losing readers by disparaging them! I do wonder, however, where golf goes in the taxonomy. I'm inclined to put it in the intellectual-contest category with chess. It grates on me to call golf a sport. Do golfers even sweat? (Oops! There goes my golfing audience.)

In case you're interested, here are the publication details of Giamatti's book: A. Bartlett Giamatti, Take Time for Paradise: Americans and Their Games (New York: Summit Books, 1989). The taxonomy is set out on page 14. Rest in peace, Bart. Our beloved game, baseball, is alive and, well, alive.

To the Editor:

Monikers like "Geezers, Gerries and Golden Agers" (Week in Review, March 28) may seem funny to some, even to those they "describe," but they are part of the ubiquitous bias of ageism that I have come to believe does more to emotionally disable and marginalize elderly people than all natural age-related illnesses combined. And you don't have to be very old to be adversely affected.

And while I don't "go gently," and continue to write and speak against age discrimination, I am more and more discouraged by the growing acceptance of this societal injustice (even by older people's advocates and organizations), to which no one in the "no longer young" group is immune.

BETTE DEWING
New York, March 29, 2004

To be sure, death is not always and necessarily a harm to the one who dies. To the person in hopeless, painful illness, who has already 'withdrawn his investments' in all ulterior interests, there may be nothing to lose, and cessation of agony or boredom to be 'gained', in which case death is a blessing. For the retired nonogenarian, death may not exactly be ardently desired, but still it will be a non-tragedy. Those who mourn his death will not think of themselves as mourning for him, but rather for his dependants [sic] and loved ones, if any, or simply in virtue of the capacity of any memento mori to evoke sadness. In contrast, when a young vigorous person dies, we think of him as chief among those who suffered loss.

(Joel Feinberg, "Harm and Self-Interest," chap. 3 in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980], 45-68, at 61 [italics in original] [essay first published in 1977])

When North Texas weather is bad, it's very bad. When it's good, it's very good. Today it is good. We have sunshine, dry air (from the north), and a temperature of 67.1 degrees (Fahrenheit, of course). Walking Sophie and Shelbie just now, I was serenaded by birds of many species. Their individual songs created a beautiful symphony. Native Americans were fond of saying that it's a good day to die. No. It's a good day to live. Alas, I have student essays to grade, but I can do it outside, on my back patio, with an avian symphony as my soundtrack.

And so too, it seems, should one make a return to those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured against money, and they can get no honour which will balance their services, but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents, to give them what one can.

(Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, rev. by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson, The World's Classics [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980 (1925)], 221-2)

"(1) the consequences of our invasion have turned out to be worse than plausible alternatives" [see here].

In what regards and by what measurement? Plausible is not necessarily probable. I think possible worlds in which we may have expected rosier consequences are remote. That said, I certainly think there were lessons to be learned on the part on the US in regards to rebuilding infrastructure, securing the peace, and reinstitution of government.

The other important point to consider here is that the complete book on Iraq has yet to be written. If in the next 10-20 years Iraq turns out to be a decent democracy and a leading state in the Middle East, then the war will appear to future generations as a complete success and Bush will likely be looked on as a hero.

"(2) the means used to wage war were not proportional to the effect to be achieved."

Again I'd have to ask for better explication. The US used targeted conventional weapons to overthrow a brutal regime, not biological/chemical agents or nukes. I can't imagine that you are urging that we should have used fewer troops or lighter munitions.

By the way, proportionality is a secondary jus ad bellum concern. If you wanted to make a just-war argument you'd be on firmer ground basing your critique on the three primary jus ad bellum concerns: just cause, just authority, and right intention. One ongoing concern regarding just war and Iraq is the doctrine of preemption versus preventative war. (Thought I'd throw you a bone.)

"(3) the results of our invasion have not made us any safer."

If you think Saddam was not a threat to the US then I'd have to kindly urge you to pull your head out of the sand. Saddam may have not been the greatest threat facing the US, but that doesn't negate that he was a threat. For your argument to succeed you'd have to show that Saddam and his loyalists were not and never would be a threat to the US.

"(4) it is unjust to wage war."

I don't want to whip out a thousand years of just-war theorist on you, but if you really want to go down this road I think you have no chance of winning this argument.

In regards to Carrier's new four you might point out that the sanctions were failing and there was growing world pressure to drop them. Sanctions are not non-violent. I'd think most ethicists would know that sanctions hurt the people at the bottom the most, and they only help dictators cement their power. If Carrier is concerned about consequences he ought to consider the consequences of the sanctions regime which killed far more Iraqi civilians than the war did.

Further, Carrier has no grasp of the international legal system. By "World Court" I take him to mean the International Court of Justice. Well, at least he didn't say the International Criminal Court, since the court cannot hear cases from before July 1, 2002. Unfortunately for your argument, the ICJ cannot prosecute for war crimes either. Only UN states may appear before the ICJ, not individuals. Besides which, to my understanding, it is not a criminal court. You may have been thinking of the existing ad-hoc tribunals: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), which were created by the UN Security Council. Although they try individuals for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, their mandate is limited; in the case of the ICTY to the region of the Former Yugoslavia, and in the case of the ICTR to crimes committed in Rwanda between April and June 1994. Setting up such ad-hoc courts is expensive and time-consuming, and because they are established after the fact, they are often criticized as victor's justice.

One side note. I wonder what your take on William Safire's piece "Follow-Up to Kofigate" was. [See here.]

Here is the latest on Ralph Nader's presidential candidacy. I'm one of the rare birds mentioned in the story: a conservative supporter of Nader. Go, Ralph, go!

Brian Leiter has a nice tribute to Joel Feinberg here. I agree with everything he says about Joel. I was Joel's student from mid-August 1983, when I started my graduate studies at The University of Arizona, until 1 August 1989, when I defended my dissertation. Joel served on all my committees and directed my dissertation. I was always in awe of the man and felt undeserving to be mentored by someone of his stature. That he asked me to teach his courses from time to time, wrote about me in one of his books, invited me to his house, helped me get a job, responded to my letters long after I left Tucson, and in general treated me with kindness and respect, meant more to me than words can convey.

Let me give one example of Joel's kindness. After one of my major exams (probably the Ph.D. qualifying exam, which determines whether one is allowed to proceed in the program beyond the M.A. level), I was in my small apartment on the east side of town. I was probably celebrating by listening to a favorite album. The telephone rang. It was Joel. He said he wanted to let me know that everyone on the committee thought I had done very well on the exam. He called because he didn't want me to think I had scraped by or anything. Imagine how this made me feel. Joel had a way of making every person he knew—including his many students—feel special.

In all honesty, I have never heard a single disparaging word about Joel, personally or professionally. I am honored to have known him. He is one of the most important people in my life. Think about it. I'm deliriously happy with my life as a philosopher. Joel made that possible. He's responsible for my happiness! Whenever I explained this to him, he dismissed it by saying he was only doing his duty. "You shouldn't express gratitude to those who do their duty," he would say. "Gratitude is appropriate only in cases where one has gone beyond the call of duty." But that's just it. He did far more than his duty by any reasonable standard. That he thought he was doing his duty and nothing more demonstrates his magnanimity. He was the Mother Teresa of philosophy.

I am grateful to Keith Burgess-Jackson for letting me air my arguments on his weblog. It is also interesting to me that, from reading his ethical views, I find that we do not differ that much in theory. I am also a subjectivist in ethics, believing that Hume was right in speaking of that "sentiment of humanity" to which all our evaluative judgments must appeal. I am also an ethical pluralist in holding that there is no one ethical principle that is without exception; and, given the circumstances, any one of them might be overridden. I also believe that the rational thing to do is to try to keep one's beliefs in a moral equilibrium.

Where we disagree, apparently, is on the facts. Let me take the points of Professor Burgess-Jackson's 3/30 post in the order that he presents them.

(1) He says that justification for invading Iraq must look to "what consequences could be reasonably expected, given what was known." I agree. I disagree that we knew enough to reasonably expect anything more than we got. Other old hands, including an ex-CIA correspondent of mine who worked many years in the Middle East, predicted the aftermath. Their advice was simply disregarded by those in the Bush administration who had unrealistic expectations.

(2) Burgess-Jackson thinks our means were appropriate to the end. I think he confuses "end-in-view" with "end" as consequence. Granted, there was a wonderful end-in-view—democracy dominos in the Middle East after Saddam's fall. But that end-in-view was unrealistic. One can't employ bunker busters and cluster bombs that kill innocent people solely on the fervent wish that Arabs would flock to Western-style representative democracy. Islam is more important to Arabs than our form of government.

(3) Burgess-Jackson says that we are safer because of the war. Where is the evidence? Judging from the anti-American rhetoric that is emanating from Iraq, we are making new enemies every day.

(4) Burgess-Jackson disagrees that other means could have been used to oust Saddam Hussein. I maintain, rather, that war should be a last alternative. We could have continued to keep international pressure on his government, including prosecution for war crimes in the World Court. This is not a simple solution, since it takes time. But even Chile's Pinochet finally had to answer for his crimes, and it was done in a legally sanctioned way.

L. S. Carrier

I've been blogging for almost five months. During that time, as my regular readers know, I have linked to many sites, including personal blogs. I'm happy to help aspiring bloggers, in part because I received so much help of my own (from the likes of John Ray and Greg Goelzhauser). I'm paying it forward. I'm delighted, for example, with the success of Peg Kaplan over at what if? and Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative. But I don't link only to sites of those who share my values. How many times have I linked to essays with which I disagree? Just this evening, I linked to the text of Peter Carruthers's book The Animals Issue. I read this book in 1996 and disagree emphatically with its conclusion that animals lack rights. You, however, might read it and agree with Carruthers. Would I prefer that you not agree with Carruthers? Yes—for the sake of the animals. Does that prevent me from recommending it to you? Of course not. Of course not.

I try to be fair. The blogosphere should be open to reasoned discussion. Let the truth emerge from the clash of opinions. As a philosopher, I welcome and encourage debate. I want you to read what I write, obviously, but I also want you to read what's written by those with whom I disagree. Unfortunately, not everyone sees things this way. I've come across several prominent bloggers who refuse to link to sites in which views contrary to their own are expressed. Brian Leiter is the most conspicuous example. I hinted quite broadly to him early on that I would appreciate a link. I never got it. At first I thought he was dense, but now I think there's a different explanation. Leiter is a leftist. He knows I'm a conservative. He doesn't want to direct his readers to a conservative site. If I'm wrong about this, he can prove it by linking to my blog. Don't hold your breath.

Another culprit is Andrew Sullivan. How many times have I linked to his blog? Dozens, right? Has he linked to my blog? No. I've sent him many of my blog entries by e-mail, so it's not as if he doesn't know me. Ah, you say, but you've been critical of him. Exactly! Wouldn't an honest, confident person engage his or her critics in a public way? Not Sullivan. Nor am I alone in this regard. Sullivan refuses to link to Donald Luskin. See here. Don Luskin is a dogged critic; but he's fair. He gives reasons for his disagreements, whether they're with Paul Krugman, Andrew Sullivan, or someone else.

Sometimes I think there's a game being played. There's a kind of hierarchy among bloggers. Andrew Sullivan gets upwards of 50,000 hits a day (or so I read some time back). I get about 400. Sullivan may think that I'd get more out of a link from him than he would out of a link from me. Okay, but so what? Many relationships are like that: parent and child, for example. Suppose everyone reasoned in this manner. Glenn Reynolds of InstaPundit wouldn't link to anyone, because he's the top blog dog. I would link to Sullivan and Reynolds, but not to people who get fewer daily hits than I do. Isn't this stupid and petty? With all due respect to Leiter and Sullivan, I think they're afraid of their critics. By refusing to link to them, they (1) insulate themselves from criticism and (2) hide their shortcomings from their readers. This is pusillanimity. One wonders why they took up blogging in the first place.

Full disclosure: Don Luskin linked to my site right away, and has linked to me several times since. He even put a permanent link on the left side of his blog, for which I am grateful. I can tell from my site-counter data that Don's links have sent many of his readers my way. What did it cost him? Nothing. Okay, a few seconds of his time. What did it gain him? Respect—and a loyal reader. Not to put too fine a point on it, but Don Luskin is a better person than Brian Leiter and Andrew Sullivan.

Peg Kaplan is back home in Minnesota, home of the irrepressible Jesse Ventura and the irresponsible Walter Mondale, after a fabulously successful bridge tournament in Reno. She's back to blogging as well. See here. Good to have you back, Peg! The average intelligence of the blogosphere just increased.

The question whether Christianity requires vegetarianism is open. If you think it's closed, you're not keeping up. Here is a list of books on the topic. May I make a suggestion? Until you've read and digested these books, why not institute a moratorium on meat-eating? Give animals the benefit of the doubt.

If you'd like to read a book (online) in which the author, a prominent philosopher, denies that animals have rights, see here.

Dance, v.i. To leap about to the sound of tittering music, preferably with arms about your neighbor's wife or daughter. There are many kinds of dances, but all those requiring the participation of the two sexes have two characteristics in common: they are conspicuously innocent, and warmly loved by the vicious.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Len Carrier, a retired philosophy teacher (but not a retired philosopher!), opposed the war in Iraq. He writes (see here for the full letter):

My main reasons against our invasion are as follows: (1) the consequences of our invasion have turned out to be worse than plausible alternatives; (2) the means used to wage war were not proportional to the effect to be achieved; (3) the results of our invasion have not made us any safer; (4) it is unjust to wage war, foreseeing that the conflict will result in the deaths or maiming of innocents, which otherwise could have been prevented.

(1) Carrier says the consequences of war "turned out" to be worse than plausible alternatives. Unless one is an actual-consequences consequentialist, which I am not, that's irrelevant. The question is what consequences could reasonably be expected at the time, given what was known. (2) As for the means, I disagree with Carrier. I believe the means were proportional and appropriate to the end. (3) I also disagree that we (I assume he means Americans) are no safer as a result of the war. We're much safer, as are Iraqis, Iranians, Kuwaitis, Israelis, and others in the Middle East. Not only are we safer, but the world is a much better place in other respects as a result of the war. It's freer, for example. It's more just. (4) I reject Carrier's fourth reason.

Carrier has done nothing to change my mind that the war in Iraq was justified. Has he changed your mind?

Here is an interesting essay by William Saletan on the misguided strategies of the so-called pro-choice movement. I'm reminded of the tendency of students asked to defend a thesis to say or imply that there is no case for the denial of the thesis. But things are rarely this stark. There is almost always a good case to be made for the other side (as every lawyer knows). The pro-choice movement appears to think that unless the fetus has no moral or legal status whatsoever, the case for abortion rights collapses. They therefore do everything they can to deny moral and legal status to the fetus. But this leads to absurdities, as Saletan shows.

Keith,

This is in response to your post of 3/29/04. Far be it from me to be considered a "pundit." I rely only on logic and the power of observation. I am certainly not one of those who would criticize our invading Iraq only by questioning the motives of those who made that decision (although those motives might make the reasons given for our invasion suspect).

My main reasons against our invasion are as follows: (1) the consequences of our invasion have turned out to be worse than plausible alternatives; (2) the means used to wage war were not proportional to the effect to be achieved; (3) the results of our invasion have not made us any safer; (4) it is unjust to wage war, foreseeing that the conflict will result in the deaths or maiming of innocents, which otherwise could have been prevented.

As you can see, these reasons contain both consequentialist and deontological considerations. I am willing to challenge anyone who disputes these claims. Of course, as a philosopher, I am willing to revise any of my claims in the light of further evidence. But I should remind those who disagree with me that the waging of war requires serious reasons; those who dissent are the ones entitled to those reasons.

L. S. Carrier

To the Editor:

I was startled to read in "Less Jaw, Big Brain: Evolution Milestone Laid to Gene Flaw" (front page, March 25) your reference to "the more graceful human jaw, in contrast to apes' protruding jaw and facial ridges."

This is uncalled for. Believe me, we don't look so pretty to chimpanzees either.

CAROL JOCHNOWITZ
New York, March 25, 2004

Here is Paul Krugman's latest rant, courtesy of The New York Times. Reading it, one wonders about two things. First, did Krugman apply the same standard to the Clinton administration, which was every bit as vile, ruthless, and duplicitous as Krugman says the Bush administration is? Second, will he apply the same standard to the Kerry administration, should there be one? (Perish the thought.) I think it's clear that he didn't and won't, in which case, he's applying a double standard. Double standards without relevant differences are irrational. When they involve human beings, they're immoral.

Madonna is the true feminist. She exposes the puritanism and suffocating ideology of American feminism, which is stuck in an adolescent whining mode. Madonna has taught young women to be fully female and sexual while still exercising control over their lives. She shows girls how to be attractive, sensual, energetic, ambitious, aggressive, and funny—all at the same time.

American feminism has a man problem. The beaming Betty Crockers, hangdog dowdies, and parochial prudes who call themselves feminists want men to be like women. They fear and despise the masculine. The academic feminists think their nerdy bookworm husbands are the ideal model of human manhood.

But Madonna loves real men. She sees the beauty of masculinity, in all its rough vigor and sweaty athletic perfection. She also admires the men who are actually like women: transsexuals and flamboyant drag queens, the heroes of the 1969 Stonewall rebellion, which started the gay liberation movement.

Contemporary American feminism, which began by rejecting Freud because of his alleged sexism, has shut itself off from his ideas of ambiguity, contradiction, conflict, ambivalence. Its simplistic psychology is illustrated by the new cliche of the date-rape furor: "'No' always means 'no.'" Will we ever graduate from the Girl Scouts? "No" has always been, and always will be, part of the dangerous, alluring courtship ritual of sex and seduction, observable even in the animal kingdom.

Madonna has a far profounder vision of sex than do the feminists. She sees both the animality and the artifice. Changing her costume style and hair color virtually every month, Madonna embodies the eternal values of beauty and pleasure. Feminism says, "No more masks." Madonna says we are nothing but masks.

Through her enormous impact on young women around the world, Madonna is the future of feminism.

(Camille Paglia, "Madonna I: Animality and Artifice," in her Sex, Art, and American Culture: Essays [New York: Vintage Books, 1992], 3-5, at 4-5 [essay first published in 1990])

Has anyone besides me noticed Andrew Sullivan's slipperiness? See here. When it appears that homosexual "marriage" is going to be forbidden by constitutional amendment, he's a federalist, clamoring for the rights of states to decide for themselves. When it appears that there's a chance for state or federal courts to mandate homosexual "marriage," he talks the language of fundamental rights. He's a federalist when he's losing but not when he's winning. For him, federalism isn't a principled position; it's a hedge. What he really wants—as readers of his blog well know—is to force homosexual "marriage" down everyone's throat. Don't trust him.

Jody Kraus, my friend from graduate school (and now a professor of law at The University of Virginia), just forwarded the following message to me (thanks, Jody):

Friends, I regret to inform you that Regents Professor of Philosophy and Law (Emeritus) Joel Feinberg died today, March 29, in Tucson following a long illness.

Professor Feinberg retired from the University of Arizona Philosophy Department in 1994 after 17 years on the faculty. Prior to his appointment at Arizona, Professor Feinberg taught at Brown University, Princeton University, UCLA, and Rockefeller University. He held the B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from the University of Michigan.

Professor Feinberg was internationally distinguished for his research in moral, social, and legal philosophy. His major four-volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, was published between 1984 and 1988. Professor Feinberg held many major fellowships during his career and lectured by invitation at universities around the world. He was an esteemed and highly successful teacher, and many of his students are now prominent scholars and professors at universities across the country.

Professor Feinberg is survived by his wife, Betty, daughter, Melissa, and son, Ben. The family is planning a memorial to be held later this week on a date to be determined.

Professor Jules Coleman of Yale University is presently composing a proper professional obituary for Professor Feinberg.

You are welcome to forward this message to others.

Christopher Maloney
Head of Philosophy
University of Arizona

I will write about Joel in days to come. Here, for those who would like to savor the work of a great philosopher, is his bibliography. Incidentally, my department just created an award in honor of Joel. See here. It would be nice if all of Joel's students throughout the world created awards in his name at their universities.

Hi Keith:

I agree with the points you made [here], however I would add something to this. Never should a civilized nation or group of nations negotiate with terror groups. We should however try to understand why in particular Middle Eastern people dislike the West. I think the Bush administration is heading in the right direction by trying to turn Iraq into a Democratic state. This should make the rest of this slag heap take notice.

If we look at all the economic numbers coming out of Iraq at the moment they are just fabulous. Electricity shortages are occurring because consumption has gone way up—much higher than when the creep was running the country. There are gas shortages because since the end of the war 500,000 vehicles have been imported and sold. Real estate prices in the major cities are much higher. White-goods sales are off the charts. Most importantly real wages are going higher. This is all great stuff and it's all due to the wonderful liberation of Iraq by America.

Joe

Fool, n. A person who pervades the domain of intellectual speculation and diffuses himself through the channels of moral activity. He is omnific, omniform, omnipercipient, omniscient, omnipotent. He it was who invented letters, printing, the railroad, the steamboat, the telegraph, the platitude, and the circle of the sciences. He created patriotism and taught the nations war—founded theology, philosophy, law, medicine and Chicago. He established monarchical and republican government. He is from everlasting to everlasting—such as creation's dawn beheld he fooleth now. In the morning of time he sang upon primitive hills, and in the noonday of existence headed the procession of being. His grandmotherly hand has warmly tucked-in the set sun of civilization, and in the twilight he prepares Man's evening meal of milk-and-morality and turns down the covers of the universal grave. And after the rest of us shall have retired for the night of eternal oblivion he will sit up to write a history of human civilization.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Hi Keith,

How have you been? I've been enjoying your recent columns on Tech Central Station and your Animal Ethics blog. In case you're interested, I just wrote an essay attempting to persuade my fellow libertarians of what I call a "reasoned animal rights position" based on the so-called Argument from Marginal Cases. My feeling is, if I can persuade just a few libertarians or conservatives that animal rights is not as ridiculous as they thought—that it is a legitimate position that a person can accept rationally—I will have accomplished something.

Dave

To the Editor:

Re "Jefferson, Madison, Newdow?," by Kenneth C. Davis (Op-Ed, March 26):

As Mr. Davis so eloquently stated, my brother Michael Newdow stood before the Supreme Court for all of us.

By seeking to remove "under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance, Dr. Newdow is protecting all Americans. Who can say if and when any one of us will be in the minority?

Isn't it astounding that the settlers came here to escape religious persecution, and yet we continue to do the same thing by condemning atheists or anyone else we deem as nonbelievers? On 9/11, when religious zealots caused the unspeakable destruction of our hearts and souls, they did it in the name of their God.

True freedom is the right to practice your religion but not inflict those beliefs on anyone else. Religion is fine, it just does not belong in government. Period.

JULIE NEWDOW
New York, March 26, 2004

Only a fanatic—someone so zealous as to have lost the capacity to think clearly—could oppose a law that punishes feticide. See here. This has nothing to do with abortion, the legal right to which, for better or for worse, remains intact. (See here for discussion of this point by experts.) Look: I have a right to destroy my property. That doesn't give you a right to destroy my property. I have a right to spank my children. That doesn't give you a right to spank my children. Women have a (legal) right to kill their fetuses. That doesn't give anyone else a (legal) right to kill their fetuses. It's so simple and so obvious that it makes you wonder about the intelligence and good will of those (see here and here) who oppose the law. Here is a PDF version of the bill, which is known as the Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004. President Bush has announced his intention (see here) to sign the bill into law. Once he does, fetuses will be protected from everyone except their mothers.

I just subscribed to The Salisbury Review: The Quarterly Journal of Conservative Thought so I can keep up with British conservatism. The review was founded by Roger Scruton, so you know it has high literary and philosophical standards. For more information, including details on how to subscribe, click here.

By the way, did I ever tell you that I'm attracted to all things British? I love British rock-and-roll music (Led Zeppelin, Black Sabbath, Queen, Yes, Genesis, The Who, &c), British humor, British philosophy, and, especially in women, British accents. I'm an Anglophile. I'm also a Francophobe, despite having studied French for four years and despite loving the Tour de France. I'm the anti-Jefferson.

It pains me to say this, but the quality of argumentation concerning the war in Iraq is low, even among pundits. One might expect the uneducated to commit fallacies, but it's inexcusable for anyone with any education to make the reasoning errors I see every day.

For example, there's still an obsession in many quarters with President Bush's motivation in going to war. He did it for ulterior reason U, it is said, not for stated reason S. But what's the upshot of this? Is the implication that, if President Bush were badly motivated, the war was unjust, so that the only question is whether he was badly motivated? That's a non sequitur. Well-motivated, good people can act wrongly and poorly motivated, bad people can act rightly. We can and should evaluate persons, motives, and actions separately, by different standards.

Nor does it follow from the fact (if it is a fact) that President Bush's stated justification for the war was inadequate that the war was unjust. There can be more than one argument for a given proposition, such as "The war in Iraq was just." That some or all of these arguments are unsound does not establish the falsity of the conclusion. Unsound arguments can have true conclusions! Critics of the war must do much more than find fault with President Bush's stated justification for the war. They must address all arguments for the war. Having found fault with all of them (not just some), they must construct a sound argument against the war. I haven't seen anyone come close to doing this. There's usually a quick dismissal or questioning of President Bush's motives or reasoning and then a leap to the conclusion that the war was unjust. This is sloppy thinking.

Let me discuss another war-related matter. I've heard it said that the war in Iraq does not satisfy the requirements for a just war under just-war theory. But theories, whether in science or in morality, are revisable in light of experience. The process known as reflective equilibrium requires that one find a balance between one's theory or principles on the one hand and one's judgments in particular cases on the other. If the theory gives too many unacceptable results, it may have to be modified or abandoned. Sometimes accommodation should be made in one's judgments rather than in one's theory.

Suppose just-war theory entails that the war in Iraq was unjust. That doesn't prove that the war was unjust; it just raises the question whether the theory should be modified or abandoned. There are three possibilities:

1. Modify or abandon the theory (while retaining the judgment that the war in Iraq was just).

2. Retain the theory but abandon the judgment that the war in Iraq was just.

3. Show that the theory, properly understood, does not have the stated implication. In other words, show that just-war theory does not, in fact, entail that the war in Iraq was unjust.

My point is that it's not unreasonable for a proponent of the just-war theory to revise it in light of the judgment that the war in Iraq was just. Perhaps the just-war theory needs revision in light of our experience with terrorism. Our theories must change with the times, and the times they are a changin'.

I say again here, what I have said in the pages which follow, that from the faults and weaknesses of bookmen a notion of something bookish, pedantic, and futile has got itself more or less connected with the word culture, and that it is a pity we cannot use a word more perfectly free from all shadow of reproach. And yet, futile as are many bookmen, and helpless as books and reading often prove for bringing nearer to perfection those who use them, one must, I think, be struck more and more, the longer one lives, to find how much, in our present society, a man's life of each day depends for its solidity and value on whether he reads during that day, and, far more still, on what he reads during it. More and more he who examines himself will find the difference it makes to him, at the end of any given day, whether or no he has pursued his avocations throughout it without reading at all; and whether or no, having read something, he has read the newspapers only.

(Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. J. Dover Wilson, Landmarks in the History of Education [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960], x [first published in 1869])

I posted a quotation by dog trainer Vicki Hearne over at Animal Ethics. See here.

Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative does his usual good job of discussing the terrorist mentality. See here. Speaking of which, I heard today that the new leader of Hamas in the Palestinian territories described President Bush as an enemy of Islam and Muslims. He also said that God has declared war on the United States. See here. This plays into President Bush's hands. Polls show that Americans have significantly more faith in President Bush's international leadership than in would-be president John Kerry's. As a result, every report, quotation, or incident that reminds Americans of the dangerous world in which we live—of the people who would happily kill us—will push them further into President Bush's camp. The Kerry campaign will eventually recognize this and try to downplay foreign affairs. Kerry's only hope is that there are no more terrorist attacks (or even credible threats) between now and November. He will focus on domestic affairs, in which, to many people, he has a comparative advantage over the president. It will be tragic if Americans worry so much about stagnant job growth that they put their lives and the lives of their children at risk. A vote for Kerry is a vote for fiddling while Rome burns.

We have compared two conceptions that claim the name justice.

One is that of rendering every man his due. A man's due is what he has acquired by his own efforts and not taken from some other man without consent. A community in which this conception is realized will be one in which the members agree not to interfere in the legitimate endeavors of each other to achieve their individual goals, and to help each other to the extent that the conditions for doing so are mutually satisfactory. These agreements obtain at the level of the individual citizens, for which reason I call this conception justice from the bottom up. ("Up": there may develop a hierarchical arrangement with those at the top having special duties of enforcing the agreements; but if so, the decision concerning which agreements to enforce will not originate with them.) Such a community will be one giving the freest possible rein to all its members to develop their particular capacities and use them to carry out their plans for their own betterment. If this activity is The Good for Man (and I hold with the Philosopher that it is), then it is appropriate to call the associated conception of justice natural.

The other conception holds justice to be the satisfaction of needs so as to bring everyone as far as possible onto the same plateau of pleasurable experience. The view of human life underlying it is that life consists of two separable phases, production and consumption; the consumption phase is where The Good lies; there is ultimately no reason why any individual should have any more or less of this Good than any other individual; and the problem of how to secure the requisite production is merely technical. Society based on this conception must be structured as a hierarchy of authority, in order to solve the problem of production and to administer justice, i.e. to adjust the satisfaction quanta. Thus I have called this justice from the top down (though of course I don't think it is really justice at all).

Justice from the top down as I have described it does not sound attractive. I have tried to account for the fact that, nevertheless, it commands the enthusiastic support of so many clever men and women and is everywhere on the march by showing its emotional basis in the structure of the family, an institution that has been felt to be, at its best, a warm, conflict-free, loving refuge from fear and anxiety. Many people do not really want to grow up, and when they do they yearn for a return to blissful dependence in the family or even in the stage of development previous to that. I do not think it can be controverted that this is part of the explanation for the popularity of top-down justice; but nor can it be the whole, for such a complex phenomenon must be due to many factors. Among them are: genuine compassion for the unfortunate and altruistic desire to help them; fantasies of omnipotence, to which powerless academic intellectuals are exceptionally liable; and envy. What the proportions are, is anybody's guess.

As there is no hope of lessening the influence of these emotions in human affairs, the triumph of the top-down cannot be stemmed unless there are yet more powerful emotions to pit against them. What might they be? I can think of three possibilities: the desire that everyone has that he himself should be given his due, and the concomitant outrage, with which more and more people are becoming acquainted, when the top-down authority denies it; revulsion witnessing the actual, practical effects of top-down justice, e.g. in Cambodia; and finally the life force itself, Spinoza's conatus, the endeavor of each thing to persevere in its being, and not (except in parasites) by sucking forever but by getting proper solid nourishment. I hope these are strong enough to prevail and show this funeral oration to have been premature: Justice is not dead, only mugged by intellectual hoods.

(Wallace Matson, "Justice: A Funeral Oration," Social Philosophy & Policy 1 [autumn 1983]: 94-113, at 111-3 [italics in original])

Cartesian, adj. Relating to Descartes, a famous philosopher, author of the celebrated dictum, Cogito ergo sum—whereby he was pleased to suppose he demonstrated the reality of human existence. The dictum might be improved, however, thus: Cogito cogito ergo cogito sum—"I think that I think, therefore I think that I am;" as close an approach to certainty as any philosopher has yet made.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Have you ever wondered what contemporary analytic philosophers think about love and allied concepts, such as care? See here for an insightful review (by Notre Dame philosopher Philip L. Quinn) of a new book (The Reasons of Love) by Princeton philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt. I think you'll enjoy it. By the way, you can have reviews such as this sent to you by e-mail, as I do. Here is the main page of Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Click on "Subscribe," type in your e-mail address, and wait for the reviews to start coming. Isn't the Internet great?

To the Editor:

I disagree with Thomas L. Friedman ("No Vote for Al Qaeda," column, March 25) when he, in effect, tells the democratic world not to vote the way it wants to simply because that's what terrorists would like us to do.

Mr. Friedman seems to say that even if your heart and instincts tell you to vote a certain way, even if your government lies and deceives you when it sends young people to die in a war and even if your leaders mislead you about who committed terrorism in your country, you should ignore all that and keep the liars and deceivers in power. To do otherwise, in this view, is to appease the terrorists.

If this is what post-9/11 voting has become—a reflexive effort to achieve the opposite of what the terrorists want—I think that the terrorists must be very happy that they have robbed us of our democracy.

BONNIE MCGRATH
Chicago, March 25, 2004

Keith:

As I fast approach my 60th year I cannot help but reflect upon our apparent agreement that there is a struggle between Thinkers and Feelers. More important is whether this has been an eternal struggle or is it now reaching critical mass. Likely all who have walked upright age with the notion that the succeeding generation is heading in the wrong direction. But in MY last quartile of life I seem to be bombarded with more and more proof that the feelers are winning . . . and we have reached a point of no return. Hence a constant struggle against depression ensues. I guess I seek some perspective, some rational evidence that I am wrong.

I further posit (although not new to me) that this conflict can also be distilled into a sexual realm. Generally (with many notable exceptions), women are more likely to be feelers and men thinkers which results in the additional question: is this thinker/feeler struggle really a struggle of men vs. women? With some proof, women are now more prone to say men have been in control long enough (i.e., look where THINKING has gotten us . . . !) and now think it's THEIR turn (can't we all . . . just . . . get along???). Indeed, watch politicians promote the Nanny State more and more as they sense this shift. Even Bush pays homage to this (note his horrific domestic policies) and dares projecting his masculine side ONLY in his War on Terror. And even this last vestige of masculinity is under attack by our more sensitive compatriots. I sit here frozen in disbelief as society washes over me each day, be it the bulk of the media or assorted intelligentsia. Clearly, the feelers seem to be holding the cards and are frittering away (or denouncing) man's best hope: a reliance on thinking—not feeling. With a grade school teacher as a wife, there is no doubt that schools now have a singular purpose: to make little boys into little girls.

Lastly, capitalism can be linked to thinking—to masculinity, while socialism (and the Nanny State . . .) is feminist in nature. When bolt upright in wide-eyed shock at the goings on, usually "The Neutering of America" comes to mind. This, by the way, is not a sexist tirade as I believe we all need both proper mothering AND fathering. Sadly, it appears the latter is under attack. The final nail in its coffin will be if Bush's remaining gonad (and his War on Terror) is snipped off this fall. Your journey into conservatism (mine landed me closer to the libertarian camp) was possible in an educational environment far different from today. Spend some time in any local public grade or high school today then ask yourself how many of these creatures will ever discover the path YOU took to conservatism?

Best, Will

Here is a policy statement by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). I quote from the statement:

Physicians for Human Rights was one of the first organizations to document Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against his own population, and in 1988 testimony before the United States Senate we concluded that the massacres of Kurds and destruction of thousands of their villages amounted to genocide.

The United States Government has decided that Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, and their concealment, pose such an overwhelming threat to international security that it warrants military action against Iraq if disarmament cannot be achieved in any other way. Neither human rights nor international humanitarian law prohibit war, nor do they provide any guidance on the evaluation of claims of security threats the Bush Administration makes to justify a military attack. As a human rights organization, focused as we are on compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law and without special expertise in evaluating security threats, we have traditionally not taken a position on whether such military intervention is justified. Rather, PHR has demanded that during the course of war, human rights law, the Geneva Conventions, and other aspects of international humanitarian law be respected and that violators be held accountable, including criminally accountable where warranted.

PHR does believe, however, that in extreme situations and as a last resort when all diplomatic and other means have failed, military intervention may be necessary to save people from genocide and crimes against humanity committed on a massive scale. We called for such intervention in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo. In the late 1980s a military intervention to stop genocide against the Kurds would have been justified. Should Saddam Hussein once more commit crimes against humanity, including by using chemical or biological weapons against his own people or others, or if such use were imminent, military intervention could well be justified if other means of stopping or preventing these actions proved fruitless.

The regime of Saddam Hussein continues to commit systematic human rights abuses against the Iraqi people, including denial of free expression, imprisonment without trial, torture, and extrajudicial execution of political opponents. These are serious violations of human rights, and need to be opposed and ended. However, PHR has seen no evidence that the regime of Saddam Hussein is committing or is about to commit genocide and crimes against humanity against the people of Iraq or others today. In fact, while the Bush Administration has cited the horrific human rights record of Saddam Hussein in its advocacy for a war, it has not explicitly made prevention of genocide or crimes against humanity against a primary reason for military intervention.

Let me get this straight. Saddam Hussein committed genocide, which would have justified military intervention, and at the time this statement was released he was still perpetrating "systematic human rights abuses," including torture and summary execution, but the genocide had stopped (thank goodness!), so taking him out was impermissible. This isn't thinking; it's feeling.

The mass graves in Iraq (mentioned in 3/27 post) are not to be denied. What is at issue is whether they are a justified casus belli. Check out the link in my post of 3/26 to "humanitarian grounds." That will get you to Ken Roth's definitive account of the humanitarian defense for initiating war [see here]. Roth gives several reasons why a humanitarian defense won't fly.

L. S. Carrier

"Wile E. Coyote, Acme Explosives and the First Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of Regulating Violence on Broadcast Television," Brooklyn Law Review 60 (fall 1994): 1101.

"Forty Megahertz and a Mule: Ensuring Minority Ownership of the Electromagnetic Spectrum," Harvard Law Review 108 (March 1995): 1145.

"Patriarchy Is Such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a Postmodern Account of Gender," Harvard Law Review 108 (June 1995): 1973.

Michael Goldman, "Why?" Teaching Philosophy 17 (December 1994): 285.

J. M. Balkin, "Ideology as Cultural Software," Cardozo Law Review 16 (January 1995): 1221.

John Ray has put up a post about the nature of morality. See here. John appears to be what R. M. Hare (1919-2002) calls a descriptivist (or, more particularly, a naturalist), but, as Hare argues, descriptivism leads to relativism. I don't think John wants to be, or thinks of himself as, a relativist, so he must grapple with Hare's argument. Hare makes the argument in several places. Here is one: R. M. Hare, "A Reductio ad Absurdum of Descriptivism," chap. 8 in his Essays in Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 113-30 (essay first published in 1986).

How many times have you heard it said that the only long-term strategy for dealing with terrorism is to understand and accommodate the rage of those who perpetrate it? Terrorists are said to be desperate, alienated, angry, frustrated, and envious of Western success. The implication is that we can and should negotiate with them. Perhaps we can share our wealth and technology with them. But Islamic terrorists don't want our wealth or technology. They want our deaths. They don't want to partake of our material culture; they want to destroy it. There's nothing to be negotiated, so there's nothing to talk about or to understand. What part of "They want to destroy us and our culture and will stop at nothing, even their own deaths, to do it" is misunderstood?

All you can do to people who want to kill you is kill them first. You can't deter them, for deterrence requires that the one to be deterred cares about something. Islamic terrorists care about nothing except our destruction, which is why they so willingly die for it. That liberals can't see this is frightening. Liberals think all problems can be solved through communication and compromise. They think everyone wants what we have and that if we share it with them, their animosity will dissipate. This is idiocy. Thank goodness we have a president who understands the threat we face and who has the backbone to make unpopular decisions. Anyone with any sense will work for his reelection, whatever you think of his other policies.

Virtues, n. pl. Certain abstentions.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Maybe Hussein wasn't carrying on genocide at the moment, but the mass graves were very real. Combined with his active support for terrorists this was reason enough for the war to remove him.

I am surprised otherwise intelligent people have such big problems with this. Sure, it wasn't the best thing we ever did, but we did have reason enough.

I repeat, the mass graves were VERY REAL. Do you deny that?

Now, if a person agrees with the conclusion of the argument thus far, that animals are the sorts of beings that can have rights, and further, if he accepts the moral judgment that we ought to be kind to animals, only one further premise is needed to yield the conclusion that some animals do in fact have rights. We must now ask ourselves for whose sake ought we to treat (some) animals with consideration and humaneness? If we conceive our duty to be one of obedience to authority, or to one's own conscience merely, or one of consideration for tender human sensibilities only, then we might still deny that animals have rights, even though we admit that they are the kinds of beings that can have rights. But if we hold not only that we ought to treat animals humanely but also that we should do so for the animals' own sake, that such treatment is something we owe animals as their due, something that can be claimed for them, something the withholding of which would be an injustice and a wrong, and not merely a harm, then it follows that we do ascribe rights to animals. I suspect that the moral judgments most of us make about animals do pass these phenomenological tests, so that most of us do believe that animals have rights, but are reluctant to say so because of the conceptual confusions about the notion of a right that I have attempted to dispel above.

(Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations," chap. 8 in his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980], 159-84, at 166-7 [italics in original] [essay first published in 1974])

To the Editor:

In "One Nation, Enriched by Biblical Wisdom" (column, March 23), David Brooks makes an important point, but not the one he intended. If we want insight into the way human beings act, from the sources they derive their hopes, fears, motivations and desires, we need to look not to religion but to philosophy.

There are few insights into human behavior found in religion that cannot also be found in the great writings of Plato, Machiavelli, Locke, Hume, Kant and Mill (to name a few), which are as much a cornerstone of our civilization as our religions.

And these works are less divisive than religious texts because their insights are not contingent on the acceptance of a particular mythology, are based on reason, not revelation, and are therefore open to discussion and more responsive to the continually changing conditions we find ourselves in.

If we look, we'll find philosophy has much to teach us about ourselves, perhaps even more than religion.

BRIAN STIPELMAN
East Brunswick, N.J., March 23, 2004

Are you reading Dr William F. Vallicella's blog? You should be. He's learned and astute—and he writes well. I especially enjoyed his discussion of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), who is one of my favorite philosophers.

A friend and former student sent this link. I love the broken English, and I'm not talking about the 1979 album and song by Marianne Faithfull, which are, if I may say so, excellent.

Andrew Sullivan says he's a federalist (see here), but in the same post he says he doesn't want states to decide for themselves whether to allow homosexual "marriage." What kind of doublespeak is that? Does the man understand federalism? He likes the label, apparently, but doesn't grasp what it means or what it commits him to. By the way, Sullivan is drawing ever closer to endorsing John Kerry for president, as I predicted he would several weeks ago. All he needs is assurance that Kerry will be tough on terrorism. Some conservative.

One more thing. Sullivan keeps saying (and implying) that conservatism is committed to small government. Where did he get that idea? For the last time (I hope), conservatism is not libertarianism. They overlap on some issues, but that doesn't make them the same political morality. (Libertarianism also overlaps with liberalism.) Conservatives want as much government as is necessary to serve their substantive purposes. They have no principled opposition to big government, as libertarians do. President Bush is a far better conservative than Sullivan is, which is probably why Sullivan has grown away from him.

Sometimes I wonder how Sullivan earned a doctoral degree. He's as sloppy a thinker as I've come across in a long time. He wouldn't last a minute in academia, where critical intellectual standards prevail. Perhaps, come to think of it, that's why he didn't become a professor. It would have made him accountable (to his peers) for what he says. As it is, he's blissfully unaccountable to anyone or anything. He contradicts himself; he commits fallacies; he distorts the views of those with whom he disagrees; and he refuses to admit error even when he's egregiously wrong, which is often.

Dear Dr. Burgess-Jackson,

Dr. Carrier writes [see here] that Saddam had not committed acts of genocide recently (I'm not sure what the statute of limitations is). Perhaps this was due to the Anglo-American no-fly zone (without UN approval). Maybe we could have ended the air cover to see what would have happened. I suggest another ethical precept, "Do not do evil so that evil may come so that good may come."

Edward Elfenbein

As I said a while back, liberal is to conservative as child is to adult. Here is another person who is growing up. Thanks to Jan Bussey for the link. By the way, please visit Jan's blog. She makes beautiful photographs.

Do you see the face on the TV screen
coming at you every Sunday
see the face on the billboard
that man is me

On the cover of the magazine
there's no question why I'm smiling
you buy a piece of paradise
you buy a piece of me

I'll get you everything you wanted
I'll get you everything you need
don't need to believe in hereafter
just believe in me

Cos Jesus he knows me
and he knows I'm right
I've been talking to Jesus all my life
oh yes he knows me
and he knows I'm right
and he's been telling me
everything is alright

I believe in the family
with my ever loving wife beside me
but she don't know about my girlfriend
or the man I met last night

Do you believe in God
cos that is what I'm selling
and if you wanna go to heaven
I'll see you right

You won't even have to leave your house
or get out of your chair
you don't even have to touch that dial
cos I'm everywhere

And Jesus he knows me
and he knows I'm right
I've been talking to Jesus all my life
oh yes he knows me
and he knows I'm right
well he's been telling me
everything's gonna be alright

Won't find me practising what I'm preaching
won't find me making no sacrifice
but I can get you a pocketful of miracles
if you promise to be good, try to be nice
God will take good care of you
just do as I say, don't do as I do

I'm counting my blessings,
I've found true happiness
cos I'm getting richer, day by day
you can find me in the phone book,
just call my toll free number
you can do it anyway you want
just do it right away

There'll be no doubt in your mind
you'll believe everything I'm saying
if you wanna get closer to him
get on your knees and start paying

Cos Jesus he knows me
and he knows I'm right
I've been talking to Jesus all my life
oh yes he knows me
and he knows I'm right
well he's been telling me
everything's gonna be alright

Jesus he knows me
Jesus he knows me, you know . . .

I haven't been blogging much on terrorism and politics, but Steve Headley has (see here). I hope you're visiting his site on a regular basis. He's hard-hitting but fair. You will find plenty of links to other interesting and useful sites. Keep it up, Steve!

This is the bicentennial year of the start of the Lewis and Clark expedition. The Corps of Discovery (as it was known) shoved off "under a jentle brease" from Camp Dubois (at the juncture of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, just north of St Louis) on 14 May 1804. I'll be reading the journals on a real-time basis for the third time. I read the journals 190 years after the fact and 194 years after the fact. Now I'll be reading them 200 years after the fact. Each reading takes more than three years if you begin with Lewis in Pittsburgh the preceding fall. If you'd like to follow along, please go to the National Geographic site (here) or buy Gary E. Moulton's superb new edition and read the actual journals day by day (see here for the cloth set and here for the much-cheaper paperback set). You might also read the journals online (see here), thanks to The University of Nebraska Press. The daily reading will inspire you, teach you, frighten you, puzzle you, and make you cry. (See here for a glimpse of the hardships faced by the Corps.) You will not be the same person after the expedition as you were before. You will be better. Morally better.

Grapeshot, n. An argument which the future is preparing in answer to the demands of American Socialism.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Keith,

You might find this tedious, but I'd like to reply to Ally Eskin's latest posting (3/25) as follows:

I'm pleased that Ally Eskin thinks that it's "cool" to engage in philosophy. I think so, too. Here's my response to your latest posting, Ally.

You say that Saddam Hussein was evil. I have no argument with that. Remember, though, that the argument that the Bush administration gave for waging war was a "three-legged stool." Here are the legs: (1) the threats posed by Saddam Hussein's large stockpiles of WMDs; (2) his operational connection to terrorists; and (3) the benefits to the Iraqi people in getting rid of a brutal dictator. The first two legs have been shown to be without basis. But if the American people, the Congress, journalists, and academics who supported the war were to have done so only by relying on the third leg, such an argument would have been laughed out of court.

Perhaps a humanitarian argument might have been launched had an active program of genocide been going on in Iraq (as it was in Kosovo). But the mass killings that took place in Iraq took place in the early 1990s (when the first President Bush turned a blind eye to what was going on); and there is no evidence that there were any such killings going on before the war, nor any evidence that they were imminent. You simply can't make a case for war on humanitarian grounds solely because of what happened in the past. If we could, then we were wrong not to invade Spain when Franco was their leader (instead of enlisting him as an ally against communism).

Here's an analogy for you to ponder. A terrorist has killed before, and he is discovered sleeping in his automobile. You can kill him, but only by killing the hostage tied up beside him. If you kill him, a hostage gets wasted. If you don't kill him, then he might kill others. Do you want to pull the trigger?

Here's a sound ethical precept: Do not do evil so that good may come. That's doubly a sound precept because of the Law of Unintended Consequences. Speaking idealistically, we may have invaded Iraq to liberate the Iraqi people. But what we have wrought is a living hell, both for our ourselves and for most Iraqis.

If you want to take a hard-headed view of why we went to war, here's the grim assessment: (1) permanent military bases in Iraq to control the Middle East; (2) support for Ariel Sharon's Likud government in subjugating the Palestinians; and (3) strategic control of Iraqi oil. All this has been documented in the Project for the New American Century, authored by main players in the Bush administration. I'm sorry to drag realpolitik into the mix, but sometimes rational argument doesn't suffice to sway those in political power.

L. S. Carrier

Having grown up in Michigan, I'm acutely aware of differences in speech between my native state and my adopted Texas. I propose to discuss some of these differences in this blog. Today's entry concerns the word "wife," which is pronounced "wof" by many Texans. You rarely hear "My wof," though; it's always "Ma wof," as in "Ma wof and ah went to the rodeo." By the way, I'm not making fun of Texans. Had I been born and raised in Texas, I'd be writing about how strange the speech of Michiganders is (not to mention how strange the word "Michiganders" is). There's no right or wrong in this realm, just differences. Differences are always remarkable.

To the Editor:

It was a particularly cynical ploy for Richard A. Clarke to apologize to the families of the 9/11 victims, a small proportion of whom were present (front page, March 25). Exploiting their misery was a theatrical ploy beyond decency.

The simple fact is that the 9/11 attack on America was the most audacious terrorist action since the Trojan horse. No one of either political party could have been expected to anticipate it.

All the finger-pointing in the world will not change that fact. Let's get on with the war on terrorism, and base our votes in the coming election on which party is more apt to succeed in protecting us.

JACK B. SHAPIRO
Beachwood, Ohio, March 25, 2004

Peg Kaplan, my blogospheric friend and conservative co-conspirator, has (with her playing partner) just won a major bridge championship in Reno, Nevada. See here. I'm damn proud of that woman. I knew she would kick butt. By the way, I hadn't seen an image of Peg until she sent this link. It's nice to put a face to the person. Have a safe trip home, Peg, and don't get too big a head about this victory, impressive though it is. You're still a regular person, with blog entries to write. (See here for Peg's blog, what if?)

[L]ife is granted to none for freehold, to all on lease. Look back again to see how the past ages of everlasting time, before we are born, have been as naught to us. These then nature holds up to us as a mirror of the time that is to come, when we are dead and gone. Is there aught that looks terrible in this, aught that seems gloomy? Is it not a calmer rest than any sleep?

(Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, trans. Cyril Bailey [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1910], 138 [endnote omitted])

I finally found the time to read, think about, and reply to John Ray's recent post [see here] about morality. I think John and I are closer than he thinks, but not, of course, identical. Let me sketch my approach to the moral life. John can then tell me where, if anywhere, he disagrees.

Each of us has values. I value self-sufficiency, for example, which is why I take some of the positions I do on legal, moral, and political matters. You probably value it, too, but we may assign different weights to it. Where we get our values and why they (sometimes) change are interesting questions, but they're not philosophical questions.

Values aren't discovered in the world; they're subscribed to. The world is a valueless place, indifferent to the welfare of its inhabitants. This flies in the face of natural-law theory, which says that the world is suffused (shot through) with value. We humans are valuing beings. We evaluate each other as persons; we evaluate mental states, such as motives, beliefs, and intentions; we evaluate bits of reasoning; we evaluate states of affairs; we evaluate actions; and we evaluate large-scale social phenomena such as laws, institutions, and traditions. We express our values in language. Here are some illustrative value judgments:

1. Saddam Hussein is evil.

2. John Kerry is an opportunist.

3. You're lazy.

4. Peace is a good thing.

5. It was wrong of Bill Clinton to lie under oath.

6. Laws against sodomy are unjust.

7. There is too much poverty in the world.

One can be an ethical subjectivist (skeptic), as I am, without thinking that morality is nonrational or irrational. Reason plays an important role in the moral life, but not the role some people think it plays. As David Hume (1711-1776) pointed out, reason can help us discover means to our ends (whatever those ends may be) and reason can help us sort out our values. Reason cannot supply ends. Reason is evaluatively neutral. The only leverage a philosopher or anyone else has in the moral life is the law of noncontradiction. If you say that you oppose capital punishment but value innocent human life, I will try to show you that these valuations are inconsistent—that you can't make both of them. If you believe that pain is intrinsically bad but eat meat from factory-farmed animals, you are not living in accordance with your values. Philosophy (which is just refined reason) helps one detect inconsistency (in belief) and hypocrisy (divergence between belief and action).

In my view, moral judgments are neither true nor false; or, if they are, they're all false, for there are no facts about the world to make them true. But this doesn't prevent moral theorizing. Moral theory is like scientific theory in that it tries to systematize a body of data. In science, the data consist of observations. In morality, the data consist of judgments. Each of us makes moral judgments every day. Suppose I judge that this act is wrong, this one right, and so on. If I am reflective, I will seek a system that renders these judgments coherent. The system (or theory) that I develop can then be used as a basis for making further judgments. It's the process John Rawls (1921-2002) calls "reflective equilibrium," but it's used at the personal level to make sense of an individual's judgments, not at the social level to make sense of everyone's judgments.

Moral theory is simply the attempt to systematize one's judgments. Utilitarians systematize their judgments by bringing them under the principle of utility. Kantians systematize their judgments by bringing them under the principle of respect for persons. You can't prove utilitarianism. You can't prove Kantianism. All you can do is subscribe to them (or not). The difference between science and morality is that the data of science are public and objective. The data of morality are private and subjective.

Note the implications of this approach to morality for moral argumentation. Argumentation is possible, but it must consist in showing one's interlocutor that he or she has inconsistent beliefs. The premises of a moral argument must be accepted by one's interlocutor if one is to be successful in changing the interlocutor's view. Moral argument isn't ad rem (to the world); it's ad hominem (to the person). It's not about discovering the truth; it's about changing views and conduct. The aim, as John Locke (1632-1704) put it, is "to press a Man with Consequences drawn from his own Principles, or Concessions" (John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 (1689)], bk. IV, chap. XVII, sec. 21, p. 686).

John Ray seems to think that I think that rightness and wrongness are built into the fabric of the world. I've never thought that. That's silly. Just as there is no god, there are no objective values. We humans invent both. (See J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong [Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1977].) Sometimes we forget that we invented these things and conclude that we found them there. No; we put them there.

By the way, my theory, deontological egoism (see the link to the left), is a systematization of my judgments (values). I don't claim that anyone else should accept it. I claim only that it's coherent. Some of you will find it attractive, as I do; some (perhaps most) will not. For those of you who do not, I encourage you to work out a system of your own and then strive mightily to live up to it. This is one aspect of an examined life, which is, as Socrates (c. 470-399 B.C.) said, the only life worth living.

One of my regular readers, Bill, sent an interesting letter about two recent posts on Animal Ethics. See here. By the way, Bill is thinking about starting a blog. He'll be a terrific addition to the blogosphere.

This phrase ["loose cannon"] doesn't come originally from the danger of a loose cannon firing in the wrong direction. [See here.] This expression comes from the days of sail when cannon were mounted on wheels and needed to be tied down to prevent them from rolling around on deck. In bad weather, a cannon that was poorly tied down could easily break loose, roll across the deck and smash straight through the side of the hull and cause the ship to sink! Chris

Weaknesses, n. pl. Certain primal powers of Tyrant Woman wherewith she holds dominion over the male of her species, binding him to the service of her will and paralyzing his rebellious energies.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Click here for an exchange with a reader about the moral status of nonhuman animals.

To the Editor:

Re "Of God and the Flag," by William Safire (column, March 24):

"In God We Trust" is engraved on our coins; the Declaration of Independence makes fervent reference to the "Creator"; the Supreme Court opens its sessions with the call, "God save the United States and this honorable court!"

But these and like expressions do not oblige loyalty to anything by their utterance. The Pledge of Allegiance does. What distinguishes the Pledge of Allegiance is that it is a pledge.

Those who make this pledge, as we hope all Americans will do freely and without reservation, assert solemnly their thoughtful respect and support for the symbols and the institutions specifically identified in the pledge.

In our country, where religion may not be established by the state, it was wrong to insert, into the Pledge of Allegiance to our flag and our nation, an indirect pledge of allegiance to God. The words "under God" should be removed.

CARL COHEN
Ann Arbor, Mich., March 24, 2004
The writer is a professor of philosophy, University of Michigan.

Private acts of killing, most of us think, are extremely hard to justify. Wars are killing on a large scale and are that much harder to justify. The greater the war looks like being, the greater the evil it must avert to be justified. (And it must be clear that the evil cannot be averted by less drastic means.) And, as well as the difficulty of justifying so much killing and misery, there is the long-term case against resorting to war, resting on the danger of strengthening the tradition of resorting to war. And, in some cases, there is the danger that a conventional war may escalate into a nuclear one, so that the special arguments against nuclear war tell also against resorting in the first place to the conventional war.

But, with all these arguments against war, it is possible that war is sometimes the lesser evil, and perhaps the Second World War was one of those times. Such a decision can only be reached by calculating gains and losses, which, even with hindsight, cannot be done with any precision. And the decision at the time in such a case is immensely difficult: who in 1939 could predict how long the war would last? On the one hand, who could predict that the war would include the use of nuclear weapons? On the other hand, who in 1939 could predict the full results of Nazism? (When in 1945 Richard Dimbleby sent the first report from Dachau, the Governors of the BBC could not believe it and refused to broadcast it until there was confirmation by newspaper correspondents.) We cannot be at all confident of being right about the consequences of a decision in a situation such as that in 1938, when the decision was against war, or in 1939, when the decision was for war. But the fact that we cannot be sure of the consequences does not absolve us from the duty to base our decision upon the best judgement of them that we can make.

One popular alternative to the evaluation of probable consequences is to rely on the distinction between aggressive and defensive war. Many people take the view that it is always wrong for a government to start a war, but always legitimate for a government to meet external aggression with force. But even this plausible-looking view is open to criticism. G. E. M. Anscombe has spoken sharply of it: 'The present-day conception of "aggression", like so many strongly influential conceptions, is a bad one. Why must it be wrong to strike the first blow in a struggle? The only question is, who is in the right.' There seems no reason in principle why it should always be wrong to start a war. If other governments had foreseen what the Nazis would do, they would probably have been right to invade Germany to remove Hitler in the early 1930s, or to wipe out all the leading Nazis by a bombing raid on one of the Nazi rallies at Nuremberg. Either of these courses of action would have avoided the far worse calamities that actually took place. Equally, it is not clearly right to wage a defensive war in all circumstances. If there is no prospect of winning, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, a defensive war is only pointless bloodshed. And, even if there is prospect of winning, the cost may be too great.

(Jonathan Glover, Causing Death and Saving Lives [Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1977], 268-9 [italics in original; footnote omitted])

Please don't worry about replying (post 3/24, 9:24 PM) as I know you are busy. But Carrier [see here] is baffling to me.

One. We have videotape, witnesses, and written evidence that Saddam Hussein and his officers were torturing people, murdering them, raping them, etc. L. S. Carrier can go do some research if he doubts the behavior of Saddam Hussein. Then, I guess we could debate the definition of evil. But I'm going to go out on a limb and call Hussein's behavior pretty darn evil.

Two. If we live by Carrier's philosophy, we would never change anything until we became gifted at predicting the future of all events. I guess you could call this a "Crystal Ball" principle? ("It's also a recognized principle that one can't really count the number of 'prevented' deaths, in the way that one can count the ones that our invasion directly or indirectly caused.") Of course, we cannot predict accurately the outcome of any behavior. We can only look at it from the best evidence available, determine if the situation demands action, and then act accordingly. We have seen repeatedly that Hussein was a cruel dictator who was concerned with his own health and wealth. Just do a search on CNN of Hussein and Torture. CNN, a renowned liberal news center, has article after article regarding this dictator's behavior, including torture chambers discovered in police stations, his sons' behavior which involved murdering and raping citizens, etc. While 10,000 deaths (according to Carrier) is horrible, we have seen in history that no change comes without bloodshed. That civilian deaths occur during war is a regrettable tragedy. It is not as if the U.S. military and allies set out to kill civilians. However, there are 24,683,313 people living in Iraq (according to www.cia.gov). To suggest that losing 10,000 innocent civilians in order to ensure the safety of over 24 million people is foolhardy.

Three. Let talk about infrastructure.

As for our destroying Iraq's infrastructure, Eskin should know that "infrastructure" refers to the things that make the lives of citizens bearable; that is, clean water, electricity, telephones, uncontaminated food, adequate transportation, and other facilities and installations that we take for granted in this country. How can Eskin call these necessities "evil"?

Those necessities that help make life bearable have to be organized and run by somebody. And I guarantee it was not done by the Iraqi farmer living down the street. It was done by the government. And that government was not providing very well for its people. The people live in poverty while its leaders live in wealth most of us can only wonder at. Yes, taking down the government means that other problems will follow, but these people are already living in squalid conditions. According to an abcnews.com poll, 70% of Iraqis say their lives are better now than before the war. According to the same poll, 71% of Iraqis believe that their lives will improve over the next year.

Carrier's suggestion that I am calling necessities "evil" is a typical liberal tactic, including statements that conservatives want to starve school children and want to drink bad water. It is ridiculous. I would love for everyone in the world to have the same necessities and comforts Americans do. We are a spoiled people, it is true, but we have paid our price to make it this way. That Iraqis may have to suffer while their government is restructured is saddening and frustrating, but leaving Saddam in power, then watching his sons follow him as the next leaders of the Iraqi government, is worse. At some point, in order for these people to even glimpse the freedom we treasure (some of us, anyway), the government has to be eradicated and rebuilt. What they suffer now will allow their children to (hopefully) live in better conditions and have a better opportunity in life. How many of us wouldn't give that for our own children? How many of our ancestors did?

It is true, I do not consider myself a philosopher. Then again, let's check that out. According to Merriam and Webster, a philosopher is "a person who seeks wisdom and enlightenment" or "a person whose philosophical perspective makes meeting trouble with equanimity easier." Hm. Guess I'll need to reconsider that. Maybe I'm a philosopher too, eh?

Thanks for the fun. I love this stuff. And it is pretty cool to get a response from a University of Miami professor of philosophy when I'm just a night-school junior in Behavioral Sciences. ;)

Ally Eskin
Central PA

I apologize to those of you who've written to me and not received a reply. I have sixty-five unanswered messages in my inbox. There just isn't enough time in the day to do everything that needs to be done. I'm busy from the time I wake up until the time I hit the sack. The thing that suffers the most is my correspondence. Be assured that I read everything sent to me. Some of you just want to pass on information or links. Thank you. Others ask questions that would take time to answer. These I can't always get to. You are many; I am one. Forgive me.

Ally Eskin's post of 3/24 [see here] assumes something not in evidence, viz. that Saddam Hussein was conducting an active program of genocide. There is no proof whatsoever that we saved "millions of lives" by our killing or wounding more than 30,000 innocents. What we know instead are the fatal consequences of our invasion. As Ally Eskin says, he/she is no philosopher. It is a recognized moral principle that one should not inflict harm merely on the chance of obtaining some good. It's also a recognized principle that one can't really count the number of "prevented" deaths, in the way that one can count the ones that our invasion directly or indirectly caused.

As for our destroying Iraq's infrastructure, Eskin should know that "infrastructure" refers to the things that make the lives of citizens bearable; that is, clean water, electricity, telephones, uncontaminated food, adequate transportation, and other facilities and installations that we take for granted in this country. How can Eskin call these necessities "evil"?

L. S. Carrier

I just learned that Dr John J. Ray, my polymathic friend Down Under, has asked some pointed questions about ethics in general and about my moral theory, deontological egoism, in particular. See here. I'll reply in this blog soon. I've been busy grading, which kept me from visiting other people's blogs on a regular basis. Thanks, John, for reading my essay. You may be the only one! If others wish to read it, click the link for "Deontological Egoism" on the left of this blog. Be forewarned: The essay contains philosophical jargon!

Here is an interesting essay about fish and fishing. Warning! It's not for the faint-hearted.

[C]ompetition per se is not bad. It offers fun, excitement, entertainment, and the incentive to perform at one's best. The problems arise when losers are scorned or discouraged from playing, and when winning becomes the end rather than the means to basic benefits. It is ironic that sports, long recommended for building character and teaching how to be a good loser and winner, have often taught aggression and elitism. Experts have become idols and millionnaires [sic], while the rest of us watch rather than participate. With effort, the entry of women into sports could foster a reawakening to these values, which are widely shared but have been lost lately in the shuffle of big business sports.

(Jane English, "Sex Equality in Sports," Philosophy & Public Affairs 7 [spring 1978]: 269-77, at 274)

Did you read Ari Fleischer's letter to The New York Times? It's reproduced immediately below this post. Here is the Paul Krugman column to which he's responding. No reasonable person can doubt that Krugman, the Princeton economist who writes a semiweekly column for the Times, is a liar and a rogue. I wish his fellow liberals would call him on it, but I know they won't. Many of them are as intellectually dishonest as Krugman and love him for it. If they cared about their movement, however, they would not hesitate to repudiate Krugman, for he is almost single-handedly destroying liberal credibility with his vicious lies and distortions.

Don't take my word for it. Read Donald Luskin's blog, which is devoted to analyzing Krugman's columns. Read Lying in Ponds, which quantifies partisanship among newspaper columnists. Read Krugman's columns for yourself every Tuesday and Friday. What's frightening is the thought that Krugman might one day have political power. Every American, even those who share his values, has reason to fear that. Krugman epitomizes what's wrong with liberalism. It's a vile, corrupt political morality, filled with little totalitarians who care not a whit for anything but their own power.

To the Editor:

In "Lifting the Shroud" (column, March 23), Paul Krugman alleges that at my White House press briefing on Sept. 26, 2001, I "ominously warned" Americans to "watch what they say, watch what they do." He accuses me of telling citizens "to accept the administration's version of events, not ask awkward questions."

At that briefing two weeks after Sept. 11, I was asked about a racist comment made by a Republican congressman from Louisiana who said that if he saw a Sikh-American with a towel wrapped around his head, he would tell the Sikh to get out of his state.

I said, "It's important for all Americans to remember the traditions of our country that make us so strong and so free, our tolerance and openness and acceptance." The president, I said, was disturbed by Representative John Cooksey's remarks.

Moments later, I was asked about Bill Maher's statement that the members of our armed forces who fire missiles are cowards while terrorists who crashed planes into buildings are not cowards.

I answered: "It's a terrible thing to say, and it's unfortunate. And that's why—there was an earlier question about has the president said anything to people in his own party—they're reminders to all Americans that they need to watch what they say, watch what they do."

My remarks urged tolerance and openness and were addressed to those who made statements and threatened actions against Muslims or Sikhs in America.

ARI FLEISCHER
Washington, March 23, 2004
The writer was White House press secretary from 2001 to 2003.

I am by no means a philosopher, nor am I particularly gifted at logic. However, L. S. Carrier's argument [see here] seems to contradict itself:

You mention Peter Singer, whom I know, as giving the best justification for our invasion. His principle is that, if it is possible to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then one ought to do it. The principle is unexceptionable. It is your application of it that is deficient. What we have sacrificed in bringing Saddam Hussein to heel is the death of 10,000 innocent civilians, the wounding of 20,000 more, and the destruction of the infrastructure of a country. This is certainly something of "comparable moral importance."

While I cannot express the grief that has been caused by these deaths, is he claiming that the good of the one outweighs the good of the many? (Thank you, Gene Roddenberry.) When we are talking about comparable moral importance, saving millions of lives at the expense of 10,000 lives seems extremely reasonable. While human lives are not commodities, and to speak of them in such objective ways seems cold, you have to move away from emotion and view the picture as a whole. And dismantling the "infrastructure of a county" is a good idea when the infrastructure is evil at its core.

Saddam Hussein was a ruthless killer and tortured his people at whim, and allowed his minions to torture, rape and kill people without justifiable cause. Even most liberals cannot deny that.

Carrier's argument makes no sense to me. How can he argue for 10,000 lives at the cost of millions? And how does Singer's principle not apply?

Help!

Ally Eskin
Central PA

Sophistry, n. The controversial method of an opponent, distinguished from one's own by superior insincerity and fooling. This method is that of the later Sophists, a Grecian sect of philosophers who began by teaching wisdom, prudence, science, art and, in brief, whatever men ought to know, but lost themselves in a maze of quibbles and a fog of words.

His bad opponent's "facts" he sweeps away,
And drags his sophistry to light of day;
Then swears they're pushed to madness who resort
To falsehood of so desperate a sort.
Not so; like sods upon a dead man's breast,
He lies most lightly who the least is pressed.
Polydore Smith.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Richard Doerflinger makes an interesting argument against physician-assisted suicide (PAS)—an argument that applies equally well to active voluntary euthanasia (AVE). Doerflinger believes that PAS and AVE are intrinsically wrong, since they violate the Judeo-Christian "axiom" against directly killing the innocent; but he knows that not all of his readers accept this starting point, so he makes a secular argument as well. This is how argumentation must proceed—in the Lockean ad hominem fashion—if it is to be effective.

Doerflinger's argument is that allowing PAS is (too) dangerous, given certain facts about our culture. He calls this a "loose-cannon" argument, but it could just as easily be characterized as a slippery-slope argument. Let's unpack the metaphor. A loose cannon on a ship—i.e., a cannon that is allowed to swivel—could swing around and shoot those on the ship. It could shoot people we do not want to shoot! Loose cannons are dangerous. The only safe cannon is a fixed cannon. The loose-cannon argument says that, given how dangerous a loose cannon is, we had better take steps to secure it. The slippery-slope argument says that, given the slipperiness of the slope and the fact that something bad lies at the bottom of it, we had better not take even a single step onto it.

The facts about our culture that make allowing PAS dangerous, according to Doerflinger, are (1) the psychological vulnerability of elderly and dying patients, (2) the crisis in health-care costs, (3) the legal doctrine of substituted judgment, (4) expanded definitions of "terminal illness," (5) prejudice against citizens with disabilities, (6) the character of the medical profession, and (7) the human will to power.

Let me elaborate on just one of these facts, so you can see how the argument proceeds. Doerflinger believes that if PAS is allowed by law, elderly and dying patients will feel pressure to end their lives. Once something is legal, it becomes a live option, and some individuals who would otherwise live (and who would rather live) will succumb to the pressure to "die and get out of the way." But doesn't this line of argument prove too much? If we allow the elderly and dying to dispose of their property, they will feel pressure to do so by their greedy friends and relatives; therefore, we should not allow the elderly and dying to dispose of their property. It would seem that these cases stand or fall together. Either we allow both PAS and the disposal of property or we disallow both.

I could go on discussing Doerflinger's essay, which I teach in my Ethics courses, but I won't. One thing to learn from it is the nature of a slippery-slope argument, not all of which, of course, are fallacious. When one makes a slippery-slope argument, one is not saying that the act in question is intrinsically wrong. What one says is that, even if it's not intrinsically wrong, it will have bad consequences if it's allowed. So what Doerflinger is saying is this: "I, personally, believe that PAS is intrinsically wrong, i.e., wrong in and of itself, because of the kind of act it is; but I realize that not everyone agrees with me on this, so I'm going to try to persuade you (the reader) that these acts are extrinsically wrong. They are wrong because of what they will bring about." You might say that Doerflinger believes that PAS is both intrinsically wrong and extrinsically wrong. In this essay, he's making the case for the latter belief.

By the way, PAS and AVE are not the same act. PAS is a case of suicide (a self-killing); AVE is a case of homicide (a killing of another). Some suicides are assisted and some are unassisted (like double plays in baseball). There's a logical difference between my killing you and my helping you kill yourself. It's a logical difference we should not obscure. But most people think this logical difference makes no moral difference. In other words, either both acts are right or both wrong. This shows that some differences don't make a moral difference.

Citation: Richard Doerflinger, "Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?" chap. 19 in The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy, 3d ed., ed. James Rachels (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 180-8 (essay first published in 1989 in The Hastings Center Report).

Hi Keith,

A few other (possible) examples of conservative analytic philosophers:

W. V. Quine (Generally known to have been a conservative, though he never wrote anything on the subject. Still, it comes out here and there in some of the articles in his book Quiddities.)

David Stove (See The Plato Cult and On Enlightenment.)

Anthony O'Hear (See his After Progress.)

John Searle (I don't know whether he'd call himself "a conservative," but many of his views are in fact conservative. He admires Hayek and hates socialism, and in a write-up in the LA Times a couple years back said that "The Republicans are stupid, but the Democrats are evil." Lots of conservatives would agree with both statements.)

Antony Flew (In answer to your reader's question about him, he's pretty clearly a conservative, in the Humean mold.)

David Oderberg (His important books Moral Theory and Applied Ethics constitute a powerful defense of traditional morality.)

Moritz Schlick (Surprising, given that he was a key member of the Vienna Circle. But in his introduction to Schlick's General Theory of Knowledge, Herbert Feigl informs us that, shaken by the rise of Nazism, Schlick was led to abandon his naive faith in progress and socialism and move in a more conservative direction. Note that Schlick became conservative in reaction against Nazism. So much for the idea that Nazism is inherently "right-wing.")

There are also Catholic philosophers like Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe who, whether or not they would identify themselves as "conservatives" (I have no idea) certainly had what today are thought of as conservative views on abortion, contraception, and sexual morality in general.

Susan Haack and Jenny Teichman are two philosophers who often write for conservative outlets like The New Criterion, and challenge much of the academic left-consensus, though I don't know that either one would self-identify as conservative.

Finally, there are of course a number of libertarian philosophers—not only [Robert] Nozick, but [Loren] Lomasky, [Tibor] Machan, [Eric] Mack et al.—who for the most part probably would not regard themselves as conservatives, but aren't left-liberals either.

I'm sure that there are some who would reply to all this: "Ah-HAH! So much for the so-called liberal domination of the academy!" The reply to that, of course, is to note that the answer to "Who are the left-of-center contemporary philosophers?" would be "Almost everyone else."

Best, [name withheld by request]

The Big Hominid has posted a long but interesting language rant. See here. By the way, scroll to the bottom of his blog and look at the image he chose for AnalPhilosopher.

Here is a short essay on bullfighting in Mexico. I know bullfighting is traditional in certain cultures, and as a conservative I respect and value tradition, but this tradition is no different, morally, from slavery, which degrades human personality. The presumption in favor of tradition is rebutted in this case, just as it is in the case of human chattel slavery.

The first intellectual operation in which I arrived at any proficiency, was dissecting a bad argument, and finding in what part the fallacy lay: and though whatever capacity of this sort I attained was due to the fact that it was an intellectual exercise in which I was most perseveringly drilled by my father, yet it is also true that the school logic [i.e., Aristotelian categorical logic], and the mental habits acquired in studying it, were among the principal instruments of this drilling. I am persuaded that nothing, in modern education, tends so much, when properly used, to form exact thinkers, who attach a precise meaning to words and propositions, and are not imposed on by vague, loose, or ambiguous terms.

(John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, The Library of Liberal Arts, ed. Oskar Piest, no. 91 [New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957], 14 [first published in 1873])

To the Editor:

At the risk of sounding like a Luddite, I have to ask Dalton Conley ("The Free Lane on the Information Highway," Op-Ed, March 19) why it's such a "wonderful thing" to be able to pick up your e-mail in a park or download photos in a cafe.

What ever happened to lying on your back in the Sheep Meadow and watching the clouds, or to chatting with a friend in person at Starbucks?

The pace of modern urban life is frantic enough without our feeling obligated to be wired at every moment, in every corner of Manhattan.

I, for one, am happy to have some "dead zones" in my life, where I can find a bit of repose, a moment of peace. Chill, WiFiers!

DAVID MOORE
New Rochelle, N.Y., March 19, 2004

Donald Dean Tennant was born on this date in 1934, which would make him seventy years old today. Some of us thought he would live forever, given his preternatural fitness, but he succumbed to a blood clot this past May. He died in spite of his magnificent health, not because of bad health. He did everything he could to control what was controllable. None of us can do anything more.

I met Don on a bicycle training ride in early 1993, when he was fifty-nine. He was loud and obnoxious, but then, so am I, so I was drawn to him. In June of that year, he and I and another friend, Kevin Dortch, did the week-long Pedal the Peaks tour in New Mexico. It was great fun. The following year I did another Pedal the Peaks tour with Don, this time in Colorado. And in 1995 nine of us did our own Colorado tour, which we called the Bike Binge and described as a "planned ordeal." Don was my tent companion on all three tours (my room companion on the third). You get to know a person well—too well, really—while sharing a tent.

Over the years, Don and I rode thousands of miles together. He was an insufferable old coot, often cranky and sometimes downright mean, but I loved him. His sense of humor was and is legendary. Nobody was better at telling jokes or enjoyed it more. On many occasions he dropped me with a joke. (That's an inside joke for bicyclists.) Don was generous, but never ostentatiously. He had lived a rough life, but never complained about it. He worked hard but always found time to play. He took great pride in keeping up with men half his age. Actually, he did more than keep up. He put us to shame. Don will always be my model of what can be done at sixty, sixty-five, and sixty-nine years of age. If he were here now, he would celebrate his seventieth birthday by riding a hundred miles or more. How many people of any age can do that?

The last time I saw Don, in January 2003, I hugged him. I'm glad I did. I never told him I loved him, because men oughtn't say such things to each other, but I did love him and he knew it. He felt it. He was loved by many people. I miss you, old man.

Philosophers, like lawyers, are trained arguers. Some of us—perhaps unfortunately for those who know us—have training in both fields. Not just anything goes in argumentation. Like chess, baseball, and joke-telling, it's a rule-governed activity. In some ways philosophy (i.e., philosophical argumentation) is more demanding than law (legal argumentation); in others, law is more demanding. (I'll discuss some of the differences in a subsequent post.) The objective in both cases is to change the view of one's interlocutor, whether it's an audience of philosophers, the lay public, a judge, or a jury.

One common pitfall in argumentation is proving too much. It's always inadvertent, never intentional. Suppose I oppose capital punishment and would like to induce others to share my view—and suppose I rule out manipulative techniques such as deception, the use of emotive language (which may not be noticed), and explicit appeals to emotion (which usually are noticed). I try to set forth reasons that, if accepted, commit one to opposing capital punishment. But presumably punishment itself is not objectionable, either to me or to my interlocutor, so I must ensure that the reasons I cite cover only one type of punishment: capital punishment.

Let me illustrate. Suppose I argue that capital punishment is wrong (or that it should be abolished) because of the possibility of erroneous convictions. I may cite evidence to show that there have in fact been erroneous convictions, the implication being that there will be others. This sounds good, until you realize that every conviction can be erroneous. No criminal-justice procedure, however elaborate and expensive, is pure, in John Rawls's sense. (In pure procedural justice, there is an independent standard by which to evaluate the outcome of the process; and, in addition, there is an effective mechanism by which to secure that outcome. An example would be letting the person who cuts a cake have the final slice. In impure procedural justice, there is an independent standard by which to evaluate the outcome of the process, but no effective mechanism by which to secure that outcome. An example is our criminal-justice process.) The possibility of error exists not just in capital cases but in all cases, misdemeanors as well as felonies. So if the possibility of error is a reason to abolish a particular type of punishment, it's a reason to abolish all punishments. Surely this is unacceptable. The argument has proved too much.

It's usually interjected at this point that death is irreversible. But having spent twenty years in prison is irreversible. We can't give you back twenty lost years of liberty! They're gone forever. About the only punishments that are reversible are those in which property is taken. The property, or its monetary equivalent, can be returned, perhaps with interest to represent the lost use of it. Deprivations of life, liberty, and bodily integrity (think of corporal punishments such as whipping) are not reversible.

It might be said that there's a relevant difference between deprivation of life on the one hand and deprivations of liberty and bodily integrity on the other. If we wrongly take your liberty or wrongly beat you, we can give you a sum of money as compensation for the wrong (injustice) we inflicted. If we kill you, however, we can't compensate you (although we can compensate your family). Now, at last, the argument is getting somewhere. What opponents of capital punishment must show is that death, as a punishment, is different or special. They must use this difference—or specialness—as the basis for opposing capital punishment but not punishment generally.

I have three more examples of proving too much. The second involves abortion. Almost everyone believes that infanticide is wrong. Some of these people, however, think that abortion is not wrong. The trick is to construct an argument that establishes the permissibility of abortion without at the same time establishing the permissibility of infanticide. This is harder than you might think. Try it! Now, someone might want to argue for the permissibility of infanticide. That's fine. I'm talking about those who don't. Be careful how you argue for abortion. Make sure your argument doesn't justify, or prove, too much.

The third example involves homosexual "marriage." Presumably, those agitating for homosexual "marriage," such as Andrew Sullivan, don't want to open the door to other types of marriage, such as polygamy or marriage between a human and a nonhuman. Then they must set forth a principle that's broad enough to include the former but not so broad as to include the latter. I have yet to see such a principle, which is one reason why I oppose homosexual "marriage." Once you open the door to types of marriage other than heterosexual monogamous marriage, anything goes. By the way, this form of argument is sometimes referred to as a logical slippery slope, as opposed to the more common causal slippery slope.

The fourth example involves nonhuman animals. I've heard it said that animals lack rights. There are different reasons for believing this. Suppose one believes that animals lack rights because rights are rooted in contract and animals are incapable of contracting. This may suffice to exclude animals from the category of rightholders, but it also excludes other individuals one would rather not exclude, such as infants, the severely retarded, the senile, and the comatose. I doubt that the arguer meant to exclude these individuals or that he or she will be happy with their exclusion.

The moral of the story is that one must take care in arguing. Principles used as premises must not sweep too broadly. They should be broad enough to cover the cases you wish to cover but not so broad as to cover the cases you do not wish to cover (or that you wish not to cover). If you prove too much, paradoxically, you prove nothing at all. It will be said by your interlocutor that your principle has unacceptable (repugnant) implications, or that it's been reduced to an absurdity.

Dear Mr. Burgess-Jackson,

An acquaintance forwarded to me your thoughts on why many have protested the Iraq war.

I'm afraid that I cannot accept your reasons for their discomfort with our administration. You say that you cannot find any reasons for their resistance, other than their hatred for President Bush. On the contrary, if there is any hatred for Mr. Bush, it is because of his reasons for waging war, not the other way around.

You mention Peter Singer, whom I know, as giving the best justification for our invasion. His principle is that, if it is possible to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then one ought to do it. The principle is unexceptionable. It is your application of it that is deficient. What we have sacrificed in bringing Saddam Hussein to heel is the death of 10,000 innocent civilians, the wounding of 20,000 more, and the destruction of the infrastructure of a country. This is certainly something of "comparable moral importance." As John Dewey said long ago, the end is justified by all the means, and, in this case, the means we employed were themselves immoral. Peter Singer, as you should know, applied his principle to the eating of animals for food, which he deemed immoral. But most of us would consider that killing a cow is less immoral than killing a person.

You also claim that you are guided by the philosophical principle of "inference to the best explanation." But nowhere do you attempt to apply this principle. I think that if you applied it to the lame reasons the Bush administration gave for waging war, you would have found that they are themselves guilty of providing reasons of "lamentably poor quality." My former colleague at the University of Miami, Edward Erwin, has cataloged all of these reasons in his article, "The Logic of War," which I hope will appear soon in the New York Review of Books. You should read it.

L. S. Carrier
Asheville, NC

Note from AnalPhilosopher: Leonard (Len) Carrier is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at The University of Miami.

Heaven, n. A place where the wicked cease from troubling you with talk of their personal affairs, and the good listen with attention while you expound your own.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I just posted a longish quotation by Dr Josephine Donovan on feminism and animal rights—over at Animal Ethics. See here.

Dear Keith,

I came across your website a few weeks ago, I can't remember from where or how naturally, but ever since I've been reading your posts daily. It is so nice to come across someone who has fair arguments, inspiring posts and not to the point of extremism.

The post you made on Dec. 27th, Becoming a Vegetarian (or Demi-Vegetarian), really got me thinking. I gave up all red meat a year ago this month, and sometimes, sadly, I still get those intense cravings for a cheeseburger. Deep down I know I would never eat one. When someone around me is eating one, I will look at it and wish for a bite, but then will realize that it is the last thing I want. Before reading your post I always felt like a hypocrite for calling myself a vegetarian and still longing for a bite of meat, but maybe this is normal. Like you, I still eat chicken and turkey, though with time and self-discipline, it will stop. Weird thing is, it's not that I even want to eat poultry, half the time I'm picking at it and putting it to the side for someone else who will usually ask me what's wrong with the chicken and then snicker when I say "nothing."

Another post that you made that got me thinking was about zoos and the horror they cause animals. On my own weblog, psycheoflove.com, I posted a small story of what I witnessed at the Phoenix Zoo in Arizona that completely changed the way I view zoo and animal welfare. Leaving the zoo that day two years ago I was so disturbed by what I had seen and the way people reacted to these animals, these animals who are there simply for their amusement and entertainment, who look so bored and alone behind their cages, I wept on the way to the car thinking and knowing that this just was not right at all. What is there that we can do though? It feels no matter how much I try to tell people or inform people, no one seems to really care for the treatment of animals, or believe that it doesn't matter . . . they're "just animals." The article about the beautiful 13 year old gorilla was terrible. Watching the video they put up, showing the police officer so determined to shoot it was painful to watch.

Bear with me.

Many years ago, when I was around eight or nine, I believe that is when I had my first moment of realization that animals deserve fair treatment, and what animal cruelty was. I practically ran away from home when I witnessed my step-father beat my dog and I could not believe the pain it caused the dog, as well as me. Ever since that moment I cannot stand to view an animal being mistreated in any form.

Ok, hopefully this e-mail has not bored you too much. All of this is to say that I, as well as many others, appreciate your website and the articles you share. It's really wonderful to know there are people like you who do care about the animals of the world.

Many blessings to you,
Jennifer

Has anyone besides me noticed a maddening tendency to fuse words? Suppose I say, "The neighbors may be on vacation." Surely one could not fuse the words "may" and "be" into "maybe," even though "maybe" is a word. It would make no sense. But the same thing happens routinely with other pairs. I see "everyday," as in "I shampoo my hair everyday," every day. It's an everyday occurrence. (See the difference?) One friend had a disturbing tendency to write "alot" instead of "a lot." She may have confused "alot" with "allot," which means something quite different. What should we do with these abusers of the language? I say we hurl epitaphs at them. I mean epithets. Had you, didn't I?

Addendum: Another conflation involves "sometime" and "some time." Here is Bryan Garner:

Sometime = at an indefinite or unspecified point in time; esp., at a time in the future. Some time = quite a while. The difference may be illustrated by contrasting the senses of these two sentences: "It was not until sometime later that George quit." (The precise time is unknown to the writer.)/"It was not until some time later that George quit." (George waited quite a while before quitting.)

Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern American Usage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 609. There's a new edition of this work, by the way, entitled Garner's Modern American Usage. I haven't purchased it yet. Garner is one of my heroes.

Why do these conflations occur? Part of the explanation, I think, is that people don't read. If they read, they'd see the different formations and take them to heart. Please do your part to protect the language. We owe it to our progeny. If we allow these conflations to occur, we contribute to the loss of the expressive power of our language. Our descendants will literally be unable to say what we're able to say.

I found this blog [post?] very interesting. Your request for others has had me thinking . . . Though the "analytic" label makes me unsure . . .

Robert Westmoreland (excellent articles in political and legal theory—definitely a conservative)
Antony Flew (or is he a Libertarian?)
Edward Feser (fellow chum at TCS, of course)
Robert Nozick (other than the Libertarian Anarchy, I'm unsure)
Michael Levin (Again, unsure . . . might be more Libertarian)

Again, a neat exercise. But God knows we need more of them . . . one more question: what are the benefits of Hume at the expense of Locke? Just curious. Thanks.

Allan

I've been thinking hard about Clement Ng's question, which I posted yesterday. See here. He asked for names of analytic philosophers (as opposed to Continental philosophers) who are politically conservative. (The adjective "politically" is necessary, for there are other forms of conservatism besides political conservatism. I'm a linguistic conservative, for example. I work hard to conserve the magnificent language I inherited. A person can be linguistically conservative without being politically conservative, and conversely.)

To be honest, I can't think of many conservative analytic philosophers. This is not necessarily because there aren't many. It could be that they keep their political views to themselves. Let's face it: Academia, like journalism and the arts, is a liberal hotbed. Conservatives are not made to feel welcome. It's not unreasonable in an environment like that to play it close to the vest. Recently, for example, my department underwent a program review. One of the off-campus reviewers took for granted that my colleague and I, who took him to lunch, are liberal. In fact, both of us are conservative. Did he leap to a conclusion? Yes; but odds were in his favor. He was more likely to be right in assuming liberalism than in assuming conservatism.

Here are some names I came up with. (Please submit others.) I offer them tentatively, in some cases because I'm not sure the classification is appropriate. Clement mentioned Roger Scruton and John Kekes. Three other well-known conservatives who have philosophical training at the highest level are Allan Bloom, John Silber, and William Bennett. Clement also mentioned John Finnis of Oxford and Robert P. George of Princeton (George was Finnis's student), but they may be special cases, since they work in the Roman Catholic natural-law tradition. Same with Alasdair MacIntyre. Their conservatism has religious roots.

How about John Gray, who was formerly at Oxford? His views have changed over the years, and I haven't read everything he's written, but I believe he would now consider himself a conservative. Anthony Quinton is a conservative. John Kekes finds strains of conservatism in Ludwig Wittgenstein. I don't know enough about Wittgenstein's politics to confirm that. Perhaps the greatest conservative analytic philosopher of all is David Hume. I'll never feel alone in the academy as long as I have Hume (who, interestingly, was not an academic) on my side. I'll put him up against any liberal you come up with. Ten rounds. Broughton's rules.

Homicide, n. The slaying of one human being by another. There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and praiseworthy, but it makes no great difference to the person slain whether he fell by one kind or another—the classification is for advantage of the lawyers.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

My nineteenth Tech Central Station column is up. See here. Don't you love Ray Patnaude's illustrations? Each one is an interpretation of the text. Each is rich in symbolism. This one features my teacher, Joel Feinberg, plus (I take it) Adam and Eve. I hope Ray's not implying with this Biblical image that one has to be religious to be conservative! If so, then I'm in trouble (or deeply confused). Keep up the good work, Ray.

Note to Ray: Please insert a comma after "Conservatives." (My original title was simply "Tradition.") Here is David W. Ewing, as quoted in Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern American Usage (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 537:

When you write a series of nouns with and or or before the last one, insert a comma before the and or or. "The location study covered labor, tax, freight, and communications costs, all in terms of 1972 prices." While this rule is not observed by all publishers, it is valid and helpful. Professional magazines follow it frequently, and such authorities as David Lambuth support it. The reason is that the comma before the and helps the reader to see instantly that the last two adjectives are not joined. In the example cited, suppose the last comma in the series is omitted; freight and communications costs could then be read as one category, though it is not meant to be. (David W. Ewing, Writing for Results in Business, Government, and the Professions [1974], 358 [italics in original])

I'm sorry to be insufferable; but hey, I have to live up to my name: AnalPhilosopher.

To the Editor:

It is interesting that the debate over immigration policies is still being fought in terms of diversity ("Bitter Division for Sierra Club on Immigration," front page, March 16). The continuing status of the United States as the world's most diverse society—racially, ethnically and culturally—is already assured by current demographics.

The question for our time is not where our immigrants should come from but—in the interest of environmental justice and social justice for workers, both citizens and immigrants—how many there should be each year.

According to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, we are now accepting one million legal immigrants every year, and through lax enforcement of Social Security registration regulations and other humane laws designed to help citizen and legal immigrant workers, we encourage one million illegal immigrants to join them.

Surely it is in everyone's shared interest, no matter what race, creed or country of origin, to ask: Is this sustainable?

HILARY HINZMANN
New York, March 16, 2004

Andrew Sullivan has said many times that he is heartened by polls showing greater support for homosexual "marriage" among young people than among people generally. But why would he take heart from this fact unless he thinks beliefs, values, and attitudes don't change? There is plenty of evidence that these things do change, and the change is ineluctably rightward—toward respect and reverence for traditional institutions and ways of life, such as heterosexual monogamous marriage. Think of all the people who return to their childhood religion, having gone through a rebellious stage. Think of the effect getting a job, marrying, becoming a parent, and buying a house have on people's values and outlook.

Young people, being young, lack the knowledge and experience that moderate and refine judgment. They have no sense of the past. They think the world can and should be built anew. They are will without reason, enthusiasm without judgment, desire without discipline. They're raw material for a person, but not yet a person—and certainly not yet a citizen. It's a good thing, in my opinion, that young people don't vote. They're not ready to vote. Their participation in the political process corrupts and debases it.

If you're forty or more years old, think back to how naive and arrogant you were at twenty, twenty-five, and even thirty. You thought you knew everything, didn't you? You thought old meant bad and new good, didn't you? You had roots, but you didn't know it. You had a future, but you couldn't see it. You had no respect for the dead and little concern for the unborn. You were immersed in the present, full of yourself and your "generation." It was as if all of history was but prelude to your existence, and nothing would ever be the same as a result of your existence. You were it!

I'm not bashing the young. Or if I am, I'm entitled to, since I was young and foolish once myself. I've lived and learned. I've grown. I've matured. My experience is broader and deeper (which is not to say broad and deep). I have a better sense of who I am and what it all means. I see things now that were obscure to me, even though they lay within my field of vision. Surely the judgment of an older, more experienced person counts for more than that of a younger, less experienced person, especially on something as complex as marriage. If Sullivan is pinning his hopes on the young, he's setting himself up for disappointment. But hey, everyone has a right to be disappointed, even the young and foolish.

I got a chuckle when I opened my Dallas Morning News this morning. There on the front of the science section was a story about the therapeutic effects of nature, i.e., natural places. See here. Many of us have known this for years, which is why we live where we do, vacation where we do, and behave the way we do (with long walks through the woods with our canine companions, for example, or bike rides in the countryside, or visits to parks). Isn't science grand? It tells us what we already know, often breathlessly, as if we couldn't have discovered it on our own—and with the vague implication that we didn't really know it until science confirmed it for us. To scientists, a thing isn't real until they say it is, and it's not really real unless it's quantified. Hubris.

By the way, these studies confirm Marxist social theory, particularly the part about capitalism alienating individuals from nature. See here and here for essays. We live in artificial environments. Cesspools, really. How can this not affect us to the bone, given that we evolved in a much different environment? Get back to nature! Get out of the goddamned city.

Addendum: If you're a regular reader of this blog (I'm averaging 350 visits a day), you may want to register with The New York Times and The Dallas Morning News, which I read every day (the former online, the latter in print). Both are free in the sense that you don't have to pay any money. That way, when I link to material from these newspapers, as I frequently do, you'll be able to log in quickly and read the items. I assume that some of you have done this already.

Desperate, lonely, cut off from the human community which in many cases has ceased to exist, under the sentence of violent death, wracked by desires for intimacy that they do not know how to fulfill, at the same time tormented by the presence of women, men turn to logic.

(Andrea Nye, Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic [New York and London: Routledge, 1990], 175)

The law already states that marriages cannot be between more than two people, that you have to be above a certain age (which varies), can't be related closer than a certain degree (which also varies), and cannot include non-human animals. I fail to see a significant material difference between specifying that only a consenting man and woman who meet those requirements can marry, versus any two consenting adults who meet those requirements. The law might be a bright line, but human beings drew it, and we can redraw it if we so choose. A properly written law that moves the line from point A to point B, does not necessarily mean that points C, D, and E come into play, unless we specifically allow them. Sex has been so completely de-linked (to use Donald Sensing's term) from reproduction by technology, that the argument against gay marriage on the basis of reproduction is sophistic at best.

That being said, I disagree very strongly with the behavior/tactics of gay activists. I am in favor of each state making its own rules, and don't want this issue to be judicially decided, although I'm not in favor of altering the Constitution either. Being of a more scientific than legal mind, I'm not certain what the answer to the problem should be. I'm optimistic that gays will be allowed to marry eventually anyway, but that pushing it too soon by way of a judicial decision would incite a great deal of backlash, and gays would lose some if not most of the acceptance gained over the last thirty years. Being gay myself, this makes me something of a pariah (some say traitor) within the gay community. I shudder to think what Andrew Sullivan would have to say to me! But then, he has a partner and therefore an emotional vested interest. I'm ambivalent about the prospect of marriage for myself, plus I'm a loner and currently sans partner, so it's easy for me to talk, isn't it?

Jan

Anyone who reads my blog on a regular basis will surely enjoy reading what if? (by Peg Kaplan) and Texas Conservative (by Steve Headley). Peg is currently giving 'em hell in a bridge tournament in Reno, Nevada. Kick butt, Peg! When you get some time, tell us which character traits bridge selects for. Aggression? Patience? Courage? Timidity? Dastardliness? Is it physically demanding; and if so, how does one train for it? Is there such a thing as a bridge face? Do bridge players bluff and sandbag? Are there unwritten as well as written rules, as in bicycle racing, baseball, and other sports? Do bridge players use performance-enhancing drugs? Is it true that bridge may be an Olympic event? Why do they call it bridge rather than, say, highway or overpass? Do tell all!

Donald Luskin has posted a letter from a lieutenant colonel who's been in Iraq. See here.

A man lives in the city
Surrounded by machines
They take away his pity
And give him what he dreams
A stream of information
On a green letter screen
Makes him feel in touch with the world
And sure of what it means

Chorus:
At the speed of light you're in endless night
At the speed of sound you don't see the ground
And in your sports car with the windows down
And the radio on and you don't stop talking
Thanks, I'll keep walking
I'm doing things in my own way
Well I'm doing things as I please
And then everything else goes its own way
At the speed of life

A man lives in the city
Distracted by the news
From sitting down with the ones he loves
Or taking time to choose
And what of conversation?
And what is left when he dies?
Is there a diary of an honest man
To stand against the lies?

Repeat Chorus

I'm doing things for their own sake
A picture on a screen won't do
I need to feel and touch it too
Do what I feel

I'm doing things for their own sake
I gotta find that essential, deep emotion
Get unhooked from this low commotion
And do what I feel
I'm doing things in my own way

I'm doing things in my own way
Well I'm doing things as I please
And then everything else goes its own way
At the speed of life

This is the speed of life

It's been almost five years since Huckleberry died. I think about him every day. Here, for those of you who missed it, is his story.

My Australian friend Dr John J. Ray over at Dissecting Leftism mentioned me in a post about animal rights. See here. He says he can't see any basis for rights other than contract; and since nonhuman animals can't contract, they can't (and hence don't) have rights. But this can't be the correct account of rights, for many humans can't contract. Some (e.g., infants and the severely retarded) have never had the capacity to contract. Others (e.g., the comatose and the senile) have had the capacity but lost it. I don't want to push this line of thought, though, because John might bite the bullet and say that these humans lack rights.

I see no conceptual barrier to ascribing rights to nonhuman animals. In other words, it's no contradiction to say (for example) that Sophie and Shelbie, my canine companions, have rights. So the question is whether they have rights (and, if so, which). That, of course, depends on what one takes rights to be. If rights are valid claims, as Joel Feinberg says, then animals have rights, for they have valid claims. We should also ask whether we're talking about moral rights or legal rights. Animals clearly have many legal rights. John must know that. (Actually, he does seem to concede this in his post.) In my opinion, animals should have more legal rights than they do, and one day, I am confident, they will—especially if we keep working at it in their behalf. Animals have more legal rights in Sweden than they do in the United States, which is why you see so many animals swimming toward Sweden. Just kidding about the swimming part.

Whether animals have moral rights depends on one's moral theory. According to my moral theory, deontological egoism, they do. According to Tom Regan's moral theory, they do. According to utilitarianism, they don't. But then, not even humans have rights according to utilitarianism, except in a manner of speaking, and in that manner of speaking, so do animals. (Read your Bentham.) Whether contractarianism (social-contract theory) leaves animals out in the cold remains a matter of dispute. Some say yes; some say no. In my view, any moral theory that precludes animal rights is to that extent unacceptable.

As most readers of this blog know, Roger Scruton is one of my philosophical heroes. He's an unabashed conservative in a world of trendy lefties. Reading his books, articles, reviews, and columns both enlightens me and gives me strength. They edify and inspire. Thank you, Dr Scruton. Here, for interested readers, is an essay about Scruton. Here is one by him. Enjoy!

Professor Burgess-Jackson,

I just read your "My Journey to Conservatism" piece at Tech Central Station. It reminded me of a similar piece penned by Roger Scruton for The New Criterion last year [see here]. Just curious—do you know of any more analytic philosophers out there who are conservative? (and I mean conservative, not libertarian or classically liberal) I think of Scruton, John Kekes, neo-natural law theorists (John Finnis, Robert George) and some other Catholic analyticals, and, now, yourself, but other than that. . . .

Clement Ng
MA Student in Philosophy
University of Western Ontario

To the Editor:

Re "Scalia Refusing to Take Himself Off Cheney Case" (front page, March 19):

It's a shame that Justice Antonin Scalia is still defying and resisting legitimate calls that he recuse himself in the case pending before him involving his friend Vice President Dick Cheney, with whom he hunted ducks in Louisiana in January.

This country cannot afford the appearance of impropriety in the institution that serves as the final arbiter for many voices, especially in cases involving this administration.

After all, cynicism remains after the 2000 presidential election and the Supreme Court's involvement in what many citizens felt was a court-elected president of the United States.

Justice Scalia must not, preferably by his own choosing, or by the collective choosing of his colleagues on the court, be allowed to preside in the case involving Mr. Cheney. It would be a further affront to the American people and the basic canons of law.

SIDNEY L. HOOD
Chicago, March 19, 2004

Telescope, n. A device having a relation to the eye similar to that of the telephone to the ear, enabling distant objects to plague us with a multitude of needless details. Luckily it is unprovided with a bell summoning us to the sacrifice.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Peggy Reeves Sanday, "Trapped in a Metaphor," Criminal Justice Ethics 13 (summer 1994): 32.

Gilbert Geis, "Moral Innatism, Connatural Ideas, and Impuissance in Daily Affairs: James Q. Wilson's Acrobatic Dive into an Empty Pool," Criminal Justice Ethics 13 (summer 1994): 77.

Kathryn Abrams, "The Unbearable Lightness of Being Stanley Fish," Stanford Law Review 47 (February 1995): 595.

Hillel I. Parness, "The Curse of the Pink Panther: The Legacy of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas Dissent and Its Role in the Qualitex Supreme Court Appeal," Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 18 (spring 1994): 327.

Stephen E. Silverman, "There Is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Executive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates' Last Appeals," Arizona Law Review 37 (1995): 375.

The past few days have been hell. There's no other way to put it. I lost my DSL connection sometime Tuesday morning. Since then, I've seen a flashing green and yellow light on the modem (a SpeedStream 5260) instead of the usual four green lights. I tried various things to no avail. Finally, exasperated, I reconfigured my EarthLink dial-up connection, which I've been using for the past five days. Friday, thinking the modem might be bad and not wanting to wait for an EarthLink technician to come out, I ordered a new one. It's supposed to arrive tomorrow. I've been keeping my fingers crossed that when I replace the old modem with the new, all the lights go green.

Fast forward to thirty minutes ago. I was grading Ethics examinations at my desk, ten feet from the computer. You can grade only so many exams at one sitting, so, irritated by the modem's intransigence, I jumped up to play around with its cords. "What haven't I tried?" I asked myself. "Have I tried taking this filter off?" You guessed it. I removed the filter, looked up, and saw that all four modem lights were green. Was I dreaming? No! At least I hope I'm not. I clicked the EarthLink icon and went online immediately. Yeehaa! (For those of you not blessed to live in Texas, that signifies exultation.)

I have no idea what role the filter plays or why it went bad, as it obviously did. It doesn't matter. My DSL connection is back. Had I not thought to remove the filter, I would have found the same light configuration on the new modem as existed on the old one. That would have disappointed me greatly. I would have been back to square one, calling EarthLink and making arrangements for a technician to come to my house. When the new modem arrives, I'll stash it away against the day when the old one really goes bad.

I'm sorry to have wasted your time with this message. Let's just say that I'm a happy cybercamper.

As we consider the whole range of moral issues, we may conveniently imagine a kind of scale or yardstick which begins at the bottom with the most obvious demands of social living and extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspiration. Somewhere along this scale there is an invisible pointer that marks the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excellence begins. The whole field of moral argument is dominated by a great undeclared war over the location of this pointer. There are those who struggle to push it upward; others work to pull it down. Those whom we regard as being unpleasantly—or at least, inconveniently—moralistic are forever trying to inch the pointer upward so as to expand the area of duty. Instead of inviting us to join them in realizing a pattern of life they consider worthy of human nature, they try to bludgeon us into a belief we are duty bound to embrace this pattern. All of us have probably been subjected to some variation of this technique at one time or another. Too long an exposure to it may leave in the victim a lifelong distaste for the whole notion of moral duty.

(Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, rev. ed. [New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1969], 9-10 [1st ed. 1964])

I just discovered a wonderful organization devoted to the abolition of zoos, which are morally abominable. See here. Animals are not resources for our use, consumption, disposal, or entertainment. They are fellow travelers, entitled to the same respect we accord human beings. Only someone who thinks animals are objects, with no moral status whatsoever, could eat them, experiment on them, hunt them, or confine them for purposes of display or entertainment. By the way, if you're a Christian and think animals exist for your use, you either haven't read your Bible or don't understand it. See here.

Should President Bush be concerned with the likes of Paul Krugman, who writes a semiweekly column for The New York Times? Nearly every column Krugman has written during the past year has been about President Bush, and I have not seen even one favorable comment in all the verbiage. If all you knew about President Bush had been gleaned from Krugman's columns, you would think that he is unremittingly evil, or at least unremittingly incompetent. I have hypothesized (see here) that Krugman hates President Bush. The evidence for this hypothesis grows with each column he churns out.

I don't think President Bush should be concerned with Krugman and his ilk. First, each of them has only one vote. Our electoral system has no way of capturing the intensity of one's support or opposition. Krugman's vehement (some might say hysterical) opposition to the president is offset by one person's lukewarm support. Perhaps this is unfair, but it's the system we have. Second, it's unlikely that Krugman's drivel has any effect on those who are uncommitted. Certainly it has no effect on President Bush's supporters—except perhaps to make them laugh. If Krugman were serious about changing people's minds, he would adopt a different strategy than the one he does. He never reaches out to the uncommitted, trying to find common ground. He shows neither the inclination nor the capacity to reason. What he does is distort, misrepresent, and attack. His forte (pronounced FORT) is character assassination.

About the only effect Krugman has is bucking up the Bush-haters, some of whom might otherwise stay home on election day. He's not persuading them. He's motivating them. But I think his hateful, manipulative rhetoric has just as much influence on President Bush's supporters. Krugman's vitriol motivates them to vote, if only to show him that maliciousness and intellectual dishonesty don't pay. (Krugman is the most intellectually dishonest person I've ever known. By far.)

All things considered, Krugman has no effect, one way or the other. All he does is degrade our public discourse twice a week, thereby embarrassing himself, The New York Times, Princeton University, and everyone else with whom he's associated.

Professional bicycling's World Cup began today. The World Cup, which is run every year, is a series of ten one-day races: five in the spring and five in the fall. Points are assigned to the finishing riders, with 100 for first place, seventy for second, and so forth. The rider with the most points in the ten races receives the World Cup, which is one of the most prestigious prizes in the sport. It rewards (i.e., selects for) durability—the events include Paris-Roubaix, some of which is run on cobblestones—and consistency.

Today's race began in Milan, Italy, and finished in San Remo. It's the longest of the World Cup races at 182.6 miles. (I'm American; we don't do meters.) If you'd like to read a "live" report of the race, click here. If you want the wrap-up, replete with images, click here. I won't give away the winner, but he finished in seven hours, eleven minutes (averaging 25.4 miles per hour). Imagine spending over seven hours on a bicycle racing at top speed, only inches away from other riders. The slightest touch of a wheel can take dozens of riders down. Injuries range from contusions to broken bones. These are the best bike handlers in the world, but they still crash. They're also, in my opinion, the best athletes in the world. What they do is mind-boggling.

I should explain the title of this post. Late in today's race, as you'll see if you read the "live" report, one of the breakaway riders was about to be swallowed up by the pack (known as the peloton), which was bearing down on him. He was desperately trying to stay away, although he must have known from experience that he wouldn't. The race reporter said that he was "clearly suffering and clearly enjoying it." Note the "and" instead of "but." 'Nuff said.

There has always been and will always be evaluative disagreement, even within a homogeneous culture. A values X; B doesn't. C values X highly; D values it only a little. Different people value different things, and even people who value the same things assign different weights to them. Where we get our values, and why they change, is an interesting question, but not one to be addressed by philosophers. It's a question for social scientists, particularly psychologists.

Does reason have a role to play in the processes of acquisition of and change in values? Yes, but not the role many philosophers think it has. Reason doesn't discover values; it draws them out of (i.e., extracts them from) preexisting values. If I'm trying to persuade you to accept evaluative proposition p, I must show you that values you already have commit you to p. In other words, at least one of my premises must be evaluative (to avoid violating Hume's law) and, more importantly, you must already subscribe to it. Otherwise, my argument gets no traction with you. You walk away unconvinced.

I've been thinking philosophically about the war in Iraq for the past year. What astounds and dismays me is not that there is disagreement about whether the war was justified, which is to be expected, but how entrenched the disagreement is. On one side, you have people (like me) who think the war is obviously justified, a no-brainer; that if the war in Iraq was wrong, nothing is right. On the other side, you have people (and not just in Europe) who think the war is obviously unjustified. With views this entrenched, and so shrouded in emotion, rational persuasion is unlikely to be effective. Both sides are impervious to reason.

Why do I say that the war was justified? Well, it liberated a people. I wish that those who oppose the war would acknowledge this fact. Do they not care that Saddam Hussein and his Baathist thugs (including his vicious sons, who were being groomed to replace him) are no longer in power? Do they not think it good that people who were once raped, tortured, and murdered by their own government are free of these abominations? I don't see how anyone who is functioning normally and thinking clearly can deny that the Iraqi people—all twenty-five million of them—are much better off today than they were a year ago.

Ah, you say, war was not necessary to achieve this goal. Oh? Suppose the United States had not displaced the Hussein government. Do you think anything would have changed? If anything, not acting would have convinced Hussein that nothing he did had consequences. He would continue terrorizing his people, rewarding mass murderers, and destabilizing the Middle East. The United Nations lacks the backbone to enforce its resolutions. Unenforced resolutions are so much ink on paper. Thank goodness President Bush had the resolve to do what the United Nations would not (or institutionally could not).

Much of what I hear from war opponents is irrelevant. They say, for example, that the United States government once cozied up to Saddam Hussein. Okay. Does it follow that it must always cozy up to him? I honestly don't understand the force of this criticism. It was wrong to cozy up to Hussein. The sooner we stopped cozying up to him and taught him a lesson, the better. Do the critics think that a mistake, once made, may not be rectified? Once a mistake, always a mistake? This is idiocy.

Many opponents of the war appear to be extreme pacifists. This is the view that violence is never justified, even to prevent great evil. But extreme pacifism in a world of evil people is a recipe for disaster. If anything, it emboldens evil people to commit even more depredations and atrocities. There are evil people in this world. Please come to grips with that fact. Unless someone stands up to them, nothing will change and everyone will live in fear. Don't say that Saddam Hussein posed no threat to Americans. Are Americans the only people who matter? Don't Americans have a special role to play in the world by virtue of their economic and military power?

Peter Singer, whose new book on President Bush I don't own (yet) and haven't read, has been saying for thirty years that if it's within a person's power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, he or she ought to do so. Singer applies this principle to famine and derives the conclusion that individuals have a moral obligation to relieve and prevent it. But Singer's principle applies generally, not just to famine, and it's applicable to corporate entities such as nation-states as well as to individuals. Since it was within the power of the United States to prevent rape, torture, and murder of Iraqis (bad things, clearly) without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, it follows that the United States had an obligation to do so, which it duly discharged. What part of this does Singer reject? It seems a straightforward application of his principle.

After a year of somber reflection on the war, I have come to the sad conclusion that opposition to the war in Iraq is rooted in hatred—for President Bush. The reasoning of the war opponents goes as follows:

1. I hate President Bush (for whatever reason).
Therefore,
2. I oppose whatever President Bush does (and certainly whatever he does that increases his chance of reelection).
3. President Bush has taken the country to war (and thereby increased his chance of reelection).
Therefore,
4. I oppose the war.

There's also an element of hatred for the United States and what it stands for. I can understand why nonAmericans would feel this way. It's called envy. I cannot for a moment understand why Americans would feel this way. Okay, I can: self-loathing. This war may turn out to be a boon to psychotherapists. There appear to be many deeply conflicted, guilt-ridden, anxious people in this country—people who, instead of facing up to evil and accepting the moral burdens it imposes, tell themselves stories.

By the way, I'm not arguing that because opposition to the war is rooted in hatred, the war is justified. In other words, I'm not dismissing anti-war arguments because of facts about those who make them. That would be a fallacious argumentum ad hominem. I'm trying to explain opposition to the war. I'm puzzled by both the fact of opposition and the lamentably poor quality of the argumentation. I'm engaged in inference to the best explanation, which is a respectable philosophical technique.

To the Editor:

Now that a remarkably swift military campaign has removed one of the most brutal regimes in recent history, it is easy to write that "most Americans expected military victory to come quickly" (editorial, March 19). But in the months before the war, many warned of thousands of American deaths, months of urban battles, millions of refugees and a Vietnam-like quagmire. None of that happened.

Saddam Hussein not only sought nuclear weapons and repeatedly used chemical weapons, but he also paid money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. In a world in which unsuspecting civilians are the targets of a global assault against democracy, there can be no tolerance for such a regime.

DAN EISENBERG
New Haven, March 19, 2004

To the Editor:

In "One Year After" (editorial, March 19), you single out President Bush for stating that Saddam Hussein still had weapons of mass destruction. The truth is that everyone from the Clinton administration to the United Nations thought so, too. If weapons were no longer there, that was a failure of intelligence, not a fabrication by Mr. Bush.

You claim no connection between Iraq and 9/11. There doesn't have to be. We are fighting terrorism worldwide, and Saddam Hussein was a major terrorist.

You talk of troop deployments, imperfect plans and pulling out too early. Liberating a country of 25 million with a loss of 500 American lives is a testament to superb planning and execution. If we do pull troops out too early, it will be the fault of critics who have raised the specter of quagmire every day from the beginning. You create the intense political pressure that can cause premature moves.

MARK R. GODBURN
Great Barrington, Mass., March 19, 2004

To the Editor:

Re "Bush Says Thank You in Visit to the Troops" (news article, March 19):

Our struggle in Afghanistan was the first battle in the war on terrorism. Iraq is the second because the combatants there are terrorists in every sense of the word, and anyone who may think otherwise should come to grips with the fact that Saddam Hussein is not coming back. It's as simple as that.

The United States was attacked, it took the initiative, and it made the sacrifice. Now it's up to the United Nations to assume responsibility in stabilizing Iraq with a government in which basic human rights will be guaranteed and respected. The United States should then reduce its presence because there are more battles to be fought in the war on terrorism.

We must take the initiative wherever and whenever we can, and the time and place may not always be fashionable. But in the end it's results that will count, because winning or losing will determine the future of civilization.

FRED BILELLO
Scottsdale, Ariz., March 19, 2004

The New York Times was once a great newspaper, but it has been taken over by trendy lefties who have nothing but scorn for religion, tradition, and mainstream American values. Its editorial opinions are little more than position papers for the Democrat party, which is beholden to special interests. ("Special" contrasts with "general.") But on the matter of Justice Antonin Scalia, the newspaper's editors are exactly right. See here. The word for Justice Scalia is "arrogant." Perhaps there should be a term limit—say, twenty years—for federal judges.

Most subjects are inherently dull to most pupils. The interest of most pupils can very rarely be secured for fundamental subjects such as spelling, arithmetic, algebra, in themselves, and it is even easy to squeeze all possible interest out of inherently interesting subjects like history, literature, science; but pupils are, with all their shrewdness, in some respects unsuspecting beings, and a teacher who is endowed with a sense of humour, even to the point of practical joking at irregular intervals, can often keep his class so keen and alive that the members think they are interested in the subject and act as though they are, when, as a matter of fact, they are really only fond of their teacher and his sprightly ways. Of course, there are teachers who are devoid of a sense of humour and who would be grotesque figures if they endeavoured to simulate it. In these cases I should advise that they take to another vocation.

(Abraham Flexner, foreword to Preface to Teaching, by Henry W. Simon [New York: Oxford University Press, 1938], 3-5, at 5)

Just look at all those hungry mouths we have to feed
Take a look at all the suffering we breed
So many lonely faces scattered all around
Searching for what they need

Is this the world we created
What did we do it for
Is this the world we invaded
Against the law
So it seems in the end
Is this what we're all living for today
The world that we created

You know that every day a helpless child is born
Who needs some loving care inside a happy home
Somewhere a wealthy man is sitting on his throne
Waiting for life to go by

Is this the world we created, we made it on our own
Is this the world we devastated, right to the bone
If there's a God in the sky looking down
What can He think of what we've done
To the world that He created

As much as I admire and respect United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, I believe he is making a tragic mistake in refusing to recuse himself from the case involving Vice President Dick Cheney. See here for the New York Times story. The case stinks on many levels.

First, where do governmental agents get off using a public jet (and other resources) for a private outing? Justice Scalia says using the jet to fly to Louisiana didn't save him any money. That's disingenuous. What did it cost the taxpayers?

Second, defending his association with the vice president by citing other examples of association involving other Supreme Court justices shows that he doesn't respect the intelligence of his critics. For they can easily condemn those other associations as well. In fact, I will: They were all inappropriate.

Third, he seems to be saying in his memorandum that there was no impropriety. I take him at his word. But there's an appearance of impropriety, and that's sufficient for recusal. He is violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the lawyer's code of professional responsibility.

Fourth, what the hell are Scalia and Cheney doing killing defenseless animals? It sickens me. If this passes for recreation or entertainment among their social set, we are all in trouble. And please don't dismiss my remarks as animal-rights blather. My first three points are independent of the nature of the trip. They would be just as strong if Justice Scalia and Vice President Cheney flew to Louisiana to participate in a bike rally or attend an opera production.

Aborigines, n. Persons of little worth found cumbering the soil of a newly discovered country. They soon cease to cumber; they fertilize.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

Perhaps the secular organizations out there can take a hint from "Thou Shalt Not Call In Sick?" (news article, March 17) to get together even more and "spread the word." Religion cannot continue to be singled out as the only way to teach principles of morality, ethics and mutual respect. How about more classes in public schools as well as in our workplaces and beyond, to teach what we hope is instinctively human, not just religious?

NORMA LEE CHARTOFF
Brooklyn, March 17, 2004

Zoos teach us a false sense of our place in the natural order. The means of confinement mark a difference between humans and animals. They are there at our pleasure, to be used for our purposes. Morality and perhaps our very survival require that we learn to live as one species among many rather than as one species over many. To do this, we must forget what we learn at zoos. Because what zoos teach us is false and dangerous, both humans and animals will be better off when they are abolished.

(Dale Jamieson, "Against Zoos," in In Defense of Animals, ed. Peter Singer [New York: Harper & Row, 1986 (1985)], 108-17, at 117)

No, I don't have any dirt on Ralph Nader. I want to comment on the dirt being dug up by others. We're seeing an attempt by Democrats (or liberals generally) to destroy the reputation of a good man. Their motive is of course base. They fear that Nader's presence on the ticket this November will be enough to throw the election to President Bush. Leave aside the fact that John Kerry doesn't own anyone's vote and can't, therefore, have it "taken away" from him by Nader. Examining Nader's policies is one thing, but digging up dirt to make people think less of him as a person is despicable.

Several people have written to me in the past few weeks to direct my attention to essays that purport to show that Nader did something objectionable or exhibited a bad character trait. The motive, I gather, is to influence my view of Nader. That's not likely to happen. I've said that I admire Nader. I don't vote for him because of his policies or because of what he has or hasn't done. I admire the fact that he has lived a selfless life. If that's the basis of my admiration, then the only way to shake it would be to show me that Nader did not, after all, live a selfless life. Suppose it turned out that he had been siphoning money from his various public-interest groups and stashing it away in a personal bank account. That would bother me. I've seen no evidence that he did anything of the sort.

But suppose he did. I would still have to evaluate his life as a whole. I won't say that I love Nader, but my admiration for him is virtually unconditional, like my love for my mother and stepfather. If I learned today that my mother did something reprehensible, would I stop loving her? No. Isn't it admirable to love or admire someone in spite of personal defects and bad conduct? (If you say no, then you're saying that no parent, including yourself, is admirable.) Again, I'm assuming for the sake of argument that Nader has personal defects.

Please consider the source of any disparaging information you hear or read about Nader. Chances are that it's manufactured by his political enemies, of which, regrettably, he has many. Indeed, one of the things I admire most about him is his courage in standing up to powerful individuals and groups who detest him. He proves that one person, standing tall, acting on principle, can make a difference. Go Ralph!

My nineteenth Tech Central Station column, on tradition, will be up Monday, according to the editor, Nick Schulz. Stay tuned. (If you're interested, the other eighteen columns are listed on the left of this blog. Click and read.)

See here for my post about an escaped gorilla. I'm heartbroken (and angry) not only that a gorilla was taken from its natural environment for display, but that its human "caretakers" were so derelict as to allow it to escape, which necessitated its destruction.

Warning! The following blog entry has little or no philosophical content. As some of you know, I've been without high-speed Internet access since Monday night (actually, early Tuesday morning). When I woke up Tuesday and turned the computer on, the lights on the DSL modem weren't working properly. It's gone squirrelly before and corrected itself within an hour, so I didn't panic. But an hour went by with no change, then two, then three. By this time I knew something was wrong.

Here it is, Thursday evening, and the light configuration is the same. The "atm" light is off and the "dsl" light is flashing orange and green. All four lights are supposed to be green. (It's a SpeedStream 5260 modem.) Fortunately, EarthLink, which provides my DSL service, provides a dial-up line as well, so Tuesday I got that working. I've been using the dial-up connection for the past two days. Today, not wanting to wait for EarthLink to send a technician (and not particularly wanting a technician to come into my dirty house), I ordered a new modem. With any luck, I'll have my high-speed connection back by Monday.

Losing my high-speed connection has been traumatic. You will laugh, but it feels as though someone died. I feel strangely detached from the world. Sites I visit on a regular basis, such as Andrew Sullivan's blog, take so long to load that it's no fun. I've done very little Internet surfing during the past two days. I use my dial-up connection to receive and send e-mail, post blog entries, and pay bills. I suppose this shows that I belong to a cybercommunity. Not visiting the sites of several blogging friends makes me feel alone, cast out, rejected, a victim of technology.

My mother lives in rural Michigan, in the house where I grew up. She has a dial-up Internet connection. Now I know what she goes through on a daily basis. Just waiting for e-mail to come in takes forever! I can't stand it. But she knows nothing else. To her, this is how fast computers are. I believe that once you get high-speed Internet access, you can't go back. It would be like going back to black-and-white television, or doing without a microwave oven, or, god forbid, having only ten speeds on a bicycle. Once you go fast, you'll never go back.

All of which makes me wonder about the effect of technology on our lives. Many effects are obvious and most, thank goodness, are benign, but some are subtle and downright insidious. Technology speeds up our world. There was a television advertisement some time back about a man who did everything fast. In one scene, he stood in front of his microwave oven, foot tapping the floor, and said, "Come onnnnn." It was hilarious. I'm laughing as I type. Nobody can wait for anything any more. There was a story in today's Dallas Morning News (see here) about people's reluctance to wait for tables at restaurants. They say it's a boomer thing. Even our driving is affected. How many times have you had someone zip past you, dart in front of you, and make it to the stop light three seconds before you did? You think to yourself, "What did you just accomplish?" Or maybe you are that person.

I have a love-hate relationship with technology. There are certain technologies, such as this computer, that I could not live without. They make my work—writing—easier. I have no idea how I got through law school without a computer. It seems impossible. College, yes; law school, no. I love my titanium bicycle. I'm an avid headbanger, so I need good musical equipment. (My latest toy is a Rio Karma twenty-gigabyte portable music player, which holds my entire music collection of almost 600 CDs. I previously thought that this would be available only in heaven.) I would be lost without my microwave oven, even though it's nearly twenty years old and covered with dust. I recently bought my first digital camera (a Casio Exilim with 3.2 megapixels), which makes beautiful images.

But I've never had and have no use for the following: fax machines, cellphones, digital movie cameras, PDAs (personal digital assistants), and fancy cars. My 1989 Pontiac Grand Am is in its fifteenth year. It's never run properly, but it's been loyal and reliable. I rode my previous bicycle, a Schwinn 564, for about thirteen years—until it wore out. I got tired of people making fun of me. I'm using the same electric shaver that I bought in 1989. It doesn't work nearly as well as it did, but it works. Why replace it? Over the years, I've tried to simplify my life. Before I buy a technology, I ask whether I really need it. Will it complicate my life or will it help me do something I'll already be doing? I'm neither a technophile nor a technophobe. I'm a technopragmatist.

The experience of the past couple of days assures me that I need a high-speed Internet connection. Excuse me while I wail.

Beauty, n. The power by which a woman charms a lover and terrifies a husband.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

To the Editor:

While concern for a candidate's appearance may be silly and shallow (as the writer of a March 13 letter argues), it is perfectly understandable in the television age.

When a man becomes president of the United States, his face becomes a relentless, ubiquitous presence in the lives of people around the world. This becomes painfully evident when one dislikes the occupant of the White House. No fan of the current president, I try mightily to avoid seeing and hearing him; I often fail.

It is also amusing to note that while many middle-aged men are bald or have significant hair loss, this is rarely the case with the men elected president. The most obvious exception in the last century would be Dwight D. Eisenhower—but then again, he accepted the Nazi surrender.

DAVID HAYDEN
Wilton, Conn., March 13, 2004

A day or so ago, I linked to a New York Times story (see here) entitled "Bishops Assail Gay Marriages as a Threat." I hope you read it. The reporter, Thomas J. Lueck, says that Roman Catholic Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio of Brooklyn was interviewed on a radio talk show about homosexual "marriage." The bishop is quoted as saying this:

You want to reduce something to the absurd, which is basically rhetorical use of an image: Why can't we have marriages between people and pets? I mean, pets really love their masters and why can't we have a marriage so they could inherit their money?

These comments generated a firestorm of criticism. State Senator Thomas K. Duane said, "This is hard to believe in this day and age. It is very sad he [Bishop DiMarzio] is unable to have a substantial discussion on the issue and that he is trying to reduce the discourse to a childish, nonsensical level."

Kevin Cathcart, executive director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, said that Bishop DiMarzio should "take his absurd arguments and stay home." He added: "If this is his idea of an argument against treating people fairly, and against treating us all equally under the Constitution, then I haven't heard anything as absurd all day."

As a philosopher, I don't see anything absurd or even unusual about Bishop DiMarzio's comments. In fact, he's doing exactly what philosophers do every day. He's asking hypothetical questions to determine the scope of the marriage right being asserted by homosexual activists. He's implying that the rationale for the asserted right sweeps too broadly, i.e., that it has unacceptable (or absurd) implications even to homosexual activists.

I keep hearing that there is a right to marry. For whom? May three or more people marry? May a human marry a nonhuman? May siblings marry? May parents marry their children? I keep hearing that it's not fair to limit marriage to heterosexuals. Okay. Then it's not fair to limit marriage to humans or to pairs of humans or to unrelated humans. I keep hearing that it's discriminatory to limit marriage to heterosexuals. Okay. Then it's discriminatory to limit marriage to humans or to pairs of humans or to unrelated humans.

The point is that a line must be drawn. Not just any combination of beings should be allowed to marry. Bishop DiMarzio is challenging homosexual activists to draw a nonarbitrary line that puts heterosexual and homosexual couples on one side of it and all the other cases I've described on the other side. Bishop DiMarzio believes (as I do) that the only nonarbitrary line is between heterosexuals and everyone else, for only heterosexual couples can reproduce, and marriage is an institution designed to protect and nourish children. Bishop DiMarzio is trying to get us to think about the point, purpose, meaning, and functions of marriage. Come to think of it, maybe that's why he's being criticized. The critics fear that if we think hard about marriage, we'll see that the very idea of homosexual "marriage" is oxymoronic. Activists are trying to pull the wool over our eyes.

Please don't complain that infertile heterosexual couples are allowed to marry. I've addressed this objection at length in this blog. The law, unlike morality, must draw bright lines. The line between "heterosexual" and "homosexual" is far brighter than the line between "fertile heterosexual couple" and "others." I concede that, morally speaking, all and only couples with children (or who intend to have children) should be allowed to marry, but that would be an unworkable rule. Morality has the luxury of being precise; law has a job to do.

Every argument I've heard for homosexual "marriage" proves too much. Either the argument justifies polygamous marriage or it justifies marriages of humans to nonhumans or it justifies marriages between siblings or between parents and their children. But these are unacceptable, if not downright absurd. Which is, of course, Bishop DiMarzio's point. Homosexual activists need to do more thinking and less outraged shouting. They could learn a thing or two from the good bishop.

From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy; that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom—these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier.

(Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, ed. Harold P. Simonson, Milestones of Thought in the History of Ideas [New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1963], 57 [first published in 1893])

Let us not mince words: Animal welfare involves the subjective feelings of animals. The growing concern for animals in laboratories, farms, and zoos is not just concern about their physical health, important though that is. Nor is it just to ensure that animals function properly, like well-maintained machines, desirable though that may be. Rather, it is a concern that some of the ways in which humans treat other animals cause mental suffering and that these animals may experience "pain," "boredom," "frustration," "hunger," and other unpleasant states perhaps not totally unlike those we experience.

This would appear to put scientists in a dilemma. If we insist that such subjective language has no place in science and that the mental states of nonhuman animals cannot be studied empirically, then we opt out of all debates about animal welfare, leaving the formulation of laws and regulations concerning the treatment of animals to those (often nonscientists) who may have no such scruples. On the other hand, if we feel that laws and regulations should be based on scientific knowledge about the animals . . . , we may feel we have a duty to step into these muddy waters and say what we can, even if we then risk being called unscientific. The purpose of this . . . article is to argue that we do not, in fact, have to choose between scientific respectability and practical considerations. A middle way is possible. We can acknowledge the genuine difficulty of ascertaining what a nonhuman animal feels and yet attempt to attain a scientific understanding of its feelings. Indeed, we should do so not only because we will thus promote the welfare of animals but because the study of subjective feelings is properly part of biology.

(Marian Stamp Dawkins, "From an Animal's Point of View: Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 [March 1990]: 1-9, at 1 [citation omitted])

Idleness, n. A model farm where the devil experiments with seeds of new sins and promotes the growth of staple vices.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I received the following message from a reader:

Hi, I was wondering what your views are in regards to moral relativism. I'm not an expert, but I think the best way to refute moral relativism is to show that it lacks "self-consistency." For someone to believe moral relativism to be true they would have to believe in its truth as an absolute which the moral relativist seeks to deny. What do you think? Joseph

I replied as follows:

17 March 2004, 7:30 P.M. Joseph: Thanks for writing. Moral relativism is a theory about the nature of moral judgment. It says that moral judgments, like judgments of motion, are relative. (Just as a given object can be in motion relative to one thing and at rest relative to another, a given act can be right relative to one culture but not right relative to another.) Moral relativism is not a moral judgment, so it does not apply to itself. Saying that moral relativism is self-defeating is to commit a level confusion. kbj

For a brilliant defense of moral relativism, see Gilbert Harman, "Moral Relativism," pt. 1 in Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity, by Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Great Debates in Philosophy, ed. Ernest Sosa (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 1-64. See also Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).

To the Editor:

At a time when I am trying to be open and understand why people so staunchly oppose gay marriage, comments like Bishop Nicholas DiMarzio's ("Bishops Assail Gay Marriages as a Threat," news article, March 10) not only offend but confuse me as well.

His self-described absurd reduction that granting basic civil marriage rights to same-sex couples would lead to arguments in favor of inter-species marriages is weak and ill founded. Is this a learned man of the cloth speaking, or a taunting schoolyard bully without a real argument?

Please, do not compare my love for my partner to that of a pet. Do not compare the civil rights due us as citizens of this country to that of domesticated animals. Surely the difference is glaring.

I am prepared for people not to agree with gay marriage. Indeed, it is a difficult subject within the gay community. There cannot, however, be an open discourse without well-founded, educated arguments.

CLAY FRANCIS
New York, March 10, 2004

In life, there are only two things to worry about: Either you are well or you are sick. If you are well, there is nothing to worry about. If you are sick, there are only two things to worry about: Either you get well or you die. If you get well, there is nothing to worry about. If you die, there are only two things to worry about: Either you go to heaven or you go to hell. If you go to heaven, there is nothing to worry about. If you go to hell, you'll be so busy shaking hands with all your friends, you won't have time to worry!

Even though philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition have often disagreed about the nature of their subject, they were, until quite recently, of one mind in regarding philosophy as utterly different from literature and the literary arts. Philosophy was the realm of argument and literal truth; literature, the realm of fancy, rhetoric, figurative embellishment and fiction. But the tide has changed. The guiding star of Logical Positivism no longer burns so brightly, the influence of the continent has begun to tell, and we are now confronted by a very much more generous account of philosophy and its relation to literature.

In a word, the view is that philosophy and literature, even though they enjoy a different social status, are substantially the same: the only difference being that what we standardly take to be literature is honest and modest enough to admit its origins in metaphor and rhetoric, and is willing and able to reflect on the various stylistic devices that it employs. But philosophy (so the view goes) is similarly a product of rhetoric and metaphor; similarly concerned with style and effect; similarly concerned to change our view of the world—although it does this by claiming a certain authority, and by suggesting that, like the sciences, it can impart literal truths and so introduce us to how things really are.

The claim that philosophy is a kind of literature takes especial strength from the deconstructionist writings of Jacques Derrida. His many works, although lengthy and difficult, have inspired a new fashion of thought: a fashion which, in academic circles at least, has become the rage. But although tiresomely fashionable, Derrida's is a serious philosophical position which, by challenging certain commonplace metaphysical and epistemological views, has taken upon itself the task of reforming our understanding not just of philosophy and science, but of literary criticism as well. It is in the latter arena that deconstruction has enjoyed its widest acclaim, for in a peculiar way many literary critics have sought and found their salvation in its teachings. They have sympathised with Derrida's attack on the possibility of determinate meaning, and have taken refuge in his view that a text invariably contains a surplus of meaning. This not only absolves them from the difficult task of having to decide between competing interpretations, but removes all obligation to defend their decisions with reasons and argument. Deconstruction is taken both to explain and excuse the fact that there are often so many conflicting, yet plausible, interpretations of a single work. Even more pleasant and elevating is the suggestion that it is the reader who invents whatever meaning is to be found in the work, so that critic and artist perform the same sort of task—each as creative as the other.

(David Novitz, "The Rage for Deconstruction," The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry 69 [January 1986]: 39-55, at 39-40 [endnote omitted])

The post I attributed to the Maximum Leader yesterday (over at Naked Villainy) was actually written by his Minister of Agriculture (a.k.a. Smallholder), one of his underlings. See here. Maybe that means I have less to fear.

The Maximum Leader is not pleased with me (see here), and, since he is the Maximum Leader, I should not be pleased, either. Indeed, I should be worried. He writes:

I read the good Professor's blog nearly every day. He often posts intriguing, thought-provoking stuff. But his political blogs have become increasingly long on invective and short on the logic he values so highly. Recently, he admitted that he does at times propagandize. Propaganda doesn't bother me. Blind partisanship does. He could use his persuasive powers to make an argument; he has challenged me to think and clarify my attitudes about meat production and consumption. Instead of making me think about politics, he is now just making me skip the political rants. A case in point is his Tech Central Station column about accusations of Presidential dishonesty. I would like to see him apply his standard, "falsehood with the intent to deceive" to current reports that Bush purposely suppressed information about the true cost of his Medicare bill and intentionally deceived members of Congress so they would vote for the bill.

A friend of mine recently criticized me for inveighing against Kerry. If Kerry is better for the country than Bush, he argued, I should use my (tiny and pathetic) platform to attack the President. Any acknowledgement of Kerry's shortcomings would muddy the issues and perhaps sap the resolve of readers to displace the Commander-in-Chief. This would be moral; if the end (a Democratic president) was moral, then it was okay to self-edit in order to achieve that end. I'm not up on all the fancy philosopher lingo that AnalPhilosopher likes to sling around, but would this be called act-consequentialism?

Perhaps AnalPhilosopher has become an act-consequentialist on the issue of Bush's re-election. He has decided that a Bush election is in the best interests of the country. He therefore willingly joins the elephant echo chamber and churns out blindingly uncritical arguments supporting the righteousness of the commander-in-chief. Most reader may drink the pap. But for many of us—those who like a more reasoned discussion—these hagiographic fan letters undermine the Professor's credibility. Convince me, professor. Don't snow me.

Ouch! Where to begin? First, I did not admit to propagandizing in the derogatory sense. Like everyone else, I have views and values that I try to propagate; but I do so openly and, I like to think, fairly. Others will have to be the judge of whether I pull it off.

Second, I don't know enough (yet) about the Medicare bill. If and when I come to the conclusion that President Bush lied about it, I'll say so. Why would I try to shield him from criticism? I'm a philosopher, not a political hack. I care about process, not (just) result. And let's not lose sight of the fact that, even if President Bush lied, it would not affect the merits of the bill. This is the point I've been making for many months with respect to the war in Iraq. Whether the war was justified is independent of the motivation (as well as the stated reasons) of President Bush or others in his administration. Someone might say, for example, that the war is justified on humanitarian grounds even though that was not its motivation.

Third, I am not and have never been a consequentialist, much less an act-consequentialist. I'm a deontologist. I believe that there are certain acts that must not be performed even if they produce the best overall consequences. Also, there is no obligation to produce the best overall consequences. I endorse, in other words, both agent-centered restrictions (i.e., constraints) and an agent-centered prerogative (i.e., an option). Act-consequentialists reject both of these features. I'm as far from act-consequentialism (theoretically speaking) as a person can get! My version of deontology is deontological egoism. (See my essay of that title, a link to which appears on the left of this blog.)

Fourth, I hold no brief for President Bush, even though I like him. I've said that I will vote for Ralph Nader for a third time, despite disagreeing with him about many matters. Do I prefer President Bush to John Kerry? Yes. Does that mean I uncritically accept every policy prescription of the Bush administration? No. Does anybody agree with any candidate on every issue? On election day, each of us must make an all-things-considered judgment about which candidate is best for the country. For many of us, questions of national security take pride of place. On that question, there is no comparison between President Bush and John Kerry. I don't trust John Kerry to protect Americans or American interests. I think he's the wrong person to be president at this time and place. We're at war. This is an important juncture in human history (even though many Europeans and Americans don't realize it or refuse to face up to it). We don't need nuance. We need clarity and vision. We don't need vacillation. We need strength and resolve. We don't need a ditherer. We need a doer. The person we need is already in the White House.

The Maximum Leader may say that this is mere rhetoric, an attempt to snow my readers. I beg to disagree. I'm pointing out real differences in character, belief, value, and judgment between the two major-party candidates. What more could one want in the way of argument?

If you want to read an essay by a philosopher who disbelieves in animal rights, see here.

Litigation, n. A machine which you go into as a pig and come out of as a sausage.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Dear Dr. Burgess-Jackson,

As a constant reader of your blog, I am a little surprised to see you haven't posted anything since yesterday afternoon. If it were my own blog not being updated for a day or two, I would pay it no mind. But for someone as prolific as you are, a 24-hour absence from blogging is a little unusual. I hope the disappearance from blogging is the result of some happy time-consuming activity like grading papers. Or going for a good jog. Or visiting friends and family. Or concentrating hard on that magnum opus you've been writing.

Please know that I don't expect a reply. Other than this virtual connection through the ether of the internet, we do not know each other. And as we don't know each other, I am certainly not entitled to (or deserving of) any knowledge of your activities.

As I think through it, I suppose the purpose of this message is nothing more than a signal that another person out there recognizes your absence from the crowded blogosphere. And recognizing your absence, he wonders "What's up?" and "When will he be back?"

Yours cordially, Michael (a.k.a. The Maximum Leader)

"To be happy at home is the ultimate end of all ambition."—Dr. Samuel Johnson

To the Editor:

In "117 Deaths Each Day" (column, March 13), Nicholas D. Kristof reminds us of the obvious—that cars and trucks kill a lot more people than terrorism. If more people in each United States community would demand safe routes for bicycles, perhaps both cars and terrorism would gradually become lesser dangers.

A moving bicycle is far less likely than a car to seriously injure people, and it does not run on oil—the polluting energy source that is arguably a source of revenue for those few terrorists actually out there.

DAVID DARTLEY
New York, March 13, 2004

My research of the past five years demonstrates that Americans and Arabs live in different sensory worlds much of the time and do not use the same senses even to establish most of the distances maintained during conversations. As we shall see later, Arabs make more use of olfaction and touch than Americans. They interpret their sensory data differently and combine them in different ways. Apparently, even the Arab's experience of the body in its relation to the ego is different from our own. American women who have married Arabs in this country and who have known only the learned American side of their personality have often observed that their husbands assume different personalities when they return to their homelands where they are again immersed in Arab communication and are captives of Arab perceptions. They become in every sense of the word quite different people.

(Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension [Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969 (1966)], 3)

I spent several hours yesterday installing an ION external hard drive and loading almost seventeen gigabytes of music (6,757 songs) onto my new Rio Karma portable music player. The ION drive turned out to have twenty gigabytes of space instead of the thirty I paid for, so I had to delete everything and prepare to send it back. As you can imagine, it was frustrating.

The Karma, on the other hand, works perfectly. (Good karma?) Unfortunately, one of the devices—the ION or the Karma—messed up my DSL modem. When I woke up this morning (I went to sleep at 5:30), the modem wasn't working. It's happened before and fixed itself, but not this time. I've been on the telephone with an EarthLink technician for the past hour. To make a long story short, someone may have to come to my house. In the meantime, I'm using my EarthLink dial-up connection. It's slow, compared to what I'm used to, but at least I have access to the Internet. I'll blog a little, but probably not as much as usual, since I'm behind on everything.

I probably should have linked to this a long time ago. Better late than never. (I put a permanent link on the left side of this blog.)

Telephone, n. An invention of the devil which abrogates some of the advantages of making a disagreeable person keep his distance.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here is Paul Krugman's New York Times column (in boldface) of this past Friday, followed by my analysis:

As job growth continues to elude the U.S. economy, we're hearing two main excuses from the Bush administration and its supporters: that the real situation is much better than you're hearing, and that to the extent employment is lagging, it's the result of factors outside the administration's control. But after three years of extravagant promises and dismal results, the time for excuses has passed.

There are many economic indicators. Job growth is just one of them. But all or most of the other indicators depict a sound (and in some cases a thriving) economy, so Krugman obsesses about the one that doesn't (or arguably doesn't). Remember: His aim is to destroy President Bush, personally and politically, so he would never focus on the good aspects of the economy. That might make President Bush look good. And by the way, how much control does the president have over the economy? Seriously. Krugman assumes the president has significant control.

Let's start with the real job situation. A number of readers have asked me about what Marc Racicot, who heads the Bush re-election effort, told Don Imus the other day. He claimed that those miserable job numbers are misleading, and that another survey presents both a more accurate and a much happier story. You can find the same claim all over the right-wing media. But it just isn't so.

Note the positioning. There are Krugman and his cohorts, who speak truth, and "the right-wing media," who presumably represent ideology. Don't fall for this rhetoric.

It's true that there are two employment surveys, which have been diverging lately. The establishment survey, which asks businesses how many workers they employ, says that 2.4 million jobs have vanished in the last three years. The household survey, which asks individuals whether they have jobs, says that employment has actually risen by 450,000. The administration's supporters, understandably, prefer the second number.

And Paul Krugman, understandably, prefers the first number.

But the experts disagree. According to Alan Greenspan: "I wish I could say the household survey were the more accurate. Everything we've looked at suggests that it's the payroll data which are the series which you have to follow." You may have heard that the establishment survey doesn't count jobs created by new businesses; not so. The bureau knows what it's doing—conservative commentators are raising objections only because they don't like the facts.

How convenient! Krugman cites Alan Greenspan as an authority when Greenspan agrees with him, but attacks him as an ideologue when he doesn't. This is called "duplicity." It's contemptible.

And even the less reliable household survey paints a bleak picture of an economy in which jobs have lagged far behind population growth. The fraction of adults who say they are employed fell steeply between early 2001 and the summer of 2003, and has stagnated since then.

This is just a description of something Krugman thinks is bad. The question is who or what caused it and what can be done about it at what cost.

But wait—hasn't the unemployment rate fallen since last summer? Yes, but that's entirely the result of people dropping out of the labor force. Even if you're out of work, you're not counted as unemployed unless you're actively looking for a job.

So now Krugman admits that the unemployment rate has fallen. It's starting to look good for President Bush. But wait! Krugman explains it away, causing his liberal readers to breathe a sigh of relief. The fall in the unemployment rate only appears to be good.

We don't know why so many people have stopped looking for jobs, but it probably has something to do with the fact that jobs are so hard to find: 40 percent of the unemployed have been out of work more than 15 weeks, a 20-year record. In any case, the administration should feel grateful that so many people have dropped out. As the Economic Policy Institute points out, if they hadn't dropped out, the official unemployment rate would be an eye-popping 7.4 percent, not a politically spinnable 5.6 percent.

How much of it is laziness, Paul? And what effect do your proposed solutions of the problem have on people's propensity to be lazy? If you subsidize laziness, don't you get more of it? Liberals want to make laziness pay. President Bush knows better (thank goodness).

In short, things aren't as bad as they seem; they're worse. But should we blame the Bush administration? Yes—because it refuses to learn from experience.

In other words, it refuses to accept Krugman's solution.

Franklin Roosevelt, in his efforts to combat economic woes, was famously willing to try anything until he found something that worked. George Bush, by contrast, seems determined to try the same thing, over and over again.

There are principles at stake, Professor Krugman, the main one being that people are entitled to their earnings. Oops! Krugman has no principles. Whatever works, or might work, should be done. The end justifies the means.

In 2001 the administration rammed through long-term tax cuts, heavily tilted toward the affluent. But employment didn't turn around, and by late 2002 many economists—including supporters of the original tax cut—were urging it to try something different. My own piece, "My Economic Plan," was fairly typical: I called for extended unemployment benefits, temporary aid to state and local governments, and rebates for low- and middle-income workers.

Notice: "rammed through." I wonder how that happened. President Bush must be extremely powerful! And notice the jab at the wealthy. Krugman, like most liberals, seems more intent on punishing the affluent for their success than helping the poor. Krugman's solution? More government, of course. Higher taxes! Throw money at the problems! This is do-goodism, and it stinks.

Maybe this more or less textbook response to a depressed economy wouldn't have worked. But we'll never know, because the administration rejected all such proposals. Instead, it went for a clone of the 2001 tax cut—another big break mainly for those at the top. And once again this failed to deliver the promised jobs.

So it may not have worked and it's unprincipled, but by god, President Bush should have tried it! Also, more scorn for the successful.

Meanwhile, Mr. Bush has mortgaged the nation's future. If all of his tax cuts are made permanent, they'll reduce revenue by at least three times the amount that would be needed to secure Social Security benefits at current levels for the next 75 years.

But is it the right thing to do? Again, principle. Liberals wouldn't know a principle if it hit 'em in the face.

No sensible person blames Mr. Bush for the onset of the recession in 2001. But he does deserve blame for the fact that all he has to show for three years of supposed job-creation policies is a mountain of debt.

Don't be fooled. Krugman does blame President Bush for the onset of the recession. He blames President Bush for everything. From which it follows, by Krugman's own reasoning, that Krugman is not sensible. Q.E.D.

Here is a Dallas Morning News story about the effect of intelligence on health and wealth—or rather, on correlations among these variables. Note that some of the scientists being quoted make policy prescriptions. That's not their bailiwick. I believe that half the problems in the world would be solved if people stayed within the realm of their expertise. Social workers should do social work; natural scientists should do natural science; economists should do economics; lawyers should do law; journalists should do journalism; philosophers should do philosophy. There's a certain arrogance among intellectuals. They think that a Ph.D. degree equips them to expound authoritatively on every subject. No. It equips them to expound authoritatively on one very narrow subject.

Hi . . . I've been enjoying your blog only briefly, but will have the temerity to propose the following.

My take on the whole issue: after listening to both the pros and the antis I've concluded that I'm opposed to 'marriage' as a state sponsored institution for any combination of humans. It is intended to advantage groups of people for religious or philosophical reasons to the detriment of single people (such as myself). It therefore seems to me to violate the equal protection clauses, as well as the separation of church and state idea.

The secular reasons, by which I assume you mean something like 'protection of children' are at best illusory and are once again an excuse to advantage groups to the detriment of single people. Essentially it exploits one set of personal (otherwise legal) choices against another and therefore discriminates. If marriage is to be restricted to one combination of humans by the state then it is inherently discriminatory and unfair.

etc.

So . . . am I on unsound ground?

[Certainly answer only if you have time and interest . . . in any case keep on blogging, yours is most interesting.]

Thanks, Jack

Here is an interview of Peter Singer by Julian Baggini.

Peter S. Adolf, "Killing Me Softly: Is the Gas Chamber, or Any Other Method of Execution, 'Cruel and Unusual Punishment'?" Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (spring 1995): 815.

Robert Laurence, "A Section-by-Section Chart Summarizing the Recent Changes in the Federal Bankruptcy Code, Affixed to a Short Essay in Praise of the Sensibility of Judges and in Derogation of Small Roman Numerals, Jurisprudentially Significant Hyphens, and Title V of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994," Arkansas Law Review 47 (1994).

David S. Gehrig, "The Gun-Free School Zones Act: The Shootout over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism," Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 22 (fall 1994): 179.

Michael K. Whitehead and Richard D. Land, "Do Students Have a Prayer After Lee v. Weisman?" University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 6 (1994): 231.

Martha J. Dragich, "Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?" American University Law Review 44 (February 1995): 757.

I teach high school economics at Flower Mound High School, and take my job very seriously. To begin each day we discuss current events and politics are often at the top of the list. Many of the current issues tie right in with our course discussions. What drives me crazy is that my 18-year-old students usually have a better grasp of what is going on in our nation (politically and socially) than most of the readers who chime in on your editorial pages.

We often read some of their opinions in class and find that most people's political comments are simply based on partisan politics and shallow statements that focus more on attacking the other side than shedding light on an issue. We see more name-calling and scare tactics than intelligent analysis and informed opinion. The effects of our populace's reliance on 10-second blurbs on television news and skimming of the headlines is apparent. So many people seem content to pick a side and then argue vigorously so they "win," never attempting to find common ground on any issue.

It's for these reasons that I get out of bed every day and do what I do. I sleep better knowing that I'm helping to create a new generation of informed, skeptical, motivated and media-savvy citizens. I hope they can make a difference and show the rest of you that simply arguing rarely accomplishes much. Compromise and understanding are the only hope in a rapidly changing America.

Ryan Stagemeyer, Grapevine

Lawyer-bashing in America has long been a national pastime, having somehow escaped the palliative of political correctness that has greatly diminished other scurrilous pursuits like Jewish-American-Princess-baiting and Polish-joking.

Much of the profession's negative image can be ascribed to the sheer number of people hanging out their shingles as attorneys at law—just about as many per capita as there are inmates currently serving time in all the state prisons. Lawyers are likewise chastised for the hard-sell hucksterism of their advertising, the exponential growth of their caseloads, and the endless upward spiral of their fee scales. No doubt such perceptions, largely incontrovertible to begin with, are reinforced by the nature of the adversarial process itself, especially as it is practiced in the United States. And perceptions being reality, it can well be argued that much of the criticism leveled at the bar is richly deserved.

Thus it's little wonder that so many of the spectators—laymen and lackeys alike—are so quick to quote Shakespeare: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers!" Read in proper context, however, that oft-quoted line from The Second Part of King Henry the Sixth is in fact part of a colloquy between two ne'er-do-wells plotting to overthrow the government; clearly implicit for Shakespeare was that, without law (and lawyers), there would be anarchy. Indeed denigrating the integrity of the legal profession has itself become a glib excess.

(Kenneth Lasson, "Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice," Boston University Law Review 74 [November 1994]: 723-75, at 723-4 [footnotes omitted])

Here is a New York Times editorial about the hunting of wolves in Alaska. This topic has especial meaning to me, because I wrote a lengthy essay on the legal status of wolves in Michigan when I was in law school. (I wrote it for a graduate history course.) By the way, if you haven't read Barry Holstun Lopez's magnificent book Of Wolves and Men (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978), please do. It changed my life. It'll change yours, too. I guarantee it.

It's a light blogging day. I've been grading Ethics examinations and riding my bicycle. Spring break begins tomorrow, so I'll be back at it with gusto in the morning.

How many of you have been to Texas? I grew up in rural Michigan, then went to graduate school in Arizona (the Sonoran desert). I've lived in Texas since August 1988—fully a third of my life. I must admit, I hated Texas until a few years ago. Why would I come here, then? Can you say "job"? Philosophy positions are not exactly abundant! I had a one-year position as visiting assistant professor at Texas A&M University during the 1988-1989 academic year. I was ABD (all but dissertation). During that year, in which I earned more money than at any time in my life ($24,000), I finished my dissertation, taught, explored the surrounding area on my bike, and applied for tenure-track positions. It just so happens that I was offered a position at The University of Texas at Arlington, where I've been ever since.

Why did I hate Texas? You have to remember that I was a welfare-state liberal and radical feminist until recently. I had bought into the idea that Texas was a backward state, filled with gun-totin' cowboys who didn't give a damn about the less fortunate. I had heard Molly Ivins (I believe it was her [yes, "her," Will Nehs]) say that Texas is a place where men are men and women are property. (Molly Ivins lies. We've had a woman governor. Have you?) There's no state income tax in Texas, for example. Social services are underfunded compared to states such as Michigan, Minnesota, and Massachusetts. It's a right-to-work state, unlike my native Michigan. It's been called the buckle of the Bible belt.

Over the years, I came to appreciate certain things about this place. I now admire rather than detest Texan independence. The people here are self-sufficient, and take pride in it. I have always valued self-sufficiency (and its twin, personal responsibility), but during my liberal years I suppressed it. I love the wide-open spaces of Texas. It's a gorgeous state. (Remember: I grew up in Michigan, the Water Winter Wonderland, so I know a thing or two about natural beauty.) I love the climate. Yes, we have sultry summers, but we're compensated for it with mild winters. How many people in the United States could have ridden a bike thirty-eight miles today in sixty-degree temperatures, as I did? I used to ride my bike all year 'round. The athletic scene in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, where I live, is vibrant. I can run two marathons a year within twenty-five miles of my house. There are footraces—sometimes half a dozen of them—every weekend. I participate in over twenty bike rallies a year: from March to November. The Hotter 'n Hell Hundred in Wichita Falls, which I have done every year since 1990, is world famous. (One year it was merely Warmer 'n Heck.)

I think living here for so many years changed me. For the better. Texans are friendly to a fault. I'll never forget my first day on the campus of Texas A&M University. As people approached, they said "Howdy." At first, I turned, expecting to see the recipient of the greeting. But no; it was meant for me. Me! How can you not love people who are so kind to strangers? To this day, I use "Howdy" as my salutation. I don't have a Texan twang (yet!), but I say "Howdy," "I'm fixin' to," and "Y'all." (You know you've become a true Texan when you say "All y'all.") I no longer have a superiority complex (or what might be called a chip on my shoulder). I'm proud to fit in with my fellow Texans. I used to sneer at the bumper sticker that said, "I wasn't born in Texas, but I got here as fast as I could." Now I'm inclined to put such a sticker on my car (or bike).

I know many people, including colleagues, who despise this place. That's sad. They should move to a state that's more to their liking. The pursuit of happiness and all that. Texas has sparkling cities and wide-open spaces; cutting-edge industry and cattle ranches; Lexuses (Lexi?) and Ford 150s; museums and major-league sports franchises. It's old and new, rustic and glittery, but always big. Yes, everything is bigger in Texas. In Texas, tradition isn't something one talks about and analyzes. It's a fact of life. It's why Texans are conservative: They understand that traditions give our lives meaning. They take pity on those who think that reason—especially as wielded by intellectuals—can improve on tradition. Tradition is accumulated wisdom, reason reified. As James Michener wrote, Texas is special because Texans believe that it's special. Come visit. It'll rejuvenate you.

To the Editor:

"Fat Ladies Need Not Apply" (editorial, March 10) criticizes the Royal Opera's decision to replace Deborah Voigt with a thinner singer.

Perhaps the Royal Opera has done Ms. Voigt a service by providing a wake-up call to health, so that her magnificent voice may continue to be heard in the future.

A news article the same day says obesity is catching up with smoking as the leading cause of death in the United States. Why encourage the unhealthy lifestyle of this singer while letting the rest of us know that we should reduce our caloric intake?

DAVID RIVKIN
Jamaica Estates, Queens, March 10, 2004

If you're up for something a little longer (and deeper) than the usual fare in Slate and The New Republic, read this essay by George Weigel from First Things. Weigel argues that Europe's problem—and, by extension, our problem—is cultural and spiritual rather than political.

Lawyer, n. One skilled in circumvention of the law.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Have you heard it said that a liberal is a conservative who hasn't been mugged? This letter, from today's Dallas Morning News, perfectly illustrates it:

I am so against killing and violence that I become emotional when I think about it. I believe that the only reasonable solution for problems is to accept and love people everywhere. That said, I am becoming very emotional about the latest round of killing by cowards who blow up buses and trains that are filled with innocent people, old people, children; the defenseless of the world. If they want to kill, why not attack those who can defend themselves?

Now, the remedy: As much as it pains me to say this, I believe that we are going to have to counterattack. We have to search out those who are guilty of this mass murder and—kill them! When I was in Korea and the enemy attacked our positions, we didn't go out with a flag of truce and shake their hands. We killed them to keep them from killing us! We must do that now.

William O. Adams, Plano

It's all fine and good to talk about peace, love, and brotherhood. They will prevail in heaven, should there be such a place. But this ain't heaven. There are evil people out there, hell-bent on killing you, your children, your neighbors, your compatriots, and other peace-loving people. Liberals think they can be reasoned with. They can't be. They must be stopped, killed if necessary. William O. Adams, bless his liberal heart, sees that now. Better late than never.

Richard Cohen is confused so often, so thoroughly, and on so many topics that I could spend all of my time straightening him out. Obviously I don't. But today I can't resist. He says (see here) that Congress is "meddling with the judiciary" by keeping tabs on federal trial judges who sentence outside (specifically, below) the federal guidelines. This meddling, he says, violates the "separation of powers doctrine."

What Cohen doesn't realize, apparently, is that Congress can abolish every federal court except the United States Supreme Court if it wants to. Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the Supreme Court and empowers Congress to "ordain and establish" "inferior Courts." Presumably, if Congress abolished federal courts, it would not be violating the separation-of-powers doctrine. It would be acting within its constitutional authority. So why is something significantly less than that, such as imposing sentencing guidelines or requiring that tabs be kept on federal judges, a violation? Cohen needs to read the Constitution. Until he does, he literally doesn't know what he's talking about.

Robert Bork is one of the most brilliant lawyers this nation has produced. It is scandalous that he was denied a position on the United States Supreme Court for political reasons. Conservatives must never forget this. Here is an essay by Judge Bork on homosexual "marriage." He wrote it more than two and a half years ago, long before the shenanigans in Massachusetts, California, New Mexico, and New York, but he foresaw what was coming. He is a longtime student of the culture war as well as one of its fiercest combatants.

I read Judge Bork's column twice. He could be a little clearer in stating his conclusion, but I take it he supports the Federal Marriage Amendment. Not because it's his first choice, but because it's preferable to the alternative. He says that homosexual "marriage" will either be required everywhere or forbidden everywhere. Judge Bork, like me, is a federalist. Alas, the federalist solution of allowing each state to decide for itself, which functions as a compromise, is unlikely to obtain.

I think he's right. Federalists must therefore decide which is worse: forcing every state to allow homosexual "marriage" or not letting any state allow it. In my judgment, the former is worse. My reason is simple. Most states in the union oppose homosexual "marriage." How do I know this? Because, if they didn't, they would already have it. Nothing has stopped any state from allowing homosexual "marriage." Indeed, Massachusetts is about to do so. A constitutional amendment disallowing homosexual "marriage" will frustrate fewer majorities than a Supreme Court ruling that imposes it everywhere.

I hope you enjoyed Judge Bork's column, as I did. Notice the calm, analytical discussion. You don't get that sort of thing reading Andrew Sullivan's blog, do you? And by the way, Judge Bork agrees with me (or I him) that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution (Article IV, Section 1) can and probably will be used to force states such as Texas to recognize homosexual "marriages" entered into in states such as Massachusetts. Sullivan persists in saying that the Clause can't or won't be so used. The only reason he gives for this is that it hasn't been so used. But "hasn't" doesn't entail "can't" or "won't." Sullivan doesn't seem the least bit concerned about what might happen. Many of us are very much concerned.

On the question of the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to homosexual "marriage," whom do you believe: Judge Bork, a prominent lawyer and judge, or Andrew Sullivan, a nonlawyer? Sullivan has no legal expertise. His opinion on legal matters counts for as much as my mother's, which is nothing.

Roe [i.e., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] is a symbol for a constellation of attitudes about social issues that are typical of the groups that came together in a great coalition to organize the opposition [to my Supreme Court nomination]. The battle was ultimately about whether intellectual class values, which are far more egalitarian and socially permissive, which is to say left-liberal, than those of the public at large and so cannot carry elections, were to continue to be enacted into law by the Supreme Court. That was why this nomination became the focal point of the war within our culture. The behavior of the people involved reflects a left-liberal culture in near despair. The members of that culture know they are a minority, and they were desperate not to lose a battle in which symbolism as much as substance was at stake. The left-liberal culture commands much of the institutional high ground in our society. Until recently, one of its major strongholds was the Supreme Court of the United States. Being a minority, that culture must control such institutions, including counter-majoritarian institutions such as the federal courts, to have any hope of winning its cultural battles. As Lloyd Cutler, a prominent liberal lawyer and Counsel to President Carter, and a man who publicly supported me, said afterward, "Your enemies did not really think you would overturn all the decisions they like. But they have an entitlements agenda for the future—things like constitutional rights to welfare and to education—and they knew you wouldn't give it to them." If so, they were right. I would not have enacted that agenda for them, not because I disagree with those positions politically or morally but because they are not to be found in the actual Constitution. If the groups' programs are to become law, they must be enacted by legislatures.

(Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law [New York: The Free Press, 1990], 337-8 [endnotes omitted])

Will Nehs sent a link to this story about spiritual labyrinths. Interesting. And a good way to burn calories!

I have a confession to make. I hate lectures. I'm not talking about the lectures I give in my courses, which I enjoy very much, or even the lectures I give to philosophical or general audiences. I'm talking about listening to lectures. I get almost nothing out of them (and never have). There are too many distractions; complex analyses and arguments are difficult to comprehend; and one can't control the pace of the lecture in order to think about what is being said. It's like trying to keep up with a faster runner. All you do is gasp for air and fall further behind.

I hate lectures. They're a waste of time. I'd rather wait for the published version and take my time with it. Perhaps lectures are valuable in other disciplines, but philosophy is different. For one thing, philosophy emphasizes precision and rigor. The idea is to say things just right. Every word matters. I'm a slow reader. I refuse to move on until I have grasped what the author is saying. This can mean reading the same sentence many times. I make notes in the margins. I get up for a walk to reflect on what I've just read. I draw diagrams. Reading, to me, is an intellectual engagement with the author, not a passive exercise. It doesn't matter that the author is dead. The author's words are immortal.

Robert Brandom of The University of Pittsburgh lectured on my campus yesterday. He's a bright, personable man. But he's a terrible speaker. His voice is feeble and monotonic. I doubt that anyone in the room got anything out of his talk. I know I didn't. What was the point of his lecturing? If he wants criticism, he should circulate his essay to those who work in his field. If he wants to talk shop, he should do so—one on one. But lecturing? I don't get it.

Here is a handout I prepared for my students.

Hope you don't mind that I referred readers to your blog.

I represent the local Salem Humane Society and another local group, Angels for Animals. Your site is a great source for many of the issues we address.

Regards,
Robert L. Guehl, JD, LLM
Salem OH

If rape is sexual intercourse without an individual's consent, and if nonhuman animals (like underage humans) are incapable of consenting, then sexual intercourse with a nonhuman animal is rape (or the moral equivalent thereof). Here is an interesting news story in which a Dutch politician reaches that conclusion. (Thanks to Norm Weatherby for the link.)

Last night, I said (here) that the bombings in Madrid might induce Europeans to take terrorism seriously. It appears that this is happening. See here for excerpts from an editorial by the French newspaper Le Monde. The question is whether trendy American liberals such as John Kerry will realize that we are at war. This is not Al Capone; it's Adolf Hitler.

I honestly think that liberals so hate President Bush that it prevents them from thinking clearly about domestic and international affairs. Their reasoning seems to be: George W. Bush is for it; therefore, it's wrong and I oppose it. Liberals stand for nothing. They are reactionaries, fueled by hatred, anger, and envy. Just read Paul Krugman's semi-weekly columns in The New York Times.

Come November, Americans are going to ask themselves a simple question: "Which candidate, George W. Bush or John Kerry, is more likely to protect my family and me from those who would gladly kill us?" Wouldn't it be ironic if Europeans support President Bush before the American Left does?

To the Editor:

In "The Next Nader Effect" (Op-Ed, March 9), Charlie Cook is wrong to suggest that Ralph Nader can tilt the next election toward the Republicans. Only the electorate can do that.

If the prospect of what Mr. Nader calls "more voices and more choices" is worrisome to Democrats, they are worried, then, about democracy, which is all about choices. If Mr. Nader, or any third-party candidate, is a little too much democracy for Democrats, no wonder voters are looking elsewhere.

Instead of demonizing the threat, the Democratic Party should heed the dissenting views that give the Nader candidacy its force. Instead of turning Mr. Nader into a scapegoat, they should ask why they need one.

PETER JOSYPH
Wheatley Hts., N.Y., March 9, 2004

To the Editor:

Charlie Cook (Op-Ed, March 9) seems to believe that Senator John Kerry is entitled to every vote that Ralph Nader "steals" from him. There's an easy solution to this problem. Mr. Kerry could incorporate some of Mr. Nader's ideas into his presidential campaign and form a coalition of voters. Until that happens, though, Mr. Nader has every right and reason to run. Quite simply, Mr. Nader's votes are not Mr. Kerry's to have unless he can earn them.

PAUL BRENZEL
White Plains, March 9, 2004

The editorial board of The New York Times is coming to understand terrorism. See here. The only question is which presidential candidate, George W. Bush or John Kerry, has the backbone to protect Americans from it. I think you know the answer. Sometimes things are black or white, not Kerry gray.

I received the following letter from a reader:

Dear Professor:

I enjoy reading your blog and columns on TCS.

I wonder if I can appeal to you for a book recommendation. I would like to find a single volume, accessible historical survey of philosophy. Something that starts with the Greeks and makes its way through the important figures and their ideas. Something with the coverage of, say, Strauss's "History of Political Philosophy," but shorter and less dense. Something for a non-specialist who has only had a fragmented exposure to philosophy.

Any recommendations would be greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Kind regards, Kelion Kasler

Thanks for writing, Kelion. The book I'm about to recommend is not short (it comprises 836 pages, not counting prefatory material), and some parts of it are dense, but it's the best one-volume history of philosophy I've read. (Actually, it's the only one-volume history of philosophy I've read.) The book is Richard H. Popkin, ed., The Columbia History of Western Philosophy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). I wrote a long, favorable review of this book in Teaching Philosophy a couple of years ago. I learned a lot from it, and you will, too.

Dictionary, n. A malevolent literary device for cramping the growth of a language and making it hard and inelastic. This dictionary, however, is a most useful work.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

The other day I quoted John Kekes, one of my philosophical heroes. (See here.) When I quote someone who's alive, such as Kekes, I send a link to him or her with the subject line "some publicity for you." It's publicity for me, too, of course. Nothing wrong with that. A few days later, Kekes wrote back, saying that he hoped my "propaganda" would have an effect on the smug "left-liberal" consensus.

Perhaps I should have been flattered by this, but it puzzled me, because "propaganda" is derogatory (rather than laudatory or neutral). "Is Kekes insulting me?" I wondered. But why would he, since I share his conservatism? Is he implying that there is little or no philosophical content on my blog? I could ask him, obviously, but that would be too easy—and I might not like what he says. Let's learn something. Here is the complete definition of "propaganda," used as a noun, from the Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed. (which I have on my hard drive as a result of review work I did for Oxford University Press):

propaganda, n.

[a. It. (Sp., Pg.) propaganda (F. propagande), from the mod. L. title Congregatio de propaganda fide 'congregation for propagating the faith': see sense 1.]

1. (More fully, Congregation or College of the Propaganda.) A committee of Cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church having the care and oversight of foreign missions, founded in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV.

2. Any association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice.

Sometimes erroneously treated as a plural (= efforts or schemes of propagation) with singular propagandum, app. after memorandum, -da.

3. The systematic propagation of information or ideas by an interested party, esp. in a tendentious way in order to encourage or instil a particular attitude or response. Also, the ideas, doctrines, etc., disseminated thus; the vehicle of such propagation.

4. attrib. and Comb., as (sense 3) propaganda campaign, chief, film, fund, leaflet, meeting, play, poster, raid, technique, war, warfare, work; propaganda machine, an organization responsible for the dissemination of propaganda.

When used in the first sense, "propaganda" is not derogatory; but clearly Kekes wasn't using it in that sense. Sense 3 is the derogatory sense. Its derogatoriness derives from the fact that information is presented tendentiously rather than openly and fairly. The propagandist is result- rather than process-oriented. He or she has an ulterior (hidden, undisclosed) motive. The aim is to instill a belief or attitude, presumably without concern for its rational basis.

What interests me is the second sense. It's nonderogatory. Every moral theorist, religionist, and politician (understood broadly to mean political actor) is a propagandist in this sense. If there is something objectionable about it, then everyone is guilty: consequentialists as well as deontologists, Christians as well as Jews and Muslims, liberals as well as conservatives and anarchists. Each seeks to propagate his or her doctrine (beliefs, values). I, Keith, think it would be a better world if there were more conservatives, so I do my best to articulate, elaborate, and defend conservatism. My liberal friends think it would be a better world if there were more liberals, so they do their best to articulate, elaborate, and defend liberalism.

Not everything I post on this blog is reasoned, much less philosophical. Sometimes, as I'm sure you're aware, I rant. Those posts could be characterized as propaganda in the derogatory sense. (For what it's worth, I've yet to see a rantless blog. And I have said, from the very first day, that this blog consists of "Analytic Philosophy [and Other Stuff] in the Anal-Retentive Tradition" [emphasis added].) But I like to think that some (much?) of what I post is both reasoned and philosophical. This very post, for example, is an attempt to clarify the concept of propaganda. If a given post is a reasoned articulation, elaboration, or defense of conservatism, then it's propaganda in the nonderogatory sense. I hope that's the sense in which Kekes used the term. He, too, is a propagandist for conservatism in the nonderogatory sense.

[W]e must begin thinking more seriously of civil disobedience as a regular part of gay politics. Civil disobedience stands to law as coming out stands to social interdict. It is the purest principled manner in which to assert dignity in politics, for it necessarily puts self-interest imminently at risk for the sake of what is right. Rosa Parks established and asserted her dignity and self-worth by sitting at the front of a city bus in violation of law so that it would come to pass that other blacks could do so by right. So too, religiously organized gays could show that they have dignity in substance—not just in name—by conducting holy unions at marriage license bureaus in violation of law so that it would come to pass that other gays could marry there by right.

(Richard D. Mohr, Gay Ideas: Outing and Other Controversies [Boston: Beacon Press, 1992], 97)

According to today's Dallas Morning News (citing Health magazine), seventy-seven percent of "surveyed women across the globe . . . say that beauty products are a must-have, not a luxury." I'm sure the cosmetics companies enjoyed hearing that. I'm just as sure starving people around the world did not.

Pray, v. To ask that the laws of the universe be annulled in behalf of a single petitioner confessedly unworthy.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Some readers of AnalPhilosopher know that I have two blogs. The other is Animal Ethics. I try to post at least one item a day on Animal Ethics, just to keep it going. Sometimes I post the same item on both blogs. See here for today's post.

Maybe a few more attacks like this on Europeans will induce them to take the war on terrorism seriously. You can't reason with people who are hell-bent on killing you. Either you stand up to them or you die at their hands. Thank goodness we have a president who is able and willing to stand up to Islamic murderers. Ask yourself whether John Kerry would. (Thanks to Texas Conservative for the link.)

Andrew Sullivan posted the following on his blog today:

QUOTE OF THE DAY: "Before leaving the question of divorce, I should like to distinguish two things which are very often confused. The Christian conception of marriage is one; the other is the quite different question—how far Christians, if they are voters or members of Parliament, ought to try to force their views of marriage on the rest of the community by embodying them in the divorce laws. A great many people seem to think that if you are a Christian yourself you should try to make divorce difficult for everyone. I do not think that. At least I know I should be very angry if the Mohammedans tried to prevent the rest of us from drinking wine. My own view is that the Churches should frankly recognize that the majority of the British people are not Christians and, therefore, cannot be expected to live Christian lives. There ought to be two distinct kinds of marriage: one governed by the State with rules enforced on all citizens, the other governed by the Church with rules enforced by her on her own members. The distinction ought to be quite sharp, so that a man knows which couples are married in a Christian sense and which are not."—C. S. Lewis, from "Mere Christianity." What an extraordinary contrast to the current religious right.

Two things. First, Sullivan continues to imply that opposition to homosexual "marriage" must be rooted in religion. This allows him to evade the secular arguments against it, which are, in my opinion, strong. And what's wrong with religious motivation? Sullivan is a Christian. Why does he impugn the motives of his fellows? Second, he slyly implies that C. S. Lewis would support homosexual "marriage." There is no evidence for this. The distinction Lewis is drawing is between heterosexual marriage in the legal sense and heterosexual marriage in the spiritual or religious sense. How do you feel when you read Sullivan and realize how manipulative he is? He isn't interested in persuading you rationally; he's interested in moving you emotionally. Some public intellectual.

I hope you're reading Peg Kaplan's blog every day. See here. She has an interesting take on current affairs.

I happened upon this. It'll make you laugh. Look at the expression on the father's face.

To the Editor:

McDonald's decision to downsize its meals causes one to reflect on other aspects of our lives that need downsizing ("Downsize That Order!," editorial, March 8).

Our wants, needs and necessities have bloated, just like the average American waistline. More clothes to wear, bigger cars to drive, more space to live, more power, more influence—the plague of gigantism has hit us. In our mad rush to the big, we should remember that dinosaurs were not the most successful form of life on this planet.

SOMNATH MUKHERJI
Arlington, Mass., March 8, 2004

I don't know whether to laugh or cry when I read stuff like this. Have we lost our minds? If you're fat, stop eating so much or exercise more, or both. This notion that others are responsible for every misfortune we experience has burrowed so deeply into our psyches that we seem incapable of clear thought. Let me say it very clearly: You are responsible for your health. I'm not. Your neighbor is not. Restaurant owners are not.

By the way, imagine a world in which (1) there is universal, government-funded health care (for which many liberals are agitating) and (2) we continue to discount or disregard personal responsibility. The disciplined among us will subsidize the undisciplined; the healthy will subsidize the sick; the intelligent will subsidize the stupid; the responsible will subsidize the irresponsible and the nonresponsible; the industrious will subsidize the lazy. There will be a massive transfer of wealth from those who live clean, healthy lives to those who don't. I'm sorry, but I'm not paying one dollar to help some fat person get lean. Get out and run, dammit! Ride a bicycle! Swim! Even walking burns 110 calories a mile.

End of rant.

How does an American reach adulthood without learning that the rights that make up the Bill of Rights (the first ten [really, the first eight] amendments of the United States Constitution) restrict government, not individuals or associations? (Originally, they were held to restrict only the federal government.) The other day, sports columnist Gerry Fraley of The Dallas Morning News wrote about a plan by Major League Baseball to test its players for performance-enhancing drugs: "[Donald] Fehr and [Gene] Orza [executives of the Major League Baseball Players Association] want the players to have the same protection under the Fourth Amendment as everyone else. Players do not sacrifice constitutional protection in return for a big check." (See here for the column.)

Major League Baseball is a private entity, not an arm, agency, or instrumentality of government. One might argue that because of its antitrust exemption, it should be treated as a governmental entity, in which case constitutional restrictions would apply to it; but that's a stretch even by lawyerly standards. There is no state action here. The same mistake is made in connection with the First Amendment's free-speech clause. I've heard sports columnists say, for example, that in-house speech codes of sports leagues or franchises violate the First Amendment. This is risible. Sports columnists who utter such nonsense should take a refresher course in civics. What's sad is that Fraley has a degree in history. He must have missed the lecture on the Constitution.

Addendum: I just read this New York Times story about steroids in baseball. Note that Gene Upshaw of the National Football League players' union needs to join Gerry Fraley in the civics refresher course I mentioned. And Donald Fehr, the head of the baseball union, thinks the presumption of innocence applicable in criminal trials applies outside that context. This is legalism: the extension of legal concepts into nonlegal domains. Does Fehr presume the innocence of his children when the evidence of their culpability is clear? Does he require proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Somehow I doubt it.

Being about, if I am so happy as to obtain her consent, to enter into the marriage relation with the only woman I have ever known, with whom I would have entered into that state; and the whole character of the marriage relation as constituted by law being such as both she and I entirely and conscientiously disapprove, for this among other reasons, that it confers upon one of the parties to the contract, legal power and control over the person, property, and freedom of action of the other party, independent of her own wishes and will; I, having no means of legally divesting myself of these odious powers (as I most assuredly would do if an engagement to that effect could be made legally binding on me), feel it my duty to put on record a formal protest against the existing law of marriage, in so far as conferring such powers; and a solemn promise never in any case or under any circumstances to use them. And in the event of marriage between Mrs. [Harriet] Taylor and me I declare it to be my will and intention, and the condition of the engagement between us, that she retains in all respects whatever the same absolute freedom of action, and freedom of disposal of herself and of all that does or may at any time belong to her, as if no such marriage had taken place; and I absolutely disclaim and repudiate all pretension to have acquired any rights whatever by virtue of such marriage.

(John Stuart Mill, "Statement on Marriage," in Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, ed. John M. Robson, vol. 21 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson [Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984] [statement dated 6 March 1851] [italics in original])

Here is the newsletter of my department, Philosophy and Humanities. Tomorrow we have a visitor, Dr Robert Brandom, a distinguished professor of philosophy at The University of Pittsburgh, which has one of the top philosophy departments in the world. He will be lecturing on "Hermeneutic Practice and Theories of Meaning." See here for details. You are welcome to attend.

Well I'm sitting on a hillside
On the warmer side of cool
With the future laid before me
Like a green and misty jewel
And to climb above the tree line
Is only for the fools
So they say
So they say

Chorus:
On the warmer side of cool
What you feel in your heart is all
On the warmer side of cool
Being cool it's so easy to be cold

Well I'm sitting by the seaside
On the warmer side of cool
With the ocean spread before me
Like a blue and misty jewel
And if I jump into the water
Would an angel break my fall
So they say
So they say

On the warmer side of cool
What you feel in your heart is all

I'm sorry if I offend you
If I'm a little bit intense
But I never did intend us
To be sitting on the fence
And even though I'm guilty
Of making total sense
I'm happy when it's all
On the warmer side of cool

Repeat Chorus
It ain't cool to be cold
It ain't cool to be cold

Kelion Kasler just sent a link to this site. It looks terrific. Thanks, Kelion!

Here is an interesting blog.

I love reading Dick Morris's columns. He's a master strategist. Although I've been a political junkie for thirty years (since I was in my teens) and have a degree in political science, I learn something from him every time I read or hear him. Here is Morris's latest column: on President Bush's imminent dismantling of John Kerry. (Thanks to Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative for the link, which I'm unlikely to have run across otherwise. By the way, Steve is becoming a superb blogger. Today he got his 1,200th site visitor. Congratulations! I wouldn't let a day go by without reading his posts.)

The following item appeared on James Taranto's Best of the Web Today. You can have this page sent to you by e-mail for free. Don't tell anyone, but I'd pay to have it sent.

Virginia Is for Lovers

Is this confusing or what? "Study Examines STD Rates of Teen Virgins," read the headline of an Associated Press dispatch yesterday. If they're virgins, wouldn't their STD (sexually transmitted disease) rate be zero by definition? Not according to Medical News Today, which headlines its story on the same subject "Virgins Have Same Rate of Sexually Transmitted Diseases as Non-virgins." Again, unless sexually transmitted diseases have been eradicated altogether, how could this be?

MSNBC.com provides a little more information in its headline, which reads: "Teen 'Virgins' Face STD Risks, Study Finds." There's also a subheadline: "Less likely to use condoms than non-abstinent youth." Again, why would virgins use condoms at all, unless there were a shortage of balloons?

MSNBC's scare quotes offer a clue to what this is all about, and a Reuters headline finally gives it away: "Teens Pledging Sex Abstinence Often Fail-Study." In other words, the defining characteristic of the teens the AP describes as "virgins" is that they've lost their virginity!

Who'd've thunk it?

A reader sent a link to this column by Thomas Sowell. (Thank you.) Compare it to the blog posts by Andrew Sullivan during the past couple of months. Sowell reasons; Sullivan rants. Sowell is calm and collected; Sullivan is hysterical. Sowell thinks; Sullivan feels. Which columnist would you rather read?

"And we are absolutely convinced that we drilled through the gates of hell!"

Thank you for the best laugh of the day (maybe even of the month!). Alas, I fear that my unholy, "abhorring unto all flesh," unbelieving infidel self is doomed. And unto myself only is the blame to be laid, for I was warned in college (that den of iniquity), that I had a hole in my soul yearning to be filled by Jesus (amen!), and that the failure to receive the Lord (into the aforementioned hole) as my personal savior, would result in damnation and hellfire, and that the torture of nevermore being in the presence of the most merciful God was beyond anything my abominable, maggot-eaten flesh could conceive. I replied that "holes yearning to be filled" sounded somewhat pornographic, and did their preacher know that they were going around trying to pick up women in this manner? Then I invited them up for pentagrams at 5 o'clock, but they'd have to bring their own goat's blood. For some reason, they left me alone after that.

X, Satan-in-training

Euthanasia is a good, easy, or gentle death. (The word derives from the Greek words "eu," good, and "thanos," death.) The central case of euthanasia involves a person who is terminally ill, in great pain, and desirous of dying. Hastening the person's death is a release from misery. The motive of the person doing the euthanizing is benevolence. We say that we're doing it for your own good—because we love you. A synonym for "euthanasia" is "mercy killing."

Suppose we find a healthy, happy orphan. If we put him or her to death because (1) no individual is willing to provide the necessary care and (2) society is unwilling to allocate the resources for such care, is it euthanasia? Clearly not—even if the death itself is quick and painless. The orphan, by hypothesis, is healthy and happy and will, with adequate care, live a long life.

So why do we call it euthanasia when healthy, happy dogs and cats are put to death? We're not doing it for their benefit. We're not doing it because the only alternative to death is a life of unmitigated misery. We're doing it because we—individually and collectively—are unwilling to pay for the care they need.

Why do we call it euthanasia when it's not? I think it's because we're hiding the ugly reality from ourselves. We don't like to think that we're killing healthy, happy animals simply because we'd rather use the resources for other purposes, such as entertainment and fashionable clothing. The word "euthanasia" assures us that we're doing it for the sake of the animals.

I'm not arguing, here, for increased funding, although I believe it's scandalous that an affluent nation such as ours doesn't provide for its feline and canine companions. I'm arguing for honesty. If we're unwilling to provide for dogs and cats, let's say so. Let's stop implying, by our terminology, that we have no choice. We do. We're making a bad choice.

Nursing is a traditional female occupation. What happened when males went into it? They became male nurses, not nurses simpliciter. If and when homosexuals are allowed to marry, there will be marriages and homosexual marriages. This is as it should be, for there are morally and legally relevant differences between them. Homosexuals want acceptance. They're not likely to get it. Their relationships will always be stigmatized, and the qualifier "homosexual" in "homosexual marriage" will always be there. (Moreover, the word "marriage" in the expression "homosexual marriage" should be placed within quotation marks to signal nonliterality.) You can legislate rights and duties, and you can coerce people into obeying the law, but you can't legislate how people think, talk, and feel. Which is not to say that liberals don't try.

To the Editor:

While I applaud your support of gay marriage ("The Road to Gay Marriage," editorial, March 7), I am troubled by your failure to call for the immediate national recognition of this fundamental civil right.

You observe that states have traditionally written their own marriage laws, then note that the Supreme Court invalidated states' antimiscegenation laws across the nation. You fall short of the logical conclusion that when it comes to civil rights and equal protection, the individual states obviously cannot be trusted.

Justice will not be served until the courts strike down not only the federal Defense of Marriage Act but also the various antihomosexual state laws and state constitutional tenets that perpetuate the denial of equal protection.

Gay unions must be recognized as equal, in name and in fact, at all levels, federal and state. It is a simple question of love, and there is no time to wait.

ERIC MOTYLINSKI
Levittown, N.Y., March 8, 2004

To the Editor:

Marriage by definition is between a man and a woman, in preparation for bearing and raising the next generation. A man and a woman need to work together, and the law should back them up. Government should refuse to marry a man to a man or a woman to a woman because it makes a mockery of the main point of marriage, which is orderly procreation.

Do the gays really want marriage, or do they want the acceptance that marriage, traditionally defined, brings? Now they are full of joy, but it is selfish and discounts the institution of marriage.

How can you (editorial, March 7) encourage this destruction? If you want to editorialize along the lines of the civil rights model, why don't you consider the right of each child to have both a father and a mother, together for life?

HELEN LYMAN
Portland, Ore., March 7, 2004

Infidel, n. In New York, one who does not believe in the Christian religion; in Constantinople, one who does. (See GIAOUR.) A kind of scoundrel imperfectly reverent of, and niggardly contributory to, divines, ecclesiastics, popes, parsons, canons, monks, mollahs, voodoos, presbyters, hierophants, prelates, obeah-men, abbes, nuns, missionaries, exhorters, deacons, friars, hadjis, high-priests, muezzins, brahmins, medicine-men, confessors, eminences, elders, primates, prebendaries, pilgrims, prophets, imaums, beneficiaries, clerks, vicars-choral, archbishops, bishops, abbots, priors, preachers, padres, abbotesses, caloyers, palmers, curates, patriarchs, bonezs, santons, beadsmen, canonesses, residentiaries, diocesans, deans, subdeans, rural deans, abdals, charm-sellers, archdeacons, hierarchs, class-leaders, incumbents, capitulars, sheiks, talapoins, postulants, scribes, gooroos, precentors, beadles, fakeers, sextons, reverences, revivalists, cenobites, perpetual curates, chaplains, mudjoes, readers, novices, vicars, pastors, rabbis, ulemas, lamas, sacristans, vergers, dervises, lectors, church wardens, cardinals, prioresses, suffragans, acolytes, rectors, cures, sophis, mutifs and pumpums.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I've never made a secret of my atheism. It's just a fact about me that people can take or leave. But some people seem unable to accept it. For example, I've had several letters recently in which the writer says he or she will "pray for me." What is that supposed to mean? The writer knows that I disbelieve in the being to whom he or she is praying, so it can only be an insult—a way of saying, "You're going to burn in hell forever." Maybe so, but the odds are strongly against it. What the writers should come to grips with is the possibility—indeed, the probability—that when we die, we die. Stop living in fantasyland. But if you insist on living there, at least respect my decision not to join you.

Addendum: If you're a Christian, you may be thinking, "Why is this guy so touchy? All the writers said is that they'll pray for him." You're not using your imagination. Suppose I belonged to the Santa Claus sect. Learning that you doubt the existence of Santa Claus, I say, "I'll ask Santa to bring you gifts anyway." What would you think? You'd think I was either nuts or condescending (or both).

I was born the 26th of April 1711, old style, at Edinburgh. I was of a good family, both by father and mother: my father's family is a branch of the Earl of Home's, or Hume's; and my ancestors had been proprietors of the estate, which my brother possesses, for several generations. My mother was daughter of Sir David Falconer, President of the College of Justice: the title of Lord Halkerton came by succession to her brother.

My family, however, was not rich, and being myself a younger brother, my patrimony, according to the mode of my country, was of course very slender. My father, who passed for a man of parts, died when I was an infant, leaving me, with an elder brother and a sister, under the care of our mother, a woman of singular merit, who, though young and handsome, devoted herself entirely to the rearing and educating of her children. I passed through the ordinary course of education with success, and was seized very early with a passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my enjoyments. My studious disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring.

(David Hume, "My Own Life," in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, The Library of Liberal Arts [New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1947], 233-40, at 233 [essay first published in 1777 as The Life of David Hume, Esq.])

Andrew Sullivan complains about having his views distorted by William Bennett. See here. Sullivan is in no position to complain about this, for he routinely distorts both the motivation for the Federal Marriage Amendment (which he disingenuously calls the "religious right amendment") and arguments against homosexual "marriage." Sullivan continues to use manipulative rhetoric. He says, for example, that restricting marriage to heterosexuals is "discriminatory." Of course it is. But is it arbitrary discrimination? If there are relevant differences between heterosexuals and homosexuals, then discrimination between them is not only not forbidden by justice; it is required by it. I have yet to see Sullivan address this issue.

Sullivan's blog would illustrate an entire course on fallacies. He questions the motives of those who disagree with him (thus committing the fallacy of poisoning the well); he begs the question by calling heterosexual marriage "discriminatory" and by insisting that "equality" requires homosexual "marriage"; and he commits the fallacy of false dichotomy by assuming that there are just two options: (1) homosexual marriage on the same terms as heterosexual marriage and (2) nothing at all. (The obvious third possibility is civil unions.) He's also slippery. He refuses to endorse a constitutional amendment that would implement the federalist principles he claims to hold. Sullivan doesn't seem interested in (or capable of) rational discussion, which is sad, for he would have a lot to contribute.

Here is an interesting column by Patrick J. Buchanan on the culture war. I've enlisted on the side of my Christian friends in this war. (Thanks to John Ray over at Dissecting Leftism for the link.)

When I wake up in my tree
wake up in my bedroom tree
a little girl and a parakeet
are singing to me

My, oh my, what a peaceable kingdom
why would I ever wanna leave
leave a peaceable kingdom

And when I wake up on the floor
on the carpeted forest floor
all of the squirrels in their conifers
are saying to me

My, oh my, even if you had a set of wings
why would you ever wanna fly
from a peaceable kingdom

oh my, oh my, what a peaceable kingdom
why would I ever wanna leave
leave a peaceable kingdom

It's quiet at night
when the monkeys retire
so we lay down our faces
by the fireplace
and sing softly
what a peaceable kingdom

To the Editor:

Even though the love of equality will always be the indispensable republican virtue, most Americans realize, I think, that this does not mean that we all have to be equal in fortune or talent ("Clash of Titans," by David Brooks, column, March 6).

It simply means that the citizens of the ideal republic must respect each other as having equal human value.

What is troubling today is not that our current president comes from a powerful and wealthy family, but that he and his chief aides have failed to show that they truly respect the great majority of us.

John Kerry, on the other hand, has so far seemed to do so.

PHILIP WALKER
Santa Barbara, Calif., March 6, 2004

Homosexual activists such as Andrew Sullivan will not like reading this. Shouldn't we move extremely slowly on homosexual "marriage," given (1) the long period of time in which marriage has been restricted to heterosexuals, (2) how poorly we understand the effects of homosexual childrearing, and (3) what is at stake? This is not a Right-Left issue so much as an issue of common sense. If homosexual couples want the right to make medical decisions for each other, which seems to be the gravamen of their complaint, they should agitate for legislation to that effect. Tinkering with marriage is absurd.

Bush-haters will hate this.

The following letter appeared in today's Dallas Morning News:

Your Feb. 28 editorial, "Tort Reform?—Congress shouldn't give gun dealers immunity," regarding the proposed legislation to protect gun manufacturers from lawsuit liability does a fine job of telling about half the story.

The gun control lobby has fought this legislation tooth and nail for the simple reason that it has failed in its attempts to curb gun rights through legislation and it sees nuisance lawsuits as a method to bankrupt the American gun industry. This proposed law would put an end to that scheme.

President Bush has proclaimed, quite wisely, his support for this legislation. The fact is that nuisance lawsuits, used as a tactic to bankrupt industry, are a slippery slope that we should never attempt to go down. Once one industry is successfully targeted and destroyed, all others will be vulnerable.

At present, far more Americans are killed every year by automobiles than by guns. Over half of all traffic fatalities are alcohol-related. If you think that GM, Ford and Chrysler should be held responsible and financially accountable for the actions of every drunken driver, then by all means you should support this legislation.

However, if you think that criminals are the ones truly responsible for their actions, then you should have a problem with it. Criminals do enough damage in the United States. We should not allow irresponsible activists to add the destruction of American industry to that butcher bill.

James Dark, executive director, Texas State Rifle Association, Addison

The author's point about automobiles is well taken. Those who use guns to harm others are misusing them and should be held accountable for their actions. If gun manufacturers are liable for the misuse of guns, then automobile manufacturers are liable for the misuse of automobiles. And this is just a start. Knife manufacturers are liable for the misuse of knives; baseball bat manufacturers are liable for the misuse of baseball bats; logicians are liable for the misuse of logic. Why don't we just hold the misusers responsible?

Most discussions of Ayn Rand are either so blindly hostile or so uncritically adulatory as to be unprofitable. For a critical assessment that has neither of these faults, see Robert Nozick, "On the Randian Argument," The Personalist 52 (1971): 282-304. (James Rachels, "Suggestions for Further Reading," in The Right Thing to Do: Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy, ed. James Rachels [New York: Random House, 1989], 78, at 78)

Since I shall be quite critical of Miss Rand's argument in the remainder of this essay, I should here note (especially since she has been given a largely vituperative and abusive hearing in print) that I have found her two major novels exciting, powerful, illuminating, and thought-provoking. These virtues, even combined with a "sense of life" that is worthy of man do not, of course, guarantee that her conclusions are true, and even if we suppose they are true, all this does not, of course, guarantee that the actual arguments offered will be cogent, that they will prove their conclusions. Nothing I say in this essay is meant to deny that Miss Rand is an interesting thinker, worthy of attention. (Robert Nozick, "On the Randian Argument," The Personalist: An International Review of Philosophy 52 [spring 1971]: 282-304, at 299 n. 1 [italics in original])

Here are some images from inside factory farms.

Imagine you hear about a father who sees his only son is being brutally murdered—in fact, he had advance knowledge of the atrocity—yet he does nothing to prevent the murder, even though he would be in no danger if he intervened. What would be your opinion of that father? A decent person would condemn the father, judging him guilty of Child Abuse.

How did he know about the murder IN ADVANCE? And how did he possess the ability to STOP the murder? Because the father in question is God—and his brutally murdered son is Jesus. If God was capable of creating the entire universe out of nothing, could it have been beyond the scope of his powers to stop the murder of Jesus? Hardly, because he is all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good. How can mere mortals—some Jews who clamored for Jesus's death and some Romans who carried out the Crucifixion—be regarded as anything other than as agents of God's higher purpose? Otherwise, we have to believe that THEIR power exceeded his power, which is absurd.

The proper response, I think, to Mel Gibson's new movie, The Passion of the Christ, is NOT to worry about its potential for fomenting anti-Semitic outrages today because of what some Jews allegedly may have done twenty centuries ago, but instead to ask: how were they supposed to thwart God's plan for Jesus's death? And what bearing does their action have on ANYONE living today? Only the notion of "collective guilt" could justify punishing or stigmatizing the indirect descendants of people who acted shamelessly two thousand years ago.

Of course, a much deeper level of rebuttal to the Mel Gibson movie, which purports to present historical fact, as recounted in the New Testament's Four Gospels, is to point out that the entire story of Jesus and the Crucifixion is a MYTH—a fabrication based on earlier mythologies from pre-Christian centuries. There is NO contemporary evidence that Jesus ever existed—the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, Luke and John were written, at minimum, sixty years after the alleged death of Jesus, which means that NONE of them wrote on the basis of first-hand knowledge. Serious historians since 1850 have cast doubt on the historical existence of Jesus—his "historicity." For details, read THE CASE AGAINST CHRISTIANITY, by Professor Michael Martin, who teaches philosophy at Boston University. His book was published in 1991 by Temple University Press and is available from Amazon.com.

For an immediate and wider inquiry, go to Google and type in: "Jesus + historicity." It will yield many accounts of why scholars, including Christians, question the historical existence of Jesus.

If you do not relish the prospect of watching a movie that features fifteen minutes of torture and flagellation, in an excruciating realistic style, then skip seeing Mel Gibson's "religious snuff film."

Robert Hessen

To the Editor:

Re "Judge Finds a Typo-Prone Lawyer Guilty of Bad Writing" (news article, March 4):

Three cheers and one cheer more for the federal judge in Philadelphia who punished a lawyer for a stream of typos as well as "vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, verbose and repetitive" prose.

As someone who travels from company to company teaching effective writing, I can tell you that sloppy, disorganized and poorly phrased business writing costs this country many millions of dollars each year in lost productivity.

Look at the next piece of writing that crosses your desk. How many examples of wordiness, redundancy, poor punctuation and mangled grammar are there? How many typos? Is the tone positive or downright nasty?

I find a minimum of six to eight errors in every letter, memo and report submitted to me by my students. Recent ones include "Cheryl and me will fix the report," "San Hose, California" and this petulant closing: "please respond accurately and quickly."

GARY BLAKE
Port Washington, N.Y., March 4, 2004

To the Editor:

I am writhing in response to your article about a lawyer's poor writing skills ("Judge Finds a Typo-Prone Lawyer Guilty of Bad Writing," news article, March 4). Lawyers who fail to proofread their writing say one thing but mean something very different. If it were not so common, it would be laughable.

JAMES B. FISHMAN
New York, March 4, 2004
The writer is a lawyer.

One would expect that a great deal has been written on the justification of egalitarianism, but one would be disappointed. Most liberal arguments concentrate on clarifying the nature of equality, working out the details of favored conceptions of it, and championing one conception against its competitors. The literature is reminiscent of scholastic debates about the nature of the Trinity. Everything is considered in minute detail except the tenability of the basic assumption. The liberal attitudes responsible for this state of affairs range from disclaiming the need for justification to offering ones so cursory that they carry only the believers' conviction. The deeper reason underlying these attitudes is the supposition that no decent person who understands what is at stake could fail to be committed to egalitarianism in one form or another. This too brings to mind a scholastic attitude: the one toward atheists.

(John Kekes, Against Liberalism [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997], 93-4)

I'm teaching an upper-level undergraduate seminar on research methods and philosophical writing. It's fun. I get to reflect more than I usually do (which is a lot) on the concepts and methods of my discipline. About half the course is devoted to close readings of classic philosophical essays, such as Peter Singer's "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" and William Rowe's "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism." The best way to learn philosophy, in my view, is to immerse oneself in it. That means reading, thinking, discussing, and writing—and reading about, thinking about, discussing, and writing about reading, thinking, discussing, and writing.

There are two books in the course in addition to the course pack. One, by Zachary Seech, is on philosophical writing. The other is Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl, The Philosopher's Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). Seech's book is excellent, although he inexplicably omits discussion of The Philosopher's Index. (This is like writing a book about automobile maintenance without mentioning the wrench.) The book by Baggini and Fosl is nicely conceived but, with all due respect, sloppily executed. There are many typographical errors. Why are books rushed into print without careful editing? Why would Baggini and Fosl allow a book to appear with "Emmanuel Kant" in it? Sometimes it's "Emmanuel"; sometimes it's "Immanuel."

Here's an example of a more substantive gaffe. In the two-page discussion of false dichotomy, the authors write:

False dichotomies are more often found in everyday arguments than in philosophy. This is because presenting an either/or choice is a typical rhetorical move, employed more often with the aim of persuading people than with actually constructing a good argument. But they do also crop up in philosophy. (88)

I have no problem with the distinction being marked. The word "rhetorical" suggests a contrast with "logical." Rhetoric is concerned with inducing belief. Logic is concerned with inducing true or justified belief. Rhetoric is an art. Logic is closer to a science. To a rhetorician, the end (belief) justifies the means. To a logician, certain means, such as appealing to the emotions and exploiting ambiguity, are categorically prohibited. Rhetoricians are consequentialists; logicians are deontologists.

What bothers me is the use of "persuasion" to refer to rhetoric. Here is the first definition of "persuasion" in the Oxford English Dictionary, 2d ed.:

The action, or an act, of persuading or seeking to persuade; the presenting of inducements or winning arguments; the addressing of reasonings, appeals, or entreaties to a person in order to induce him to do or believe something.

The word "persuasion" derives from the Latin persuadere, which means "to bring over by talking, induce." But there are two ways to bring one over by talking: first, by appealing to reason; and second, by appealing to emotion. The definition of "persuasion" incorporates both elements.

If I give you a reason to believe some proposition, I appeal to your rational faculty. My aim is to induce belief by showing you that your existing beliefs commit you to some further belief. My leverage is the principle of noncontradiction. This is eminently respectful of the person. Let's call it "rational persuasion." If I play upon your emotions in order to win assent to some proposition, I appeal to your emotional or passionate faculty. My aim is to move you. I may try to frighten you into accepting the proposition, for example, or I may exploit the emotive meanings of words. This is disrespectful of the person. It is manipulative.

Rational persuasion is open and honest. Nonrational persuasion is subliminal and dishonest. The end is the same: inducement of belief. The means differ. Here is what Baggini and Fosl should have said:

False dichotomies are more often found in everyday arguments than in philosophy. This is because presenting an either/or choice is a typical rhetorical move, employed more often with the aim of persuading people nonrationally than with providing good reasons for belief. But they do also crop up in philosophy.

"Persuasion" has a bad name in philosophy because it is identified with rhetoric and other disreputable techniques. But this is to confuse one type of persuasion—the nonrational type—with persuasion. I propose that the word "persuasion" be modified from now on by "rational" and "nonrational." Rational persuasion is the essence of philosophy. This is not to condemn rhetoric; it is to say that rhetoric has no place in philosophy. A philosopher would rather not induce belief at all than induce it by nonrational means. (This, by the way, is why I chose philosophy over law.)

Addendum: It might be objected that the word "persuasion" has a technical meaning in philosophy, just as "burglary" has a technical meaning in the common law. (Burglary was defined at common law as the breaking and entering of a dwelling place in the nighttime with the specific intent to commit a felony or petty larceny therein. Thus, if I break into a house to commit rape, murder, kidnap, or arson, I commit burglary.) The word "persuasion," it might be said, just means "nonrational persuasion." I agree that many philosophers use the term this way. I'm arguing that they shouldn't. It ruins a perfectly good word. The distinction we want to mark is between two types of persuasion (rational and nonrational), not between persuasion and argumentation. All argumentation is persuasion—rational persuasion. My suggestion has etymology on its side.

Idiot, n. A member of a large and powerful tribe whose influence in human affairs has always been dominant and controlling. The Idiot's activity is not confined to any special field of thought or action, but "pervades and regulates the whole." He has the last word in everything; his decision is unappealable. He sets the fashions of opinion and taste, dictates the limitations of speech and circumscribes conduct with a dead-line.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I served as an enlisted man in the U.S. Navy 1983-88.

There does indeed seem to be less racism in the military than in much of the civilian world—mainly because racist talk and behavior is NOT tolerated by the command. In fact, it is severely reprimanded. This works both ways, by the way: race-baiting by blacks would be just as strongly reprimanded as race-baiting by whites. Essentially, what the military has is a more evenhanded form of the kind of speech codes found on our politically correct campuses. To achieve such conditions in the civilian world would entail more infringements on your right to free speech than I think you would wish to tolerate, Professor Burgess-Jackson. The military is NOT a democracy.

By the way, the military is, as you say, a meritocracy and I do think that the fact that it is one has helped to smooth racial tensions in the ranks. I never heard any griping, even among my Good Old Boy shipmates, that the blacks in the military were coddled or given special consideration.

Sincerely,
Bill Vargas

Susan Lundstrom, "Dying to Get Out: A Study on the Necessity, Importance, and Effectiveness of Prisons Early Release Programs for Elderly Inmates and Inmates Suffering from HIV Disease and Other Terminal-Centered Illnesses," BYU Journal of Public Law 9 (1994): 155.

Stephen Schiffer, "Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (But Not the Ones You Expect)," Mind 104 (January 1995): 107.

Jerome McCristal Culp Jr, "The Michael Jackson Pill: Equality, Race, and Culture," Michigan Law Review 92 (August 1994): 2613.

Jeanne L. Schroeder, "Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix: A Feminist Critique of the Disaggregation of Property," Michigan Law Review 93 (November 1994): 239.

John C. Coffee Jr, "Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models—and What Can Be Done About It," The Yale Law Journal 101 (1992): 1875.

Dr John J. Ray, my polymathic friend Down Under, has an interesting post about Christian ethics. See here. John says that Christian ethics usually pays. But what if it doesn't? May a Christian ignore it? Surely not! It's easy to follow Christian teachings when they redound to one's benefit. It's easy to follow any teachings, religious or secular, when they redound to one's benefit. The acid test is when morality and self-interest diverge, not when they converge. I believe that Christianity, properly understood, is morally demanding (like its secular twin, consequentialism). It requires that Christians love their neighbors as themselves—and "neighbors" doesn't mean the people on your street. It includes the people starving to death on the other side of the world. I doubt that any Christians live up to Jesus's teachings. That's fine; but they should strive mightily to do so.

I recently read an interesting essay on hypocrisy. The author said that hypocrisy isn't the failure to practice what one preaches. It's the failure to try to practice what one preaches. This makes sense, for if one has lofty standards—and everyone should—they will be unattainable by mere mortals. Christians should be judged by how hard they try to live up to their savior's teachings, not by whether they succeed. With all due respect, most Christians don't try very hard. I see Christians living in luxury in the midst of deprivation. It's scandalous. Jesus would not be pleased.

To the Editor:

Nicholas D. Kristof presents a strong case for the legalization of gay marriage (column, March 3). I was therefore dismayed to read his statement that "conservatives can fairly protest that the gay marriage issue should be decided by a political process, not by unelected judges."

In this polite formulation of the conservative cry against activist judges, Mr. Kristof, like those conservatives, forgets that the role of the judiciary is to rule on the constitutionality of that very political process. Otherwise, we might still have laws against interracial marriage.

What, then, is fair about this conservative protest when judges are performing the very role that the Constitution says they should be performing?

ROBERT KAPLAN
New York, March 3, 2004

The New York Times weighs in today (see here) on homosexual marriage. The Times draws an analogy between state laws that prevented heteroracial marriage (sometimes called "anti-miscegenation statutes") and those that prevent homosexual marriage. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court ruled that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Times believes that the Court should (and will) rule similarly in the case of state laws that restrict marriage to heterosexuals.

The analogy is weak. First, heteroracial heterosexual couples can reproduce; homosexual couples, whether heteroracial or homoracial, cannot. Marriage has always been linked to reproduction. Second, race is, constitutionally speaking, a suspect classification; sexual orientation is not. What bothered the Court about Virginia's statute is that it seemed "designed to maintain White Supremacy." The Court employs strict scrutiny when reviewing race-based classifications. It has never suggested that classifications based on sexual orientation receive anything other than rational-basis review. States can easily satisfy the rational-basis standard by linking marriage to reproduction. Third, the statutes at issue in Loving were criminal statutes. Yes, you read that right: It was a crime in Virginia for individuals of different races to marry. Obviously, this is much more worrisome than laws that restrict marriage to heterosexuals. Laws of the former sort infringe liberty; laws of the latter sort merely withhold a status.

There is little chance that the United States Supreme Court will constitutionalize homosexual marriage, as it constitutionalized abortion. In fact, I hope a case comes to the Court soon so that we can get this issue behind us. If the Court rules as I predict it will, each state will continue to decide for itself whether to allow homosexual marriage. That is the federalist position. It is the correct position.

Human friendships share many features in common with certain social relationships in other species, particularly among non-human primates. The requirement, however, that friends should value the relationship itself above and beyond the gratification of personal ambitions, seems to be unique, and is uncharacteristic of analogous relationships among animals living under natural conditions. Human friendships, and the particular rules of conduct associated with them, probably evolved in the face of increasing social pressures which necessitated the formation of durable, reciprocal alliances with individuals other than kin or sexual partners. Since such alliances are expected to last a long time, perhaps for the lifetime of the individual, the process of friendship-formation places the emphasis on mutual liking, trust and compatibility, rather than on the prospect of immediate or even deferred material gains.

Despite the apparent absence of true friendships among animals, humans are able to derive many of the social and emotional benefits of friendship from relationships with animals, especially dogs, cats and other household pets. Perhaps because they involve other species, and therefore appear superficially counterfeit, such relationships between humans and animals have been largely ignored by ethologists and social psychologists. This is, perhaps, regrettable, since their particular differences and similarities may reveal a great deal about both the meaning and the limits of friendship.

(James Serpell, "Humans, Animals, and the Limits of Friendship," chap. 7 in The Dialectics of Friendship, ed. Roy Porter and Sylvana Tomaselli [London and New York: Routledge, 1989], 111-29, at 127-8)

I got a lot of hits today from Crooked Timber, so I inspected. Sure enough, Henry Farrell mentioned me in a comment on one of his own posts. Here it is:

Drapetomaniac, I've heard this line before from you, and frankly it's childish and insulting. When I say that I've liked some of Brooks' previous stuff, I'm not trying to cosy up to the right as you imply; I'm stating a fact as I see it. I find some people on the right to be interesting and thought-provoking; if this doesn't fit into your picture of what a card-carrying member of the left should do, that's your problem. It's bad enough having to deal with rightwing fruitcakes like Keith Burgess-Jackson telling me that I'm advocating leftwing opinions to advance my academic career, without having to put up with this kind of nonsense from other lefties.

I must say, being called a rightwing fruitcake by Henry Farrell makes me chuckle. When Henry grows up, he'll be conservative like me. He's at the totalitarian stage. I know: I was there. Thank goodness I had no power, and thank goodness he has none. Henry, who hopes one day to be tenured, is trying desperately to impress his professors and older colleagues by showing them that he learned their leftist licks. Don't you love his sneering tone? Thanks for the boost, Henry! (By the way, I love fruitcake. My mother didn't send me one this year.)

Peg Kaplan over at what if? finally got a site counter. Good work, Peg! I knew you could do it. As of a moment ago, Peg had 913 visits. It won't be long before she breaks the thousand-visit barrier, and then she'll be on her way to five digits. Meanwhile, over at Texas Conservative, Steve Headley has 951 visits. It's neck and neck!

Let's get something clear up front. Libertarians are not conservatives. Libertarians and conservatives may agree on certain issues, but that's an accident, philosophically speaking. They're driven by different considerations. I know: I was a card-carrying member of the Libertarian party for several years in the early 1980s (even voting for Ed Clark in 1980), and now I'm a conservative. In between, I was a welfare-state liberal. Conservatives are not advocates of limited government. They want as much government as is necessary to achieve their ends. What we're seeing now is a split in Republican ranks. The libertarian branch of the party dislikes President Bush's spending; the conservative branch does not.

Another point. No self-respecting conservative can support homosexual marriage. The very idea that one can do so is absurd. Heterosexual monogamous marriage is a bedrock social institution. As such, it must not be tampered with. So Andrew Sullivan, who advocates homosexual marriage, is no conservative. What he is is a libertarian. His core value is individualism, which is antithetical to conservatism. He wants minimal government in both the economic realm and the social realm. Sullivan can be what he wants, but he should not give conservatism a bad name by calling himself a conservative.

To the Editor:

Re "Bush Ad Campaign Ready to Kick Off an Expensive Effort" (front page, March 4):

My son was killed at the World Trade Center on 9/11, leaving a young wife and three small children. It is with horror and intense anger that I today witnessed the television commercials with images from 9/11 used by President Bush and his campaign strategists. Using visual reminders of this terrible tragedy to get votes is disgraceful.

Adding insult to injury is the fact that the 9/11 commission is still investigating the United States intelligence efforts, or lack thereof, before the 9/11 attacks—during President Bush's watch.

The Bush ads use the 9/11 images to proclaim "leadership." What kind of leadership is this?

ELINOR STOUT
Watertown, Mass., March 5, 2004

To the Editor:

If it's O.K. for John Kerry to "wrap himself in the flag" about Vietnam, why is it wrong for President Bush to do the same about 9/11 (front page, March 4)?

CHRISTINE GOLDEN
Toledo, Ohio, March 5, 2004

Philosophers take positions very strange to ordinary people. They have, that is, an inner need to choose between alternatives that to ordinary people are not worth distinguishing, or a need to pursue ideas well beyond the bounds of common sense. From this perspective, then: The philosopher is the person who tries to persuade people to accept abstract, unscientific ideas that seem, at least at first, absurdly scrupulous, outrageously exaggerated, or, simply, fantastic.

(Ben-Ami Scharfstein, The Philosophers: Their Lives and the Nature of Their Thought [New York: Oxford University Press, 1980], 87 [italics omitted])

Appeal, v.t. In law, to put the dice into the box for another throw.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

In her famous 1971 essay "A Defense of Abortion," Judith Jarvis Thomson, a professor of philosophy at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, discusses the following argument:

Every person has a right to life. So the fetus has a right to life. No doubt the mother has a right to decide what shall happen in and to her body; everyone would grant that. But surely a person's right to life is stronger and more stringent than the mother's right to decide what happens in and to her body, and so outweighs it. So the fetus may not be killed; an abortion may not be performed. (Judith Jarvis Thomson, "A Defense of Abortion," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 [fall 1971]: 47-66, at 48)

Thomson concedes for the sake of argument that all fetuses, from the moment of conception, are persons—with a right to life. (Her own view, which she discloses in the essay, is that some fetuses are persons and some not.) She wants to see whether the immorality of abortion follows from fetal personhood. It does not. Here is a reconstruction of the argument she criticizes:

1. All fetuses are persons (with a right to life).

2. Abortion kills fetuses.

Therefore,

3. Abortion is wrong (from 1 and 2).

As it stands, the argument is invalid. The truth of its premises is compatible with the falsity of its conclusion. But let's not give up on the argument too quickly. Perhaps the formal defect can be repaired by adding a premise. Let's try this:

2a. Killing persons is wrong.

Now the argument is valid. Propositions 1, 2, and 2a entail 3. But Thomson says the added premise, 2a, is false. It's not always wrong to kill a person. It's not wrong when done in self-defense, for example, or in a just war (against combatants), or as punishment for murder. We have repaired the formal defect by introducing a substantive defect. We have robbed Peter to pay Paul.

Perhaps we chose the wrong premise. Fetuses, unlike assailants, combatants, and murderers, are innocent. Let's replace 2a with this:

2b. Killing innocent persons is wrong.

This change requires a change in the wording of proposition 1 to preserve validity. It becomes:

1a. All fetuses are innocent persons (with a right to life).

This new argument—premises 1a, 2, and 2b entailing conclusion 3—is also valid, and premise 2b is more plausible than premise 2a, which it replaced. But premise 2b is false, Thomson says. Sometimes, as in the case of her famous violinist (see below), it is not wrong to kill innocent persons. It would be a good thing (an act of supererogation) if we refrained from killing them, but it is not wrong to kill them.

If Thomson is right, then the most common argument against abortion is unsound. This doesn't mean that abortion is morally permissible, of course, because unsound arguments can have true conclusions; but it disposes of one common argument for its impermissibility. In effect, she has shifted the argumentative burden to those who think abortion is wrong. "Come up with a better argument," she's saying.

Here, for those who are interested, is a formalized version of the argument Thomson rejects:

a. All abortions are fetus-killings. (This is a conceptual claim.)

b. All fetuses are persons. (This is a conceptual claim.)

Therefore,

c. All abortions are person-killings (from a and b). (This is a conceptual claim.)

d All person-killings are violations of the right to life. (This is a normative claim.)

Therefore,

e. All abortions are violations of the right to life (from c and d, AAA-1 syllogism). (This is a normative claim.)

f. All violations of the right to life are morally impermissible. (This is a conceptual claim.)

Therefore,

g. All abortions are morally impermissible (from e and f, AAA-1 syllogism). (This is a normative claim.)

Thomson rejects premise d by giving a counterexample. Killing the famous violinist (a person) does not violate his right to life. It infringes it, but it doesn't violate it. But now we must ask which abortions are analogous to unplugging the violinist. It may be only a numerically small subset.

Addendum: Here is Thomson's violinist case, in case you're unfamiliar with it:

You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist's circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, "Look, we're sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist now is plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it's only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you." (48-9)

Here is Thomson's commentary:

Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, "Tough luck, I agree, but you've now got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person's right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him." I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago. (49; italics in original)

Which abortions are analogous to this case?

You're probably thinking, "Why does this Burgess-Jackson guy post only the most flattering letters from his readers? Why doesn't he post the negative ones? Is he some sort of megalomaniac?" Actually, I am a megalomaniac. But seriously, almost all the e-mail I receive is positive. I don't know why this is. When I write a column for Tech Central Station, I get a mixture of positive and negative feedback on the site. Some of it is quite nasty. (Click on the columns to the left and see for yourself.) Believe me, I'm trying my hardest to piss you off. If the atheism doesn't do it, then perhaps my support for Ralph Nader will. Or how about the deontological egoism I espouse? Yes, I'm an egoist. (Click the link to the left to read my latest essay on the topic.) Or how about my vegetarianism? Have I told you that it's wrong to eat animals? And don't you hate it that I'm so vigorous, wealthy, and handsome? All right; now I'm talking crazy. If I get some negative mail, I'll post it. I promise.

Dear Professor Burgess-Jackson,

I am moved to write by having recently discovered your blog (through the excellent John J. Ray). I have been profoundly moved by it and visit every day now. The combination of philosopher, conservative, atheist, and animal-advocate, which describes me as well, is something I never thought I'd find. Naturally those of us who have thought out our views as consistently and searchingly as possible think that everyone must come to the same conclusions, but given the reality that they don't I have been very gratified to see many of the same views advocated by an intelligent and thoughtful person such as yourself. Now if only you could get over your admiration for Ralph Nader! I also appreciate the tone of your writings: reasonable and calm. I've taken to reading through your archives also, not getting enough of your daily blogging. Finding your blog has meant a great deal to me. The intellectual companionship which I get from the 'net has been a consolation for the lack of same in my physical surroundings, and I do believe that you top the list. Thank you so much for what you are doing.

Sincerely,
Dennis Mangan
Santa Rosa, CA

P.S. I'm a former marathon runner who's been stricken with chronic fatigue for many years now, as well as one who thinks that being a philosophy professor is one of man's highest callings, so I get vicarious pleasure from reading about your activities.

Forgive me for saying this, but when I read stuff like this and this (scroll down to "Thank God for Krauthammer"), I understand what Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) meant by the following:

I think all the great religions of the world—Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Communism—both untrue and harmful. . . . The conviction that it is important to believe this or that, even if a free inquiry would not support the belief, is one which is common to almost all religions and which inspires all systems of state education. The consequence is that the minds of the young are stunted and are filled with fanatical hostility both to those who have other fanaticisms and, even more virulently, to those who object to all fanaticisms. (Bertrand Russell, "Preface," in Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, ed. Paul Edwards [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957], v-vii, at v, vi)

Amen. I predict that Christians, Jews, and Muslims will still be slaughtering each other 100, 500, 1,000 years from now—should there be anyone left.

Twice a week, I'm astonished and dismayed by the misrepresentations and distortions of New York Times columnist Paul Krugman, whose picture appears in the dictionary next to "partisan." Please read his column of this date (here) and then Donald Luskin's withering critique (here). As you know, liberals will accept no tinkering with Social Security. But why? Here's Luskin:

Why all the lies, and all the contradictions? Simple. For liberals, Social Security is a fortress of New Deal collectivism and paternalism that must be held fast against conservative assaults, at all costs. What liberals fear is that, through private accounts, system beneficiaries would become real stakeholders in America and captains of their own financial fates—not wards of the state, dependent on the whims of incumbent legislators to tell them what benefits they will be permitted to receive.

You nailed it, Don. Liberals aren't benevolent. That's the lie they purvey. They're power hungry. They're totalitarians manqué.

Peg Kaplan over at what if? has an incisive post (here) about the Gray Lady, a.k.a. The New York Times. It's sad to see a great newspaper become an organ of the Left. Who can trust the Times any more? I can't. I read it, but I have to read between the lines while doing so. Even the straight news stories are slanted. The editorial opinions are little more than partisan rants.

James Taranto hypothesizes that liberals are aborting the next generation of liberals. See here. I'm agnostic about his hypothesis, but it's interesting. I will say this: If it's true, it's fitting. Abortion is prima facie seriously immoral.

Addendum: We already knew that liberalism is destructive. If Taranto is right, it's also self-destructive.

This will make you laugh. I guarantee it.

David Peterson has a neat blog. Check it out (here). Anyone who puts the lyrics of Guns N' Roses's "Welcome to the Jungle" (from Appetite for Destruction [1987]) on his or her blog can't be all bad. It's a headbanger's delight. Incidentally, they play "Welcome to the Jungle" just before each Texas Rangers baseball game at The Ballpark in Arlington. It gives me chills. Talk about a sound system!

Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative found a German site that's taking a poll on President Bush's job performance. Please vote! It takes only seconds. See here for instructions. By the way, Steve's blog has really taken off. He's a natural-born blogger. Thanks for supporting him—and me. I'm proud to have done for Steve what John Ray did for me. Just "paying it forward."

The basic principle of comparative justice is that like cases are to be treated alike and different cases to be treated differently. If Doe gets a large share and Roe a small share in a distribution, our sense of justice is not satisfied until we learn of some respect in which Doe and Roe differ that underlies and justifies this difference in treatment. If Doe and Roe are exactly alike in every respect, but one is given more than the other, the discrimination in their treatment is totally arbitrary, and arbitrary discrimination is the essence of comparative injustice. Indeed, many writers hold that the principle of like treatment for like cases is more than simply one among many ethical principles vying for our allegiance, but is rather an instance of a more general principle that is constitutive of rationality itself. One would violate this more general principle by ascribing different geometrical properties to two identical isosceles triangles, or by holding that a given physical event was a lonely exception to Newton's Laws, as much as by denying equal protection of the law to those citizens who have black skins.

Any two persons or things will differ in some respects, and it is always possible to cite some difference between them in support (more precisely, in justicization) of differences in the way they are treated. Clearly, then, comparative justice requires more than that difference in treatment be based on differences in characteristics. The underlying differences between individuals that justicize differences in their treatment must be relevant differences, and the underlying similarities that justicize similar treatment must be relevant similarities. Injustice is done when individuals who are alike in every relevant respect (not in absolutely every respect) are treated differently, or when individuals who are different in some relevant respect are treated alike.

The principle of like treatment, then, is only a starting place in the analysis of comparative justice, and needs supplementation by criteria for determining the relevance of differences. For that reason, the like treatment principle is usually said to be merely a formal principle of justice, and the criteria of relevance for various contexts of justice with which it must be supplemented are called material principles of justice. A formal principle of justice, in the words of a recent writer on the subject [Louis I. Katzner], "contains a completely unspecified variable whereas material principles constitute different ways of replacing the variable by a constant." The principle that persons who are alike in the relevant respects must be treated alike, while persons who are unalike in the relevant respects must be treated unalike and in direct proportion to the differences between them is formal in the defined sense, since it fails completely to specify which respects are relevant. The principle that social wealth should be distributed to each in proportion to his contribution (or, alternately, his ability, need, rank, or virtue) is a material principle, since it at least goes a long way toward specifying which characteristics are relevant to the justice of distributions of social wealth.

The principle that like cases should be treated alike is put too hastily by some equalitarian writers in the form of a "presumption for equality." It is commonly said, for example, that although it is absurd to think that justice requires us to treat all men exactly alike, it does require that we give them equal treatment until we have good reason not to do so, that "the burden of proof is on the person who wants to treat people differently from one another. . . ." But this presumptive principle is by no means identical in meaning or implications to the formal principle as we have formulated it. Our formal principle (which derives from Aristotle) would have us: (1) treat alike (equally) those who are the same (equal) in relevant respects, and (2) treat unalike (unequally) those who are unalike (unequal) in relevant respects, in direct proportion to the differences (inequalities) between them. The equalitarian presumptivist formulation completely ignores the second part of this principle in insisting that all and only departures from equal treatment need justification. Clearly, what needs justification according to the double formula above are: (1) departures from identical (equal) treatment when individuals seem to be the same (equal) in relevant respects, and (2) departures from different (unequal) treatment when individuals seem to be different (unequal) in relevant respects. Where the "burden of proof" actually lies in a given case, then, depends upon what is given (believed or known) about the relevant traits of the individuals involved, and also upon the particular context of justice and its governing norms and maxims. The presumption in favor of equal treatment holds when the individuals involved are believed, assumed, or expected to be equal in the relevant respects, whereas the presumption in favor of unequal treatment holds when the individuals involved are expected to be different in the relevant respects.

Consider some examples. If two pupils both violate the same rule but one is given a more severe penalty, we would presume (knowing no more facts) that a comparative injustice had been committed by the teacher. Unless some relevant difference between the two offenders or their offenses could be brought to light by the teacher, we would treat the presumption as decisive. On the other hand, consider the example cited by Louis Katzner to show that sometimes the "burden of proof" is on those who advocate equality of treatment. A testator whose sole survivor is his son leaves one half of his estate to that son and, "equally," one half to another person of the son's age. The two inheritors are different in a respect we normally take to be relevant in such contexts, namely that one is a member of the testator's immediate family whereas the other is not. Because of this given relevant difference, the father has the burden of presenting a justification for treating two people equally that will override the presumption that they should be treated differently.

The equalitarian presumptivist principle, then, errs in overlooking cases in which our antecedent expectations about the existence of characteristics agreed to be relevant creates a presumption in favor of inequality. The disguised normative character of the principle ("disguised" when it is claimed to be the formal principle of comparative justice), and, more importantly, its ultimately arbitrary character, are shown by a consideration of how it would apply to cases where no expectation exists about the equal or unequal degree to which relevant characteristics are possessed by those subject to our treatment. The presumptive principle, in these cases, tells us to presume even in our ignorance that equal treatment is called for, that individuals about whom we know nothing should nevertheless be treated equally unless or until grounds for distinction between them can be found. In this instance, the presumptive principle clearly reveals itself as not "merely formal"; it purports to be a decisive guide to our conduct. Thus, a controversial (and indeed very doubtful!) normative principle is presented in the guise of a purely formal principle of reason supposedly definitive of the very nature of comparative justice. The moral of the story is this: Don't confuse an exceptive principle ("Treat all men alike except where there are relevant differences between them") with a presumptive principle ("Treat all men alike until it can be shown that there are relevant differences between them"). The exceptive principle is indeed formal, providing no guide to action or grounds for presuming either equality or inequality in the case in which we are ignorant of the characteristics of the men to be treated. The presumptive principle has us presume equal treatment even in this case, and that would be to make a presumption every bit as arbitrary as the presumption in favor of unequal treatment in the absence of knowledge of the relevant similarities and differences of the persons involved.

Stating the correct principles of material justice (criteria of relevance) is a task of a different order from that involved in formulating the principle of formal justice. Deciding which material principles to adopt requires us to enter the moral arena itself, where basic attitudes are in profound opposition, and social interests and political parties contend. The issues involved here, being substantive moral questions rather than questions of conceptual analysis with no direct normative implications, cannot be settled decisively by appeals to "the very definition of the concept of justice." We shall have to bring in normative principles from the outside so that justice can have substance and provide direction.

The choice of material principles is sometimes severely limited by the context itself, and is therefore not particularly difficult or controversial. We should not discriminate between persons who are alike in all relevant respects; but which respects are relevant depends upon the occasion for justice, on our purposes and objectives, and on the internal rules of the "game" we are playing. There is no one kind of characteristic that is relevant in all contexts, no single material principle that applies universally. In short, what we seek when we look for a material principle is what H. L. A. Hart has called "a shifting or varying criterion used in determining when, for any given purpose, cases are alike or different." Hart went on to make the interesting suggestion that there is an analogy between relevance to a given purpose and other relational notions: "In this respect, justice is like the notions of what is genuine [real], or tall, or warm, which contain an implicit reference to a standard which varies with the classification of the thing to which they are applied." Thus, the standard of tallness varies depending on whether we are speaking of children, men, women, buildings, or mountains. There is no vicious "relativism" in this variation, and no skeptical affront to reason. It is useful to have words whose criteria of application vary in understood ways with the context, and "relevant" (as it occurs in formulations of the formal principle of comparative justice) is such a word.

(Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy, Foundations of Philosophy Series, ed. Elizabeth and Monroe Beardsley [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973], 99-102 [italics and brackets in original; footnotes omitted])

Keith:

In the "Necessity is the Mother of Invention" category, my wife (being neither anal retentive nor a psychology major) is glad that Apple's latest upgrade allows desktop name changes. "AnalPhilosopher" greeting her each time she sat down to our computer created some angst. Thanks to Apple I was able to change it to KBJ and toss it off as the new website of the KGB. In either event, I still get a twinge of perversion each time I click on ANALPHILOSOPHER.

Best,
Will Nehs

Danny Sheives of Houston just passed along a link to an interesting site. See here. Thanks, Danny.

My neighbor Johnny keeps an immaculate yard. He works in it nearly every day. The grass is kept mowed, the edges trimmed, the flower plots weeded. Every so often he changes out the flowers. To me, he's wasting his time. I have no interest in growing things. But Johnny loves it. It's deeply satisfying to him. He gets nothing financial from it; in fact, it costs him money he could use for other things. He takes pride in how his house and yard appear. He likes giving pleasure to neighbors and passersby. The flowers, in particular, brighten the neighborhood.

Today it occurred to me that I blog for the same reason Johnny grows flowers.

To the Editor:

In "More Than Money" (column, March 2), David Brooks says, "If you graduate from high school, wait until marriage to have kids and work full time (at whatever job), it is almost certain that you will not remain poor."

I have a friend with most of the credits for a master's degree. He also has a minimum wage job with no benefits and no chance for advancement. For years after graduating from college, I held similar jobs. Then I became a computer programmer. Now I am an unemployed computer programmer.

Like so many others in our circumstances, my friend and I have no illegitimate children. Many of the hardest working, most responsible people in this country are desperately poor. Those who cannot see them are not looking.

JOHN ENGELMAN
Wilmington, Del., March 2, 2004

As far as I'm concerned, there cannot be too much philosophy in cyberspace. Certainly there's a crying need for it in the blogosphere, where sloppy thinking and fallacious reasoning prevail. (I sometimes think that the world is held together by philosophers. Okay, I know it's held together by philosophers.) Here is a new blog by "independent philosopher" Dr William F. (Bill) Vallicella. Welcome, Bill! I look forward to savoring your intelligence and hope that many of my readers visit your site for edification and entertainment. (These are not incompatible!) I will put a permanent link on the left side of this blog so that readers who lose you can find you again.

Mind, n. A mysterious form of matter secreted by the brain. Its chief activity consists in the endeavor to ascertain its own nature, the futility of the attempt being due to the fact that it has nothing but itself to know itself with. From the Latin mens, a fact unknown to that honest shoe-seller, who, observing that his learned competitor over the way had displayed the motto "Mens conscia recti," emblazoned his own shop front with the words "Men's, women's and children's conscia recti."

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I have never served in the military. The draft ended shortly after I registered. (I still have my draft card.) But my father (Air Force) and stepfather (Army) served. I'm proud of them, as I am of all who serve(d). Yesterday I got to wondering about something. Given the nature of military service, is there less racism among soldiers and sailors than among people in general? Here's why I wonder. There can be no room for trendy social-engineering programs in the military. There's too much at stake. Either you do the job or you don't. Everyone and everything depends on it. To cut someone slack would be to undermine the effectiveness of the unit. This is why you don't see affirmative-action programs in the military, at least beyond recruitment outreach. Nobody is promoted on the basis of race, sex, or any other irrelevant trait.

Imagine someone who enters the military as a racist. Once you see that only merit matters; once you come into contact with people of other races, ethnicities, religions, and backgrounds; once you learn that your life depends on the competence of those around you—and that they are competent; you forget about irrelevancies. Others earn your respect. You stop thinking of them as inferior. You don't even notice the skin color of those around you. They are teammates, confidants, friends.

I may be wrong about all this. It would be interesting to hear from people who served. Is there less racism in the military than in civilian life? Is it because the military is a meritocracy? If the answer to these questions is yes, then perhaps we should apply the methods and principles of the military to civilian life. Stop the infernal social engineering! Let merit prevail! Stop insulting people by assuming that they can't make it without a push. I believe it's significant that when it matters most, we rely on merit.

In case you missed John Ray's blog today, here is a link to Ann Coulter's latest column. Say what you will about Coulter; she's a master polemicist. I'm glad she's on my side. Coulter, by the way, is an Ivy League graduate (Cornell University) and a product of one of this nation's best law schools—at The University of Michigan. She's no dummy. In fact, I would wager that she's smarter than ninety-five percent of her critics.

[C]ommunitarians can insist that even if they have trouble formulating a critical stance toward the community, liberalism has trouble formulating a way to respect and use (what might be called) the "moral wisdom" implicit in that community. If one's political theorizing is too individualistic and fails to focus on the community, it can fail to acknowledge that all sorts of social structures in our society, including our legal institutions, family structures, and systems of educating the young, have been worked out by generations of people responding to a variety of problems in ways that are complicated, nuanced, and often highly successful. One argument in favor of communitarianism . . . is that it encourages us to respect the moral wisdom implicit in these social structures and not to adopt the hubristic attitude that any one of us could do better by reasoning about these social structures by ourselves. This argument for communitarianism therefore links it with philosophical conservatism, a position associated with the writings of Edmund Burke (1729-1797). An important political figure and member of the British Parliament, Burke argued that a society is ill advised to try to govern itself by relying on abstract reasoning, because such reasoning cannot compete with the accumulated wisdom of generations of people struggling with highly complicated issues in various areas. How can a single individual, for example, generate an adequate code of criminal conduct simply by using her reason? Moreover, Burke argued that custom, human sentiments, and the lessons we learn from experience are as important as reason in giving us the tools to construct a well-functioning political society. (These themes are also present in the novels of George Eliot, who criticized certain zealous attempts at reform in the nineteenth century by people who had no respect for the moral life of the community.)

(Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy, Dimensions of Philosophy Series, ed. Norman Daniels and Keith Lehrer [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997], 189-90 [endnotes omitted])

To the Editor:

Stephen Gillers's ingenious proposal that Senator John Kerry choose former President Bill Clinton as his running mate (Op-Ed, March 3) raises more constitutional problems than Mr. Gillers suggests. Although the 22nd Amendment seems to preclude Mr. Clinton from being elected president again, it alone does not disqualify him from being elected vice president, Mr. Gillers argues.

The 12th Amendment, however, provides that "no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States." Since Mr. Clinton is ineligible to be elected president, he is also ineligible to be elected vice president.

Of course, one might argue that Mr. Clinton is not constitutionally ineligible to be president but simply cannot be elected again as president. Since the 22nd does not disqualify him to be president, the 12th Amendment would not disqualify him to be, or to be elected as, vice president.

But it makes little sense to construe the Constitution to bar Mr. Clinton from running again for president but to allow him to succeed to the presidency after having been elected vice president. The location of the sentence regarding vice-presidential eligibility in the 12th Amendment seems to equate qualifications to serve with those to be elected.

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN
St. Louis, March 3, 2004
The writer is a professor at St. Louis University School of Law.

Here is a New York Times story about the first round of television advertisements by the Bush presidential campaign. Some of the wording suggests that the campaign is duplicitous. President Bush is said to be "portrayed" as this or that, the implication being that he isn't really this or that. The commercials are "carefully orchestrated" and "devised to erase months of Democratic attacks." There is constant reference to the administration's "message." The reporter is trying to be above the fray, but he can barely hide his contempt for the president. He seems to be saying, "Look at all the lies this guy is telling; don't buy it." Let's hope that when John Kerry's advertisements begin to run, they're described in similar terms and with the same sneering, cynical tone. Betcha they're not.

Let me follow up. You may be wondering about the feminism part of what I wrote a few minutes ago. It seemed to come out of nowhere, didn't it?

Women have not been respected. That's a fact. They have been loved, but not respected, or not always respected. Traditionally, respect has been to male as love has been to female. Respect is rational; love is emotional. Respect is between equals; love can be for inferiors, such as children and animal companions.

Feminists rightly challenged this double standard, but perhaps they committed certain fallacies along the way. First, love and respect are not incompatible. I both love and respect my mother and stepfather. I stand in both relations with regard to each of them. Something could happen to cause me to stop respecting them, but I can't think of anything that could happen to cause me to stop loving them. (Okay, I can: Mom sells my collection of National Lampoons.)

But perhaps it's thought that love and respect aren't compatible, in which case, if women are to be respected, they must not be loved—even by their husbands. Imagine a feminist wife telling her husband that she wants his respect, not his love. Shouldn't she want both? Isn't it reasonable to want both? Why would she think she can't have both?

Another fallacy consists in inferring "I'm merely loved" from "I'm loved." This is an instance of what Antony Flew calls "The It-Is-Merely Fallacy." From the fact that x is F, it doesn't follow that x is merely F, for x may be many other things besides. I'm a professor, for example, but I'm not merely a professor. I'm a lawyer, a bicyclist, a neighbor, a demi-vegetarian, an atheist, and so forth. If A loves B, B may fallaciously infer that A merely loves B, i.e., that A does not also respect B. But that doesn't follow. Each spouse can and should be both loved and respected. Each spouse, in turn, should both love and respect.

It seems simple and straightforward, but then, people commit reasoning errors all the time. It's why we have—and need—philosophers, and why they pay us the big bucks.

Adore, v.t. To venerate expectantly.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

David Broder is an esteemed columnist for The Washington Post. In today's column (see here), he hands out "the political Oscars for this season." Here is his award for Best Supporting Actress:

A tie between Elizabeth Edwards and Teresa Heinz Kerry, who campaigned vigorously and effectively on their own and managed, when on stage with their husbands, to avoid the adoring gaze that once was expected from the candidate's spouse. Smart, independent women, they did much to signal a welcome change in American society. And a special award to Judith Steinberg Dean, who sent the same message simply by sticking to her medical practice.

Perhaps I'm reading too much into this, but Broder seems to be sneering at political wives who gaze adoringly at their husbands. I assume that if there's something wrong with the act, it's the adoring part and not the gaze part. In other words, there's nothing intrinsically objectionable about gazing at one's spouse.

To adore is "to regard with honor and deep affection" (The Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide, 1999). What's wrong with adoring one's spouse? Shouldn't husbands adore their wives and vice versa? Is adoration submissiveness? I don't get it.

Nancy Reagan is said to have adored her husband, Ronald. Why should she not gaze adoringly at him? Laura Bush, by all accounts, adores George W. Do women not want to be adored by their husbands? Is adoration of one's wife permissible but not of one's husband? I hate to think that feminists have so corrupted our thinking that we can't distinguish adoration—honor and deep affection—from submissiveness. If Hillary Clinton did not adore her husband, Bill, isn't that a character defect in her? Why would she remain married to him if she did not adore him, especially since their child, Chelsea, was grown? It's all very confusing, folks. I'm sorry.

By the way, I adore my mother and my stepfather, and I'm proud to say that I do. I would not be in a relationship with a woman I did not adore, and I would not expect a woman to remain in a relationship with me unless she adored me. Everyone is adorable in the sense of being capable of being adored, although not everyone is adorable in the sense of being worthy of being adored. Everyone should strive to be adorable in both senses.

I predicted in this blog several weeks ago that Andrew Sullivan—an avowed conservative and a vigorous defender of the war in Iraq—would support the Democrat presidential candidate. He's already making nice to John Kerry. See here. Why did I make the prediction? Because, while Sullivan is a complex person, like anyone else, there is only one issue that drives him on a gut level: homosexuality. He is first and foremost a homosexual. He will abandon President Bush because he thinks the president abandoned him.

Here is a terrific (indeed, prize-winning) essay on sexual signaling by Geoffrey F. Miller. I think you'll enjoy it.

Friendship is a demanding relationship, as Aristotle well knew. Unfortunately, there's a tendency to inflate the concept. Mere acquaintances become friends and friends become "good," "close," or "best" friends. Let's stop inflating the concept. A friend is a friend, nothing more and nothing less. Friends are alter egos (other selves). They enjoy each other's company, count on each other, trust each other, and inspire each other—even if it's at a distance. I believe it's possible to befriend someone one hasn't met (and never does meet) in person. See here.

A case in point is Dr John J. Ray, the Australian polymath, who went out of his way to help me with my blog back in November. We have corresponded ever since, and we link to each other's blog on a regular basis. John is a good man. I admire and respect him. We don't agree on everything, of course, but that's not essential for friendship. It's not essential for marriage, so why should it be essential for friendship? Friends learn from and teach one another, ideally in equal measure. I'm still working on John's ethical naturalism. He's still trying to figure out why I like Ralph Nader.

John said kind words about me on his blog today. See here. I replied with this letter, which I will make public at the risk of embarrassing John:

3 March 2004, 5:33 P.M. John: Thanks for the kind words about me on your blog. I enjoy blogging very much, and you were instrumental in helping me get started. Congratulate Joe for me. He's going to have a hard time living up to his dad's high intellectual and personal standards, but I'll bet he does it! You have reason to be proud. Many kids, sadly, give their parents nothing to be proud of; and just as sadly, many parents don't deserve even the mediocre kids they get. Parenting is the most difficult task anyone ever performs, and also the most important. I don't think I'm up to it, if you want to know the truth. kbj

I hope you're reading John's blog every day, as I do. You'll be the better for it.

I used to think abortion was morally permissible. Now I think it's wrong. "What happened?" you ask. Did I have a religious conversion? Did someone near and dear to me have an abortion? Were certain facts about abortion, such as fetal pain, unknown to me? Have I gone mad?

None of the above. I was persuaded by an argument by Don Marquis, who teaches philosophy at The University of Kansas. That's right. It's possible to change one's mind about abortion in response to an argument. I doubt that it happens often, but it happens. The argument that changed my mind is Marquis's "Why Abortion Is Immoral," The Journal of Philosophy 86 (April 1989): 183-202, reprinted in The Problem of Abortion, 3d ed., ed. Susan Dwyer and Joel Feinberg (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1997), 24-39.

Marquis breaks the deadlock over the morality of abortion by avoiding the personhood question and asking what makes any killing wrong. All of us believe that killing is wrong, but why is it wrong? Once we get the correct account of the wrongness of killing, he says, we can apply it to the case of abortion. We will be following reason where it leads rather than rationalizing judgments made on other grounds. Marquis persuaded me that his account of the wrongness of killing is correct, and I agree with him that it entails that "abortion is, except possibly in rare cases, seriously immoral, that it is in the same moral category as killing an innocent adult human being" (183).

I lecture on Marquis's essay in my Ethics courses every spring. One of the questions my students ask (or that I raise if they don't) is whether Marquis's argument entails that abortions in rape cases (i.e., in cases in which a woman is impregnated during rape) are wrong. I saw (and see) no exception for such cases. But I wondered whether I was missing something, so today I asked Marquis. He gave me permission to reproduce our exchange. I begin with my letter to him:

3 March 2004, 1:05 P.M. Don: I've been meaning to ask you something. I recently lectured on your essay. Near the end of my lecture, I ask the students what could be put on the scale opposite the fetus's interest in its life to outweigh it. It seems that only the mother's life could weigh as much. But what about cases of rape or incest? I tell the students that you lack the resources to take that into account. A fetus conceived in a rape is not a rapist. It has a future like any other fetus. Some students are aghast at this. They consider it a reductio on your theory. They think that there have to be exceptions for rape, incest, and where the mother's life is at stake. What say you? If you don't mind, I'll share your response with them. kbj

Here is Marquis's reply:

Keith:

1. Start with incest. Where is the problem AT ALL unless the case is also a case of rape? (Consider the case of Fred, who is 35 conceiving a child with his sister Sally who is 30). It seems to me that abortion is clearly wrong in that case, for I cannot imagine any considerations that would override the right to life of a fetus.

2. that leaves us only with cases of rape. I have some comments.

a. I think that the Thomsonian view is wrong. But the argument of the essay is compatible with the view that the Thomsonian view is correct. I blithely assume that it is not in about the second paragraph of the essay.

b. Many people believe that Thomson's view works for rape and only for rape. (after all, the violinist is attached involuntarily) If they are correct, then one can hold my view and also hold that abortion is morally permissible in cases of rape and when the life of the mother is threatened, but only then.

c. I am unclear (as I stated in the essay) about what to say about the moral status of the thing that exists during the first 14 days after conception. If that thing lacks moral status, then anyone who is raped may (permissibly) go to the emergency room of the hospital and do the rape kit thing. So where is the problem?

I could say more, but I have to run to class.

Best, Don

Here is my rejoinder:

3 March 2004, 1:36 P.M. Don: Forget about Thomson. I didn't ask about her and I wasn't thinking about her when I wrote to you. I want to know what your argument/theory says about rape abortions. As for incest, most people use the term to mean sex between a father/older brother/uncle and an underage girl. It's not rape in the usual sense of forcible intercourse. That's why it's called "statutory rape". The girl is presumed by law to be incapable of consent, even if in fact she's capable. Most people think the girl should be able to abort, and that any theory that implies otherwise is to be rejected. What do you say? As for rape proper, forget about the first fourteen days. What about abortions after that? Wrong? You're evading the question, old man! (I say that endearingly.) kbj

And here is Marquis's reply to my rejoinder:

Keith:

What can I say? I offer some qualifications with respect to THAT argument in paragraphs 2 and 3. I believed at the time that the consensus among pro-choicers was that the Thomson view works with respect to cases of rape when the life of the women is threatened and not otherwise.

I think that 'rape' should be defined in terms of lack of morally valid consent. There are clear cases of rape that are not violent. Consider the guy who drugs the woman and has sex with her.

If you want MY view (and this view is not defended in the essay) I think that abortion after the first 14 days except to save the life of the mother is wrong.

Best, Don

If any of this sounds interesting, please acquire and read Marquis's essay. I think you'll enjoy and learn from it, and who knows? It may change your view!

To the Editor:

Re "How the Judges Forced the President's Hand," by Lisa Schiffren (Op-Ed, Feb. 29):

In the debate over gay marriage, I remain perplexed over how the institution of marriage would be degraded if gays could wed. How can increasing the number of stable families be bad for society?

On the flip side, it's easy to imagine that banning gay marriage could do harm to conventional marriages.

In the absence of gay marriage, civil union laws will spring up across the country. They will quickly expand to include heterosexual couples looking for a smaller first step toward commitment than full marriage, leading to an increase in families not united by marriage. A similar trend has been seen in some European countries.

Consequently, social conservatives should be the first in line to introduce legislation authorizing gay marriages!

MARK SOLOMON
Hamden, Conn., Feb. 29, 2004

Zeal, n. A certain nervous disorder afflicting the young and inexperienced. A passion that goeth before a sprawl.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

I hate to impose on you, dear reader, but are you visiting Peg Kaplan's blog every day, savoring her intelligence, wit, and good sense? See here. Steely Dan's song "Peg" (from Aja [1977]) was written about her.

Okay, that's a lie. But it could have been. Peg's old enough. Here are the lyrics:

I've seen your picture
Your name in lights above it
This is your big debut
It's like a dream come true
So once you smile for the camera
I know they're gonna love it
Peg

I got your pin shot
I keep it with your letter
Done up in blueprint blue
It sure looks good on you
And when you smile for the camera
I know I'll love you better

Peg
It will come back to you
Peg
It will come back to you
Then the shutter falls
You see it all in 3-D
It's your favorite foreign movie

Reading Dick Morris's column, together with this column about him (by Carol Devine-Molin), got me to thinking. I suspect that many Democrats are disappointed with the impending nomination of John Kerry. He is an intellectual dud with almost no charisma. He was chosen because he was not as bad as the other Democrat candidates, some of whom were (are) downright embarrassing. These Democrats would much rather have Hillary Clinton as their presidential candidate. As Morris points out, Hillary wants George W. Bush to be reelected this fall. Otherwise, there will be a Democrat incumbent in 2008 who will keep her from running. (She could run, of course, as Ted Kennedy did against Jimmy Carter in 1980; but she probably wouldn't.) That would make 2012 her best chance at becoming president. By that time, Morris notes, she will be sixty-five years old and twelve years removed from the White House. She will be old news as well as old. Eight years is a long time.

Suppose you're a Hillary lover. You have to decide whether you're willing to put up with the hated President Bush for four more years in order to get eight years of Hillary. It may be your only chance to get another Clinton presidency. What's four years, anyway? Didn't the previous four go fast? Many Democrats appear to love being on the outside. They can wail and moan, raise money by frightening the masses, and in general be irresponsible critics. It's fun being out of power. You can say and do almost anything. Would Paul Krugman have half as much fun writing a column for The New York Times if Al Gore were president right now? The very idea is laughable. President Bush gives him his raison d'être. Every morning, you can be sure, Krugman wakes up with a fervent desire to attack the president. The only question is whether the attack will be personal or political, and if political, on what issue.

I predict that some or many Democrats will sour on John Kerry before November and let him go down in flames, believing that it will hasten Hillary's arrival in the White House. I just hope that President Bush gets three or four Supreme Court appointments during his second term. A few forty-year olds on the Court, guided by Chief Justice Clarence Thomas, should rein it in for the next couple of generations.

I don't know about you, but I consider Dick Morris (who worked for Bill Clinton) a brilliant political analyst. When he talks, I listen. Texas Conservative just put up a link to this column by Morris. Take a look!

The fact that CP [Continental philosophy] is characteristically advanced in the form of books that are relatively accessible (if only in the sense that they have the room to explain their specialized terminology), while AP [analytic philosophy] is advanced in the form of journal articles that are generally comprehensible only to other specialists, is explained by the differences in the audiences to whom Continental and analytic philosophers typically address themselves. As normal scientists [in the Kuhnian sense], analytic philosophers address themselves to fellow specialists. But Continental philosophers commonly address themselves to the educated public at large. This is no doubt due, in important part, to the fact that philosophy is taught in high schools across Europe. An unexpected consequence of this expansion of the potential audience of philosophical texts is the relatively small part played in CP by detailed research upon esoteric questions, as opposed to more wide-ranging speculation. The analytic philosopher addresses specialists she knows will share her technical vocabulary and her sense of what problems she ought to be concerned with. The Continental philosopher addresses an educated layperson she knows will possess at least an outline knowledge of the history of Western thought.

(Neil Levy, "Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Explaining the Differences," Metaphilosophy 34 [April 2003]: 284-304, at 296)

Wow. Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative has just posted an excerpt (here) of a review (by Hugh Hewitt) of John Podhoretz's new book Bush Country. I must read this book. What I've read so far is spot-on. By the way, Peter Singer's much-touted book on President Bush is out: The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush. It'll be interesting to read the books back to back (or side by side). You can be sure that Singer has nothing but bad things to say about our intellectually benighted and morally regressive president.

If you live with (or for) a dog or a cat, you will enjoy this. Thanks to Jean Robart for the link.

The fact, that you do not remove the emotive force of a word by saying that you are removing [it], makes it possible to use the emotive force of a word while pretending not to. You declare that the word is not to be understood in what follows as having its usual emotive force; then you use the word; and it does have its usual emotive force. Thus Veblen in his Theory of the Leisure Class said the word "waste" was not to be taken as a term of disapproval in that book, and thus pretended not to be pouring scorn on the rich when he went on to say that their characteristic is conspicuous waste. Thus Churchill speculated whether the speaker "would admit the word 'lousy' as a parliamentary expression in referring to the Administration, provided, of course, it was not intended in a contemptuous sense, but purely as one of factual narration."

(Richard Robinson, "The Emotive Theory of Ethics," The Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume 22 [1948]: 79-106, at 90-1)

I got this from Andrew Sullivan's blog. It's the best thing I've read (so far) on Mel Gibson's The Passion of the Christ.

Bush-hatred is pandemic. Perhaps he is hated because he's smart and because he kicks liberal ass. See here. (Thanks to Dr John J. Ray for the link.)

You asked your faithful blog readers [here]: Are you persuaded? Why or why not? His argument does not convince me. It does not convince me (as a relatively wealthy US citizen) to act individually in the way he describes, and does not strike me as a realistic proposal to solve any of the many problems facing the world.

If I understand it, a brief restatement of his position is that US citizens should contribute their income in excess of $30K per year to international relief organizations. But, he would be happy if a somewhat lesser level of giving were attained.

Uhmm, this is so silly I do not know where to begin. Three aspects of his argument:

1) I assume the $30K figure is per household. Let's try this for one year. This would mean the US, would allocate its $10 Trillion economy as follows: $3T for $100 million households to live on, $4T in federal, state and local taxes, and $3T in international relief. At $200 per life saved, that would mean we could save 15 Billion lives. Wow. A good year for famine relief. Of course, the economy of the US and the world would tank, and the next year would be bad news indeed. This argument I find unconvincing.

2) Singer states without proof that contributing to UNICEF and OXFAM will have positive outcomes to the tune of one saved life per $200 contributed. Both of these organizations actively discourage technologies which save lives (e.g. DDT for UNICEF, and GMOs for OXFAM), which I believe has had a net negative effect in, say, Africa. Both continue to prop up socialist, anti-capitalist regimes which impoverish and starve their own people, which I also believe has had a net negative effect, because I believe that almost all modern famine has political origins. So, for all I know, contributing $200 to them will, on average, destroy one life. He offers no proof, and so I find the statement that giving my visa card number to OXFAM or UNICEF is a moral act unconvincing.

3) Part of his argument is that people in the US are not giving their "fair share". He cites some figures to support this. Ignoring statistics on private contributions as Singer does is a questionable omission in a thesis which is targeted at influencing private contributions. From 5 minutes in Google, we see that people in the US gave 0.09% of GDP to foreign relief organizations disbursed from tax revenues, 0.3% of GDP to international charities via private contributions, and 1.8% of GDP to domestic charities via private contributions. The comparable figures in Japan, which Singer cites, were 0.22%, 0.1%, and 0.1%. US citizens have been giving more and more, in dollar terms and percentage of GDP, for many years (except during recessions). So this portion of his argument intended to motive US citizens on a differential basis is unconvincing.

As the three aspects of his argument mentioned above are unconvincing to me, I reject his argument.

Ben

My academic department (Philosophy and Humanities) has just created an award, named after my beloved teacher, Joel Feinberg. See here. Thank you, Joel. For everything. If anyone would like to enhance the amount of the award, let me know. It's tax deductible. I recall how important it was to me, as a struggling student, to receive monetary awards. To this day, I am grateful to those who helped me: James Renfrew, who endowed The Renfrew Prize in Legal History (which I won twice); the Colonial Dames of America, which endowed the Graduate Student History Scholarship; and the Institute for Humane Studies, which funded the Leonard P. Cassidy Summer Research Fellowship in Law and Philosophy.

The following letter appears in today's New York Times:

To the Editor:

The writer of a Feb. 25 letter asks a very good question regarding the four big-city mayors who want to be able to sue gun makers: "Since cars also kill people, why don't they sue car makers?"

The answer is that cars are machines that are expressly designed by manufacturers to transport people safely from one place to another. When they occasionally kill someone, it is by accident.

By contrast, guns are machines that are designed by manufacturers expressly for the purpose of killing people.

When someone uses a gun to kill someone else, the gun has done exactly what it is designed to do.

MICHAEL GORDON
Pleasantville, N.Y.
Feb. 26, 2004

Gordon makes two mistakes. First, he assumes that an object like a gun can have only one purpose. Guns, like automobiles, have many purposes. Like fire and liberty, they can be put to good or bad uses. Let's commend the good uses and condemn the bad. Remember: Guns don't kill people; people kill people. Second, some killings of people are justified. If I use my gun to kill an assailant, I act rightly, not wrongly. How many killings are prevented by private gun ownership? If gun manufacturers are to be blamed for murders committed with their products, aren't they to be praised for the many lives saved by private gun ownership?

To the Editor:

Re "For Kerry, Bonds Forged With Wartime Crews Hold Strong in Presidential Campaign" (news article, Feb. 24):

Douglas Brinkley, the historian, who wrote a biography of John Kerry, is quoted as saying, "They never had their parade, these Vietnam veterans," repeating the idea that Vietnam vets feel deprived because we didn't get a parade like those seen in film clips of the returning soldiers of World War II. The remark seems to come mainly from those writing about Vietnam vets, as I've never heard another vet even mention it.

While waiting for our tours to be up, we religiously counted the days, thinking only of being home again, not of when "the parade" would be. We know that the dead could never parade, yet we are depicted as whining about not getting our moment.

I had a safe assignment over there, but in thinking of the guys who slogged through the boonies on patrol day after endless day, I often wonder how the repeaters of our supposed petty wish can imagine that a 10-minute parade and a speech by the mayor could have made amends for a year of waiting for that terrifying moment when you might never be able to walk again.

THOMAS O'CONNELL
Brooklyn, Feb. 24, 2004

When I came home from school this afternoon, I found the living room strewn with tufts of cotton. Shelbie, my eleven-month old puppy, had dragged a pillow from the bedroom, removed its case, and proceeded to disembowel it. When I confronted her, I expected her to deny having done it, which would have implicated Sophie. Nope. "It was an accident," she said.

Christian, n. One who believes that the New Testament is a divinely inspired book admirably suited to the spiritual needs of his neighbor. One who follows the teachings of Christ in so far as they are not inconsistent with a life of sin.

I dreamed I stood upon a hill, and, lo!
The godly multitudes walked to and fro
Beneath, in Sabbath garments fitly clad,
With pious mien, appropriately sad,
While all the church bells made a solemn din—
A fire-alarm to those who lived in sin.
Then saw I gazing thoughtfully below,
With tranquil face, upon that holy show
A tall, spare figure in a robe of white,
Whose eyes diffused a melancholy light.
"God keep you, stranger," I exclaimed. "You are
No doubt (your habit shows it) from afar;
And yet I entertain the hope that you,
Like these good people, are a Christian too."
He raised his eyes and with a look so stern
It made me with a thousand blushes burn
Replied—his manner with disdain was spiced:
"What! I a Christian? No, indeed! I'm Christ."
G. J.

(Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911)

Here is a perfect example of liberal bigotry. (A bigot, by definition, is "an obstinate and intolerant believer in a religion, political theory, etc."). If you reject the liberals' dream of expansive government, with cradle-to-grave protection from all of life's contingencies, regardless of fault, the whole thing being funded by oppressive, incentive-destroying taxation, you're "partisan." Ask yourself which is more likely: Alan Greenspan's being partisan or Paul Krugman's being wrong in calling him partisan.

Addendum: After I posted this, I visited Donald Luskin's site. Go here. Watch Luskin take Krugman apart. Warning: It's not pretty. Krugman is the most intellectually dishonest person I've ever known. I'm dead serious. That he has a national forum in which to spew his venomous hatred is a travesty.

One of my friends, Chinese Monkey Dancer (an alias, obviously), sent a letter to Anheuser-Busch criticizing the company's use of Ludacris as a spokesperson. Here is the letter he received:

Dear [X], Thank you for contacting Anheuser-Busch. We appreciate hearing from the public, even when it comes in the form of criticism. Bud Light appeals to a wide, diverse group of consumers 21 and older, and we reach them in many different ways. Many adults who enjoy Bud Light are fans of Ludacris, who has a broad-based, multicultural following. We are working with him as a way to extend brand awareness with this audience. In his primary role with the brand this year, Ludacris will appear at several private parties at bars and clubs, and only adults will be invited to these events. Again, [X], thank you for contacting Anheuser-Busch. Please contact us back if you have additional questions or comments. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. 1-800-DIAL-BUD (1-800-342-5283) www.budweisertours.com

Here is my friend's reply:

I see. You are trying to "extend brand awareness" by using Ludacris. Hmmmmm. Well . . . since "broad-based multiculture" is what you say you are shooting for, I guess there will be some other target audiences. Since Ludacris advocates criminal acts blatantly like murder, rape, torture, arson, rape, and sodomy, I see you have one solid market group handled. But are you not forgetting the Nazis, KKK, sadomasochists, pedophiles, etc.? You could show a bunch of skinheads with Nazi tattoos whipping some naked blacks with chains and whips. You could also show the Charles Manson gang reenacting torturing . . . say . . . some small kids! Hey, I think you guys have it all covered! Maybe I can suggest some other target markets: homicidal maniacs, psychotic killers, etc. Consider showing some freaked-out street types with a Bud in one hand and a machete in the other chopping up a bunch of screaming old ladies in church! Wow! What class! But let's not forget those who love to torture small animals. They can be shown drinking Buds while burning cute little puppies and kittens! That would be a marketing coup. You have already established with your reply that morals and public sensitivities are irrelevant, it's just the market impact and profits that count. Sooo . . . I am really looking forward to your inclusion of all of these market-area commercials and parties that you will be penetrating. Be sure to take some good pictures. You can throw copies off the back of the horse-drawn wagon for the kids to see as it goes down streets in parades, etc. I'm sure you could also find a market for some tapes in schools and churches. Since you have demonstrated that nothing is offensive, I know you could not possibly be "offended" by any of the above. Well, as your "star" Ludacris says: "Slash 'em and slap 'em and make 'em beg for their momma. Cause we won't stop the stompin' and kickin' cause they's just 'hos'". Kind of makes you get all choked up, doesn't it . . . sniff. [X]

Good work, Chinese Monkey Dancer! I might have said it differently, but I couldn't have said it better. It's all about money.

Steve Headley over at Texas Conservative is becoming quite the blogger. I like his blog very much. (It's one of a handful I read every day.) Check out Steve's posts for yesterday and today. They're interesting, incisive, topical, and well-written. Steve, like John Ray and me, has no patience for liberal claptrap. By the way, Steve still uses "democratic" as his adjective. I'll have to talk to that boy. It's the Democrat party, not the Democratic party. See here.

I have no idea how many people have been persuaded by Peter Singer's famine-relief argument. It's probably more than zero but less than is often claimed. What interests me is how many of the people who reject his argument are Christians. From what I can tell, Jesus (the original Christ-ian) required at least as much of individuals (morally speaking) as Singer does. I've compiled some Biblical passages that say harsh things about the wealthy. See here. Just imagine how different—and how much better—our world would be if Christians practiced what they preach! Don't respond that I'm an atheist. That's irrelevant. If you're a Christian in anything but name, you should strive conscientiously to live up to your Christian principles. I want my Christian friends to be the best Christians they can be. Isn't that what friendship requires?

This is the week I lecture on famine relief. My Ethics students and I discuss this essay by Peter Singer. Please read it. Are you persuaded? Why or why not?

Certainly, many will view [Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)] as social progress. (Surely that is the Court's view, and indeed the legislatures had been moving perceptibly, albeit too slowly for many of us, toward relaxing their anti-abortion legislation.) And it is difficult to see how it will weaken the Court's position. Fears of official disobedience are obviously groundless when it is a criminal statute that has been invalidated. To the public the Roe decision must look very much like the New York Legislature's recent liberalization of its abortion law. Even in the unlikely event someone should catch the public's ear long enough to charge that the wrong institution did the repealing, they have heard that "legalism" before without taking to the streets. Nor are the political branches, and this of course is what really counts, likely to take up the cry very strenuously: The sighs of relief as this particular albatross was cut from the legislative and executive necks seemed to me audible. Perhaps I heard wrong—I live in the Northeast, indeed not so very far from Hyannis Port. It is even possible that a constitutional amendment will emerge, though that too has happened before without serious impairment of the Position of the Institution. But I doubt one will: Roe v. Wade seems like a durable decision.

It is, nevertheless, a very bad decision. Not because it will perceptibly weaken the Court—it won't; and not because it conflicts with either my idea of progress or what the evidence suggests is society's—it doesn't. It is bad because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.

(John Hart Ely, "The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade," The Yale Law Journal 82 [April 1973]: 920-49, at 946-7 [italics in original; footnotes omitted])

This essay by Jonathan Chait is hilarious. He says near the end that Ralph Nader's presidential candidacy is "destructive to liberalism." Nothing could be further from the truth. Nader is trying to save liberalism from corporate interests and soft-headed, collaborating pragmatists. What Chait and other Bush-haters don't grasp is that there are principles at stake. Liberal principles. All they care about is power: getting it, using it, holding on to it. Expediency. I predicted that the attacks on Nader would intensify as the weeks and months progress. The barrage will only fuel his campaign and draw more voters to him. Nobody likes a bully. How did liberalism become identified with the Democrat party, anyway? That's the predominant fallacy in Chait's piece. He conflates a principled political philosophy with a be-all-things-to-all-people political party. Nader, who is smarter than Chait by at least half, knows the difference.

Incidentally, Chait and several other Great Historians say that Nader is destroying his legacy. Let's leave that to the historians, okay? A hundred years from now, people will know who Ralph Nader was and what he—one indefatigable individual—accomplished. Nobody will know a thing about Jonathan Chait, Eric Alterman, Robert Scheer, or the other Bush-haters currently attacking him. Go, Ralph, Go!

To the Editor:

"I Will Be the Candidate in Blue, Third From the Left . . . ," by Gail Collins (Editorial Observer, Feb. 25), took me a bit by surprise.

I am a middle-aged, upper-middle-class, white working woman who would probably be classified as a liberal. And I plan to vote for Al Sharpton in Tuesday's primary.

Mr. Sharpton is the only one to champion the issues most dear to the worst victims of George W. Bush's administration and its right-wing agenda.

As much as I like John Kerry and John Edwards, and will probably find myself voting for one of them come November, how many people in their communities, whom they know personally, live below the poverty line, can't afford groceries, let alone health insurance or medical care, can't get a decent job, apartment or education for their kids, and won't ever make enough money to invest in their own retirement fund?

We need Al Sharpton to keep reminding us of the real issues (especially since Howard Dean dropped out).

LISA FELDMAN
Crugers, N.Y., Feb. 26, 2004